Granting of Beddoe relief did not affect trustees' ability to settle dispute Takeaway ••The fact that the Trustee had previously been granted Beddoe relief in connection with an appeal to the Supreme Court was a factor to consider when assessing the rationality of the Trustee's decision to enter into a settlement agreement, but it did not require a different test to be applied. Summary In Airways Pension Scheme Trustee Ltd v Fielder and another  EWHC 3032 (Ch), the High Court approved a settlement agreement between the Trustee of the Airways Pension Scheme and British Airways, ending a long standing dispute over whether the Trustee was permitted to apply discretionary increases to pension in payment higher than the increase in CPI. The Court also held that, previous proceedings in which the Trustee had sought Beddoe relief1 , was a factor to consider when assessing the rationality of the Trustee's decision to enter into a settlement agreement, but did not require a different test to be applied. Background Following the government's decision to change the index by reference to which pension increases are calculated in June 2010, the Trustee exercised its unilateral power of amendment to amend the Scheme's rules to enable it to award discretionary increases higher than the increase in CPI. British Airways challenged the validity of the amendment and the subsequent exercise of the new discretionary increase power. In July 2018, the Court of Appeal held that although the amendment to introduce a new discretionary increase power was within the scope of the Scheme's amendment power, it was made for an improper purpose. The Trustee sought to appeal this decision and issued proceedings seeking Beddoe relief. Arnold J authorised the Trustee to pursue the appeal to the Supreme Court and ordered that the costs of the appeal be paid out of the Scheme's assets. A settlement agreement was subsequently reached and the Trustee sought approval from the court. One issue that the court had to consider was whether the earlier application for Beddoe relief altered the test that it should apply when deciding whether to approve the settlement. Decision The High Court agreed with the Trustee that Arnold J's earlier decision on the Beddoe application did not affect the test to be applied when considering whether or not the court should approve a subsequent settlement agreement. The Court held that, on a Beddoe application, the court does not direct a trustee to pursue litigation but rather authorises its pursuit. It is not the court's function to choose between the two options of litigating or compromising a dispute. Therefore, there is no contradiction of the court's earlier decision where the court is subsequently asked to approve a proposed settlement. As in other situations, the approval of the settlement agreement is only subject to the test of rationality. Comment This long standing dispute raises a number of interesting procedural points for trustees. The Trustee's application for Beddoe relief was unprecedented. Beddoe relief had not previously been awarded specifically for the purposes of a trustee pursuing an appeal to the Supreme Court. However, the outcome of the latest hearing confirms that the granting of Beddoe relief does not fundamentally change how the courts should approach the decision of whether or not to approve a subsequent settlement. "Beddoe relief had not previously been awarded specifically for the purpose of a trustee pursuing an appeal to the Supreme Court." 1. Costs and strategy 1. An application for Beddoe relief (see Re Beddoe  1 Ch 547) enables a trustee to obtain directions from the court approving its participation in litigation in its capacity as trustee and ordering that the trustee will be indemnified in respect of the costs of the litigation from the trust funds. HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS PENSION DISPUTES BULLETIN 03 2.1 High Court rejects appeal against Ombudsman's determination that locum GP did not die in service Summary Sanderson v NHS Business Services Authority  EWHC 2900 (Ch) concerned an appeal from a previous Ombudsman determination that dismissed a widower's complaint regarding his entitlement to death in service benefits. Facts The complainant's wife had been a locum GP and made contributions to the NHS Pension Scheme. She died on 24 December 2014, a day that she was not scheduled to work. The widower was subsequently awarded a death benefit lump sum under the death in deferment rules, and argued he should have been awarded a death in service lump sum. The Ombudsman dismissed his complaint and concluded that a scheme member would be "in pensionable employment" if he or she actually worked under a contract of services as then the member would be "engaged" in line with the definition of locum practitioner under the National Health Service Pension Scheme Regulations 1995. Decision On appeal, the High Court held that entitlement to death in service benefits under the 1995 Regulations arose from the status of a member at a specific point in time. In this case, at the time the wife died, she was not engaged to work. It did not matter that she was due to work again in the near future or that she had been working in the days prior to her death. The High Court went on to say that a locum GP would be "engaged" under a contract for services during any period when they were bound by an obligation to perform services (eg seeing patients or prescribing medicine). The period would also cover any period of time when a locum GP was engaged in any form of activity which was incidental or ancillary to their obligations under the relevant contract for services, in the sense that they would not be doing that activity if they were not bound by duties to provide the relevant service. This included activities such as travelling to the practice, lunch breaks or travelling between practices where sessions have been booked at different locations. It also extended to any period of time during