INTRODUCTION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran (2025 INSC 804) has delivered a landmark judgment which has reshaped the appellate framework in under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”). The central issue was whether a complainant in a prosecution under Section 138 NI Act qualifies as a “victim” under Section 2(wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) [Section 2(1)(y) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”)], thereby entitling them to prefer an appeal against acquittal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC [Section 413 BNSS] without seeking special leave under Section 378 CrPC [Section 419 BNSS].

BACKGROUND & JUDICIAL CONTEXT

  • Earlier, in Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka [(2019) 2 SCC 752], a similar issue was debated. While Justice Madan B. Lokur recognized the right of the victim to file an appeal under Section 372 [Section 413 BNSS] without leave, Justice Deepak Gupta emphasized the necessity of leave under Section 378(4) [Section 419 BNSS].
  • This conflicting view created uncertainty, particularly in cases under Section 138 NI Act where the complainant is both the prosecuting party and the victim.

Findings of the Supreme Court

In Celestium Financial, the Hon’ble Court sided with Justice Lokur’s view in Mallikarjun Kodagali and held:

  1. Unconditional Right to Appeal – A victim of crime must have an absolute right to appeal against the acquittal order, free from any condition precedent.
  2. Parity with the Accused – Just as a convicted accused enjoys an unqualified right of appeal under Section 374 CrPC [Section 415 BNSS], the victim too must have a similar unqualified right.
  3. Legislative Intent – The proviso to Section 372 [Section 413 BNSS] confers this right without requiring procedural hurdles. Notably, Parliament did not amend Section 378 [Section 419 BNSS] to curtail this right.
  4. Distinct Framework – The right under Section 372 [Section 413 BNSS] is independent and cannot be circumscribed by the limitations applicable to appeals by the State or complainant under Section 378 [Section 419 BNSS].

DELHI HIGH COURT’S FOLLOW-UP

In Vijender Singh v. Mahender Pal @ Bindu (2025:DHC:6295), the Delhi High Court, relying on Celestium Financial, clarified that whether an acquittal arises from a complaint case or a chargesheet, the victim has the right to appeal under Section 372 CrPC [Section 413 BNSS]. Consequently, the High Court converted a leave-to-appeal petition filed under Section 378(4) [Section 419 BNSS] into an appeal under Section 372 [Section 413 BNSS] and transferred it to the Sessions Court.

LEGAL POSITION AFTER CELESTIUM JUDGMENT

Appeals against acquittals in Section 138 NI Act cases now lie as of right under Section 372 CrPC [Section 413 BNSS] before the Sessions Court. This aligns the framework with appeals against conviction under Section 374 CrPC [Section 415 BNSS].

ANHAD LAW’S PERSPECTIVE

While the judgment undeniably strengthens the rights of victims/complainants, certain concerns arise:

  1. Textual Limitation of Section 372 [Section 413 BNSS] – The proviso to Section 372 CrPC [Section 413 BNSS] merely confers a substantive right on the victim to file an appeal against acquittal, conviction for lesser offence, or inadequate compensation. However, this right cannot be read in isolation. The main body of Section 372 [Section 413 BNSS] begins with a negative assertion which makes it clear that the right to appeal is subject to the procedural framework laid down in subsequent provisions of the CrPC, including Section 378 [Section 419 BNSS].
  2. Safeguard of Leave Requirement – The leave mechanism under Section 378(4) [Section 419 BNSS] is not a formality but a substantive safeguard. It prevents frivolous or repeated appeals and protects the presumption of innocence after acquittal.
  3. Anomalous Dual Procedure – Post-Celestium, if the State files an appeal against acquittal, it must do so under Section 378 [Section 419 BNSS] with leave of the High Court, whereas the victim can file directly under Section 372 [Section 413 BNSS] before the Sessions Court without leave. This creates procedural inconsistency and arguably places the complainant above the State itself.
  4. Imbalance in NI Act Regime – Under Section 148 NI Act, a convicted accused must deposit 20% of compensation before appeal. Yet, after Celestium, a victim appealing acquittal faces no such precondition. This asymmetry may tilt the balance unfairly against the accused.
  5. Legislative Wisdom Overlooked – Parliament, despite amending Section 372 in 2008 [Section 413 BNSS], did not modify Section 378 [Section 419 BNSS]. This suggests a deliberate intent to retain the leave requirement for appeals against acquittals in complaint cases. Judicial expansion of Section 372 [Section 413 BNSS] risks undermining this legislative design.
  6. Harmonious Interpretation: Section 372 (Proviso) [Section 413 BNSS] be treated as the source of the substantive right of appeal for victims. Section 378 [Section 419 BNSS] continues to regulate the procedure and conditions of such appeals, including the requirement of obtaining leave before challenging an acquittal. This would ensure that the victim’s right is preserved while maintaining the safeguard against frivolous or vexatious appeals, thereby protecting the presumption of innocence of an acquitted accused.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Celestium Financial has undoubtedly advanced victim-centric justice by empowering complainants under Section 138 NI Act to challenge acquittals more effectively. However, this development also risks floodgates of appeals, weakening the presumption of innocence, and creating procedural anomalies between the State and private complainants. A balanced approach such as that suggested by Justice Deepak Gupta in Mallikarjun Kodagali might better reconcile victims’ rights with the safeguards owed to the acquitted accused.