Indulge us for a moment as we recount another airline adventure. Recently, we traveled thousands of miles to an important argument. Our first flight boarded right on time, left the gate right on time, and taxied down the runway . . . partway. Then stopped. Enter the inevitable announcement: “Ladies and gentlemen, we’re very sorry, but . . . .” This time, there was “cargo” that had been loaded onto the plane by mistake. Lest the perpetrator of the mistake suffer the consequences, the airline jeopardized the connections of a planeload of business travelers. Finally, we left the gate again. And taxied again. And stopped again. “Ladies and gentlemen . . . .” This time, the captain pointed out the crew cleaning up a deceased bird on our runway. We finally took off, more than an hour late. The crew radioed ahead to the connecting city. And we held our breath. We ran up the jetway in the connecting airport with only a few minutes until our connecting flight was scheduled to depart. The plane was a few gates over and was still there. But . . . “We’re very sorry, ma’am, but boarding is closed.” And we watched the plane fly away without us. Needless to say, we were not terribly polite about this. We ended up renting a car and driving, luckily only a few hours, to our destination. It was our only chance, and we took it. (We also scored 7.500 bonus miles with a very annoyed call to the airline’s customer service department.)
In today’s very short decision, Collette v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc, 2019 WL 2603280 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2019), the plaintiff was similarly afforded a chance to save his claims but mostly failed to seize the opportunity. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s generic heart medication had caused him to develop pulmonary fibrosis. He sued the manufacturer of the branded version of the drug along with the subsidiary that manufactured the generic version, asserting the usual product liability claims. The court had granted the defendants’ original motion to dismiss the complaint but had granted the plaintiff leave to amend several of the claims.
Not so the warnings-related claims, which were dismissed with prejudice on the original motion because, as the court correctly held, they were preempted under Mensing and Bartlett. In his amended complaint, the plaintiff stated that he did not “allege that the warning label or package insert [was] inadequate or should be changed” and that he “[made] no allegations regarding the adequacy of the label.” Collette, 2019 WL 2603280 at *1. The court disagreed, citing language in the complaint that contained “echoes of the warning and labeling claim” that had been dismissed with prejudice. The court held that these claims had “already been dismissed and [were] not properly before the Court.” Id.
Failure to Provide Medication Guides
In his original complaint, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to distribute a “medication guide” with the drug. On the original motion to dismiss, the court held that the plaintiff had not included enough detail to state a plausible cause of action; for example, he had not even identified the pharmacy where he filled his prescriptions. The court also noted that the claim was likely preempted by Buckman to the extent that it was based only on duties arising from federal regulations.
In his amended complaint, the plaintiff failed to supply any additional factual support for the claim – not even the name of the pharmacy where he filled his prescription. The court held that the claim “continue[d] to fail” Twiqbal’s “plausibility requirements.” In addition, the court held that the claim did “indeed” appear to be based only on federal regulatory duties – that the plaintiff had failed to identify a parallel state duty that would have required the defendants to distribute a medication guide. As such, preemption provided an “alternative and independent basis for dismissal.” Id. at *2. This time, the court dismissed the claim with prejudice.
On the original motion, the court had held that the plaintiff’s off-label marketing claim sounded in fraud and failed to meet the heightened particularity standard of Rule 9(b). The court instructed the plaintiff to “say much more about what, specifically, each defendant said and did, and how these statements and actions (or lack thereof)” related to the plaintiff and to his doctor. Id. The amended complaint again failed to provide this detail, mentioning FDA enforcement actions against one of the defendants but not tying “any of this in any concrete way” to the plaintiff or to his doctors. The court held that the claim read “much more like a general investigative report than an actionable complaint” for a specific injury attributable to the defendants. Id. Inexplicably, however, the court again dismissed this claim without prejudice and gave the plaintiff one final opportunity to amend this claim.
So the plaintiff has one last chance to save his sole remaining claim.