which a locum was not doing a certain activity they would otherwise be doing because they were bound by a relevant contract for services. In this instance, there was insufficient evidence to show that the complainant’s wife was engaged under a contract for services at the time of her death. Comment This decision shows how fine the line can be between being deemed to be in service or not in service at a given point in time for consultants, contractors and other individuals who are not employees and who are working flexibly. Employers should consider what level of death benefits they want to provide for such workers (and whether or not this should vary depending upon whether they happen to die on a day that they are working or not). They should also ensure that the position is clearly defined in their scheme documents and communicated clearly with the individuals concerned so that they can take any necessary steps to protect themselves. “This decision shows how fine the line can be between being deemed to be in service or not in service at a given point in time for consultants, contractors and other individuals who are not employees and who are working flexibly .” 2. Death benefits 04 PENSION DISPUTES BULLETIN HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS 3.1 Part time judges' claims not time barred – Miller v Ministry of Justice  UKSC 60 Risk warning ••Individuals may have two opportunities to bring discrimination claims in a pensions context. The Supreme Court has held that claims for discriminatory treatment brought by part-time judges were not time-barred. Under regulation 8(2) of the Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000, the complaints had to be lodged within three months of the less favourable treatment or detriment to which the complaint relates occurring. The appellants' claims were each lodged within three months of retirement, but more than three months after the end of any part-time appointment. Therefore, the Court had to decide when the relevant discriminatory treatment occurred to determine whether the claims were brought in time. At first instance, the employment judge held that their claims were out of time since the three-month period started to run from the end of each part-time, fee-paid appointment, not from the date of retirement. This decision had been followed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal. However, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court unanimously allowed the appeal. It held that a part-time judge may properly claim both during their period of service (that their terms of office were less favourable than those for full-time judges) and/or at the point of retirement (that the failure to make a pension available at that point amounted to less favourable treatment). The former did not exclude the latter. Comment This decision is significant in the context of discrimination claims that arise in a pensions context because it essentially gives claimants two bites at the cherry to bring a claim. It may breathe new life into claims for discrimination that date back many years which could be resurrected when an individual retires. 3.2 Backto60 to appeal against High Court decision The Backto60 campaign has been granted permission to appeal the High Court's decision in which it held that the increase to the state pension age for women from 60 to 65 was not discriminatory. The Court of Appeal is due to hear the application before February 2021. "This decision is significant in a pensions context because it essentially gives claimants two bites at the cherry." 3. Discrimination HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS PENSION DISPUTES BULLETIN 05 The campaign group initially argued that they were not given enough time to adjust to the extra years without a state pension, and the increase constituted unlawful discrimination on grounds of age, sex, and both. Risk warning ••As we predicted in our recent practical guide to Pensions and ESG, ESG-related claims and complaints from members are beginning to emerge in the UK and in other jurisdictions. Trustees, advisers and asset managers need to be alert to this trend and ensure that they are in a position to demonstrate that they are taking ESG risks and, in particular, climate change seriously. 4.1 Members claim they have not been given sufficient information on their scheme's approach to addressing climate change risk Takeaway ••Compliance with the statutory disclosure requirements is likely to be sufficient to see off a complaint that trustees have failed to disclose sufficient information on how they are tackling climate risk, for the time being. Summary Following a complaint by a member of the Shell Pension Fund that he was not provided with sufficient information regarding how the pension scheme was taking account of climate change in the context of its investment decisions and risk management, the Pensions Ombudsman has recently held (in Mr D (PO-27469)) that the trustees had complied with their legal obligations, under the disclosure regulations, and had provided the individual with all of the information that they were required to. ClientEarth, who helped the member bring the complaint, has questioned the Ombudsman’s reasoning, arguing that case law requires trustees to go further than just complying with the statutory disclosure requirements. It has also called on the Ombudsman to carry out a review of its internal processes. Meanwhile in Australia, a member is taking the Retail Employees Superannuation Trust to court (in McVeigh v Retail Employees Superannuation Party Ltd  FCA 14) for failing to disclose sufficient information on the potential impact of climate change on its investments and how it is addressing these risks. The outcome of this case may be known in 2020 and, although it will be a decision of the Australian courts, it may increase the pressure on pension scheme trustees here in the UK to be in a position to demonstrate that they are taking climate change related risks seriously. 