How final is final when Congress steps in?

A recent Ninth Circuit labor trafficking case appeared to be over several times. But a rare combination of intervening legislation, en banc review, and an unusual willingness to review a post-judgment motion gave the case a second life. The result—Ratha v. Rubicon Resources, LLC, 168 F.4th 541 (9th Cir. 2026) (en banc)—offers important lessons for appellate practitioners.

The long road to the en banc court

The plaintiffs, Cambodian villagers, sued a California importer under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, alleging they had been forced to work at a seafood factory in Thailand. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant Rubicon, holding in part that the Act did not impose civil liability for mere attempts to benefit from forced labor.

A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed. Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., 35 F.4th 1159 (9th Cir. 2022). The court denied rehearing en banc and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Then Congress intervened, amending the Act to specify that civil liability does extend to defendants who attempt to benefit from trafficking.

The plaintiffs returned to the district court and moved for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), arguing the amendment applied retroactively. The district court denied relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in an opinion by the late Judge Ikuta. Ratha v. Rubicon Resources, LLC, 111 F.4th 946 (9th Cir. 2024). Judge Graber dissented, opining that the amendment was retroactive because it simply clarified what the Act meant all along.

The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc.

Cleaning up retroactivity doctrine

The central doctrinal issue was the application of Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). Under Landgraf, courts generally follow three steps for determining whether federal civil legislation is retroactive:

  1. If Congress expressly prescribes a statute’s retroactive effective date, that controls.
  2. If not, courts ask whether applying the statute would have a “retroactive effect”—for example, by increasing a party’s liability for past conduct. If so, a presumption against retroactivity applies.
  3. The presumption may be overcome by “clear evidence” that Congress intended retroactive application.

In the Ninth Circuit, however, some cases had treated “clarifying” amendments differently. Under those cases, if Congress was clarifying existing law, Landgraf’s framework—and the presumption against retroactivity—did not apply. Further, some Ninth Circuit cases had blended the last two steps.

In an opinion by Judge Graber, the en banc court tidied up the doctrine. First, it held that Landgraf governs the retroactivity of all civil statutes, without exception for amendments that are “clarifying”—no categorical carveout. Second, it held that courts must always conduct the full three-step inquiry.

The court was atypically precise in explaining to what extent it was overruling prior cases:

“only insofar as they bypass a consideration of congressional intent or establish a contrary presumption regarding retroactivity.” Those cases, the court said, can still be relied on for their analysis of congressional intent—the court relied on those same cases later in its opinion. In a dissent joined in various parts by four other members of the court, Judge Callahan memorably called that move “building a new house with rotten wood.”

When the presumption against retroactivity fails under Landgraf

The court held that the amendment applied retroactively. The amendment contained no explicit retroactive effective date and would increase Rubicon’s liability for past conduct, triggering the presumption against retroactivity. At step three, the court held that the presumption was overcome by four factors viewed together that showed Congress intended retroactivity:

  • “Technical and clarifying” language. Congress labeled the amendment “technical and clarifying.”While the label no longer short-circuits Landgraf, it carries “great weight” as evidence of intent.
  • Statutory ambiguity. The pre-amendment text was susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations. The court conducted a substantial statutory analysis and concluded the amendment resolved ambiguity rather than changing settled law.
  • A circuit split. The Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision conflicted with the First and Fourth Circuits, and Congress acted after that split emerged. The majority considered that timing relevant evidence, though the dissent disputed whether a genuine split existed.
  • Congressional timing and minimal debate. Congress acted within months of the Ninth Circuit’s decision and shortly after the Supreme Court denied certiorari.The relative speed and lack of substantive debate suggested it was a clarification to correct the court’s interpretation rather than policy innovation.

The court emphasized that there is no rigid checklist of factors for determining intent. Rather than isolate each factor, courts must consider “all available evidence together.”

Reversing a post-judgment motion

The procedural posture also makes the opinion in this case notable. Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) motions is reserved for “extraordinary” circumstances. Appellate courts review denials for abuse of discretion and typically do not reach the merits of the underlying judgment.

The en banc court reversed, concluding the district court abused its discretion. Why? The key was that the Ninth Circuit reached the merits of the district court’s underlying summary judgment order. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that those summary judgment merits were properly reviewed on appeal because the district court’s Rule 60(b) order had “incorporated” the summary judgment reasoning by relying on it. The dissent called this a “novel rule,” criticizing the majority for hauling the summary judgment order into the appeal on the back of a Rule 60(b) order.

The takeaways:

  • Finality may not be absolute. Even after affirmance and certiorari denial, and even in a post-judgment posture, intervening legislation may revitalize a case.
  • Retroactivity doctrine is clarified. In the Ninth Circuit, “clarifying” amendments no longer create an exception to Landgraf or to the presumption of retroactivity.
  • Precedent can be narrowed without being discarded. Ratha demonstrates how a court can overrule doctrinal holdings while retaining useful reasoning.
  • Rule 60(b) reasoning matters. When a district court incorporates and relies on merits reasoning in a Rule 60(b) order, that choice can expand the scope of appellate review.