Seaworthiness Starts with the Crew

The Admiralty Court’s recent decision in The Happy Aras [2026] EWHC 7 (Admlty) is a clear reminder to shipowners and operators that a competent crew is an integral component of a vessel’s seaworthiness. Lack of skill, training or instruction may lead to casualties, with liability falling on the shipowner.

The “Happy Aras” (the Vessel) grounded while she was transiting the Datca Peninsula, off the Turkish coast, laden with soya beans.

In the hours leading up to the grounding, the Vessel’s Master took over as officer of the watch, following which he took a series of erroneous steps: he sent the lookout officer away from the bridge to prepare tea; he made an unplanned change of direction contradicting the Passage Plan, to reduce steaming time; he failed to fix the Vessel’s position at the intervals required by the Passage Plan; he failed to alter the Vessel’s heading at the right time and location in accordance with the Passage Plan; and he failed to keep proper (or any) lookout to see the land mass of the Datca Peninsula, either physically or on the radar.

After the grounding, the Master made retrospective entries into the deck logbook.

The owners of the Vessel (the Owners) declared general average (GA) for the costs of salvage, lightering and transhipment operations that followed. Once the GA adjustment was completed, they brought a claim for contribution against the cargo interests’ insurers.

The cargo insurers refused to pay the cargo’s GA contribution, relying on Rule D of the applicable York Antwerp Rules. They argued that the grounding was caused by the Owners’ failure to exercise due diligence to make the Vessel seaworthy (as required by the Hague Rules incorporated into the contract of carriage):

Article III Rule 1 of the Hague Rules requires the owners to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy. Under the Rules, the party seeking to place responsibility for loss or damage on the owners has the burden of proving the ship’s unseaworthiness. Once unseaworthiness is established, owners will be responsible for loss or damage caused by that unseaworthiness, unless they can prove that they had exercised due diligence to make the ship seaworthy before and at the beginning of the voyage.

The established test of unseaworthiness is whether a prudent owner, knowing the defects affecting the vessel’s seaworthiness, would have required them to be made good before sending the ship to sea.

Based on expert evidence, the court found that the Passage Plan was defective. However, regardless of the defect, it found that if the Vessel had followed the Passage Plan, she would have avoided the grounding.

On this basis, despite accepting that the Vessel was unseaworthy due to its defective Passage Plan, the court found that that defect did not cause the grounding. The cargo insurers could therefore not rely on the defective Passage Plan to place responsibility for the grounding on the Owners.

Was the Vessel unseaworthy?

The main focus of the court’s decision was therefore on whether the Master was incompetent to the extent that a prudent owner would not have sent the Vessel to the sea under the command of that Master.

The court set out the principles that were relevant to determine the Master’s incompetence:

1. There is a distinction between actions which are merely negligent and those that evidence incompetence. A Master taking one, or even a series, of negligent actions is not by that very fact an incompetent Master. In turn, a Master committing a one-off negligent action (in navigation or otherwise) does not render a vessel poorly manned and unseaworthy.
2. The question of competence was one of fact. Factors which would support a factual finding of the Master’s incompetence were the Master’s lack of skill, ability or training, physical or mental incapacity, or even unwillingness to perform his duties.
3. Competence included both general and specific competence. A generally competent and qualified Master may be an incompetent Master in the specific circumstances of a voyage or vessel, if he lacks relevant training, knowledge, experience or necessary instructions and supervision.

Having regard to those principles, the court found that the Master’s sequence of systemic failures leading up to the grounding was clear evidence of incompetence. In addition, it criticised the Master’s failure to properly update the deck logbook, and his attempt to retrospectively cure his omissions.

The court therefore held that the Vessel was unseaworthy, being poorly manned with an incompetent Master, and that such unseaworthiness caused the incident.

Did Owners exercise due diligence to make the Vessel seaworthy?

The Owners argued that they had exercised due diligence to ensure the Master’s competence. They procured documentary evidence that the Master was properly qualified, experienced in vessels of similar tonnage and personnel, had worked with the owners for three years before the incident, and was well recommended. In short, that there was no reason for Owners to doubt his competence.

The court found Owners’ evidence insufficient. It highlighted that the Owners cannot merely rely on documentary evidence of qualifications and experience to establish the crew’s competence. Owners are required to adopt several forms of supervision to ensure the crew’s competence, such as regular or random checks by marine superintendents and inspections of chart rooms and their contents, at regular or irregular intervals.

On this basis, the court found that there was insufficient evidence that the Owners exercised due diligence to properly man the Vessel and found that Owners were responsible for the incident, for having provided an unseaworthy ship.

The decision is relevant to all operational matters falling within the duties of the Master or crew: the navigation of the vessel; the acceptance of cargo for carriage; the safety of passage; and cargo operations. Owners and managers should not just rely on CVs, but should consider and take constant steps to ensure that the Master and crew have knowledge, training, appropriate instructions, experience and understanding of the intricacies of commanding the particular ship, performing the particular voyage, and carrying the specific cargo.

As is highlighted by this case, owners may be exposed to liabilities, especially where they perform unusual or dangerous voyages or carriages, unless they can demonstrate that the Master and crew have received sufficient guidance and training on or have experience with the specific cargo or carriage in advance. On the other hand, owners of bulkers or general purpose vessels operating on a spot basis may view this as unrealistic, given they are not always in control of the cargoes nominated by charterers.

Operationally, it is recommended that owners and managers keep an accurate log of the actual training undertaken by the Master and crew and the vessel inspections, as well as regularly assess and appraise the officers’ and crew’s performance, to minimise the risk of allegations of incompetence. Inspections should ensure that the crew are completing various logs and documents on board accurately and on time, to reflect actions they have actually taken, and not merely completing documents on “autopilot”, whether or not a task has been performed.