On March 10, 2026, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released its first Department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Disclosure Policy (the “Policy”), aimed at ensuring uniform declination practices in all corporate criminal matters.[1] The Policy provides a mitigation framework for qualifying companies that self-report individual misconduct and circumstances under which such companies should expect either a declination or a non-prosecution agreement (“NPA”). The Policy supersedes all existing non-antitrust-related DOJ component guidance,[2] including the more lenient policy announced by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”) in late February.[3]
The Policy follows Deputy Attorney General (“DAG”) Todd Blanche’s December announcement that the DOJ would be issuing a Department-wide corporate self-disclosure policy. As the DAG previewed, the Policy seeks to promote consistency across all DOJ components, incentivize good corporate conduct through prompt self-disclosure and cooperation, and ensure individual accountability. The Policy’s emphasis on individual accountability reflects the Trump administration’s stated enforcement priority “to prosecute individual criminals . . . who commit these crimes, often at the expense of shareholders, workers, and American investors and consumers.”[4] The Policy is the latest iteration of the DOJ’s longstanding effort to encourage corporate self-disclosure and further refines and clarifies programs and incentive structures that were deployed during the Biden administration.
Declination Under the Policy
The Policy’s declination provisions are available absent aggravating circumstances relating to the “nature and seriousness of the offense,” “egregiousness or pervasiveness of the misconduct within the company,” “severity of harm caused by the misconduct,” or “corporate recidivism.”[5] When there are no aggravating circumstances, companies can expect a declination when they satisfy three conditions: they (1) voluntarily self-disclose the misconduct to an appropriate DOJ criminal component; [6] (2) fully cooperate with the DOJ’s investigation; and (3) timely and appropriately remediate the misconduct.
The inclusion of the “seriousness” and “pervasiveness” of corporate misconduct as aggravating factors contrasts with the now-superseded SDNY policy, which had explicitly carved out those factors as non-disqualifying for declination consideration. The contours of such open-ended factors, moreover, will continue to be fleshed out through concrete application. By aligning policies across the DOJ and allowing a report to any “appropriate component for investigation,”[7] the Policy seeks to avoid forum-shopping based on strategic considerations unrelated to the public interest.
Non-Prosecution Agreements Under the Policy
The Policy also provides a path to an NPA for companies ineligible for a declination. If an otherwise-qualifying company’s disclosure postdates the DOJ’s awareness of the misconduct or aggravating factors preclude a declination, a fully cooperative company that timely and appropriately remediated the reported misconduct can expect to enter into an NPA. An NPA under the Policy will require a compliance term of less than three years, no compliance monitor, and a reduction of 50% to 75% off the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fine range. Notably, the available fine reduction under the Policy introduces more prosecutorial discretion and is smaller than the flat, 75% reduction provided by the now-superseded Criminal Division policy from last year.[8]
Self-reporting companies that satisfy some but not all of the requirements for a declination or NPA under the Policy can still find relief under the Policy, as “prosecutors maintain discretion to determine the appropriate resolution including form, term length, compliance obligations, and monetary penalty.”[9]
Will Consistent Policy Yield Consistent Approaches?
The Policy is the latest in a series of DOJ efforts to incentivize individuals and entities to report misconduct and cooperate in resulting investigations.[10] After decades of declining white-collar enforcement amidst competing public safety priorities,[11] these initiatives aim to enlist corporate leaders as partners in identifying and addressing individual misconduct. The DAG’s ambitious effort to align reporting incentives across the DOJ provides a degree of clarity to those navigating potential self-reports. It remains to be seen, however, whether individual DOJ components’ interpretation of such ambiguous aggravating circumstances as the “seriousness” and “pervasiveness” of corporate misconduct will yield consistent results.
