Advocate General Spielmann’s opinion of 18 December 2025
Disciplinary sanctions are a core element of sports governance. They enable federations to enforce their rules, protect the integrity of competitions and maintain trust in sport. Yet such sanctions may have significant professional, financial and reputational consequences, particularly where they involve bans from sporting or related professional activities.
It is against this background that Advocate General (AG) Spielmann delivered his Opinion to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on 18 December 2025 in Joined Cases C-424/24 and C-425/24, addressing the extent to which EU law requires judicial oversight of sporting sanctions.
While an AG’s Opinion is not binding, it is often influential. This Opinion sits squarely within the CJEU’s recent line of cases subjecting “sports autonomy” to EU constitutional principles, including the Seraing judgment discussed in our previous insight.
I. Factual background
The case originates from disciplinary proceedings conducted against senior officials of Juventus FC after the Italian Football Federation (FIGC) found that they had taken part in a system of artificial capital gains designed to inflate the club’s profits and assets beyond their real economic value.
Following those proceedings, both individuals were banned from any professional football activities for 24 months.
The individuals challenged those sanctions before the Italian courts. However, under Italian law governing sporting disputes, only the sports justice bodies may annul or suspend disciplinary sanctions, while ordinary courts are limited to awarding damages for unlawful sanctions and cannot set the sanction aside or grant interim relief.
The referring court therefore asked whether this limitation of judicial powers is compatible with EU law, in particular the right to effective judicial protection.
II. Legitimacy of sporting sanctions
AG Spielmann first notes that bans from professional sporting activity may constitute a barrier to free movement and access to economic activity within the EU, as they can prevent individuals from exercising their profession across Member States. Such measures are therefore compatible with EU law only if they pursue a legitimate public-interest objective and comply with the principle of proportionality.
In that regard, AG Spielmann acknowledges that sporting sanctions, including bans from professional activity, may serve legitimate public-interest objectives, such as safeguarding fair and honest competition.
However, he stresses that such sanctions are compatible with EU law only if they are adopted within a framework of transparent, objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria, assessed considering the specific circumstances of each case.
III. Effective judicial review
The core of the Opinion concerns the scope of judicial review required by EU law.
AG Spielmann considers that, at least where a sporting sanction involves a breach of EU public policy (including fundamental rights, free movement or competition rules), national courts cannot be deprived of the power to annul unlawful sporting sanctions or to grant interim relief where necessary to ensure effective judicial protection.
IV. Annulment of sporting sanctions and the stability of competitions
Italy argued that the specific context of the Juventus disciplinary sanctions justified restricting judicial review to damages. Because the bans on former officials were closely linked to sporting sanctions affecting the club’s league position (including points deductions), judicial intervention during the season could, in its view, undermine certainty as to final standings and European qualification, and disrupt the orderly conduct of Serie A. Relying on the CJEU’s Cairo Network judgment, Italy claimed that restricting remedies was justified by an overriding public interest in preserving the stability of competitions once decisions are implemented.
AG Spielmann rejected that reasoning. Unlike in Cairo Network, annulling or suspending the contested sanctions would not undermine any overriding EU objective.
Put differently, the stability of competitions cannot be secured at the expense of effective and timely judicial protection where EU public policy is engaged.
V. Sports justice bodies as a potential source of effective judicial protection
AG Spielmann adds that, in principle, the requirement of effective judicial protection may be satisfied within the sports system itself, but only if the body reviewing the sanction qualifies as a “court or tribunal” within the meaning of EU law.
This requires, in particular, independence and impartiality. Where sports justice bodies are structurally or institutionally linked to federations whose decisions they review, this may cast doubt on whether they meet EU standards.
In the case at hand, AG Spielmann considers that there would be no breach of EU law if the relevant sports justice bodies meet those criteria, since they have the power to annul disciplinary sanctions and grant effective relief.
However, he expresses serious doubts that the Italian sports justice bodies involved meet those requirements. He points in particular to their institutional and functional links with the Italian football federation and CONI (the very entities whose decisions they review) as well as to the composition and appointment of their members within the sporting governance structure. In his view, these structural features may call into question whether those bodies can be regarded as sufficiently independent “courts or tribunals” for the purposes of EU law.
Key take-aways
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