An extract from The Dominance and Monopolies Review - 7th edition


i Overview

The prohibition against the abuse of a dominant position does not define the term 'abuse'; the type of abuses mentioned in the prohibition are only examples, and do not constitute an exhaustive list. For a definition of abuse, both the SCA and the Swedish courts regularly refer to the CJEU's judgment in Hoffman-La Roche, in which an abuse was defined as:

an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of markets where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from those which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition.

The prohibition covers both exclusionary and exploitative abuses.

Over the past decade, the enforcement of the prohibition has gradually shifted from being rather legalistic to being more effect-based. In 2016, the SCA adopted a new prioritisation policy for its enforcement, which states that the most important factor for prioritising cases is the potential harm to competition and consumers. It may also be noted that the PMC in a recent judgment questioned the existence of 'naked restrictions', that is, unilateral restrictions that are so harmful to competition that there is no need to show anticompetitive effects to establish an abuse.

Evidence of an anticompetitive strategy is not sufficient per se to establish an abuse, but in practice it seems to play a rather important role. The SCA has used evidence of anticompetitive intent to argue that conduct does not constitute competition on the merits, and that a dominant company has considered it likely that the conduct is capable of having anticompetitive effects. The PMC has taken evidence of anticompetitive intent into account in its assessment of a conduct's effects on competition.

ii Exclusionary abuses

Although the prohibition covers both exclusionary and exploitative abuses, the SCA's enforcement focuses on exclusionary abuses. The SCA's enforcement policy states that the SCA prioritises unilateral conduct that is capable of excluding effective competition. When deciding whether conduct is sufficiently harmful to warrant an investigation, particular consideration is given to the share of the market affected by the conduct and, in cases where the foreclosure concerns an input, to what extent the input is essential to enable effective competition. When it comes to price-based conduct, the SCA considers whether the pricing is capable of foreclosing as efficient competitors. Therefore, although as-efficient competitor tests are not strictly necessary to establish an abuse, the SCA regularly performs such tests in cases regarding price-based abuse to decide whether an intervention is warranted.

iii Exploitative abuses

Exploitative abuses are covered by the prohibition. Cases regarding pure exploitative conduct are, however, rare, in particular in public enforcement. Following the adoption of the SCA's new prioritisation policy in 2016, which does not even mention exploitative abuse, the SCA has not initiated any investigations or legal proceedings regarding pure exploitative conduct. Cases regarding exploitative abuse are more likely to occur in private litigation.

iv Discrimination

Like Article 102 TFEU, the Swedish provision prohibits the application of 'dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage'. The prohibition applies not only to discriminatory prices, but also to other discriminatory terms. It covers discrimination of a dominant company's competitors (first-line discrimination) as well as discrimination of its customers (second-line discrimination). The latter form of discrimination (sometimes referred to as pure discrimination) is less likely to lead to foreclosure of effective competition, and thus less likely to be prioritised by the SCA. Such cases are more likely to occur in private litigation.