4.2 To what extent do schemes need to consider members' interests when investing? Takeaway ••Veganism is a protected characteristic for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. Summary In January, in Casamitjana v The League Against Cruel Sports  UKET 3331129/2018, an Employment Tribunal held that ethical veganism is a philosophical belief and, therefore, it is a protected characteristic for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. The claimant had argued that he was dismissed by his company after disclosing that the company invested pension funds in entities involved in animal testing. There is due to be a further hearing in February 2020, to decide whether the claimant was unfairly dismissed. While the case predominately concerns the claimant's alleged unfair dismissal, the company has since offered all members the option to transfer to an ethical fund and has been discussing options with its pension provider and financial advisers to find other ethical options that still comply with FCA regulations. 4. ESG claims on the rise 06 PENSION DISPUTES BULLETIN HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS 4. ESG claims on the rise (continued) 2 July 2019 2 July 2019 1 October 2019 11 December 2019 1 October 2020 22 June 2017 Law Commission Report on Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries Law Commission Report on Pension Funds and Social Investment Date from which trustees of schemes with money purchase benefits (other than AVCs) must publish new implementation statement Green Finance Strategy, Transforming Finance for a Greener Future Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures, expected to publish guidance for the pensions industry for consultation Trustees of pension schemes with more than 100 members required to update their scheme’s statement of investment principles to set out (amongst other things) their policy on how they take account of financially material factors, including ESG considerations, in their investment decision making Joint statement on climate change (Prudential Regulation Authority, Financial Conduct Authority, Financial Reporting Council and The Pensions Regulator ) European Commission Green Deal March 2020 30 June 2014 Key pensions and ESG developments: HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS PENSION DISPUTES BULLETIN 07 5. Ill health early retirement 5.1 Unreasonable delay in processing ill health early retirement application constituted maladministration – Mr I (PO-17634) Takeaways ••Trustees should consider whether any requirements they impose on members who are applying for ill health early retirement are strictly necessary and whether they are permitted by their scheme’s rules. • •Where a requirement would impose an undue financial burden on an applicant trustees should consider alternative arrangements. Summary The Deputy Pensions Ombudsman (DPO) upheld a complaint by a member of the Local Government Pension Scheme, Mr I, that his ill health retirement pension (IHRP) should be backdated to when he first made the application, on the basis that his employer had wrongly asked him to pay for the cost of his medical report and to fly to the UK for a medical examination. As a result, his application for ill health was significantly delayed. Facts In May 2011, Mr I applied for an IHRP and, in response, his employer insisted that he pay for the medical report and return to the UK from Spain (where he was living) for a medical assessment. However, due to financial difficulties, Mr I was initially unable to pay for the report and he could not afford to fly back to the UK. When he eventually agreed to pay for a desk top medical report, he was informed soon after that there was insufficient medical evidence for his application to be approved. Mr I reapplied in June 2015 and, in 2016, he was granted an IHRP which was backdated to the date of his June 2015 application. Mr I complained and said that his IHRP should instead have been backdated to May 2011, when he had originally applied. Decision The DPO held that the employer had wrongly imposed a requirement on Mr I to pay for the medical report and to attend a medical assessment in the UK in person, as there was no legal basis for imposing either of these requirements under the LGPS regulations. Further, it was unreasonable for the IHRP application process to have taken five years. As a result, Mr I’s IHRP was backdated to May 2011 and he was awarded £1,000 compensation for distress and inconvenience. 5.2 Decision maker reached flawed decision by not asking medical practitioner appropriate questions – Mrs T (PO-21354) Summary The DPO upheld Mrs T’s complaint, finding that the Trust responsible for processing her IHRP application, had not adhered to the LGPS Regulations 2013, since it had not asked the medical practitioner the correct questions before making its decision. Mrs T complained that she should have been awarded a higher tier of ill health benefits to reflect the severity of her condition. The independent registered medical practitioner had recommended a lower tier and the Trust had followed this recommendation. The DPO held that the LGPS regulations had not been correctly applied. Although the Trust was entitled to give greater weight to the medical practitioner’s opinion, it had not ensured that the medical advice had addressed all the necessary questions under the LGPS Regulations, in particular what the likelihood was of Mrs T recovering to a sufficient level in the long term to return to gainful employment. Had the Trust sought this further clarification from the medical practitioner, it would have found evidence to support a decision to award Mrs T a higher tier of ill health benefits. The DPO directed the respondent to make the decision again and awarded the member £1,000 for distress and inconvenience. 08 PENSION DISPUTES BULLETIN HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS 6. Maladminstration Takeaways ••The Ombudsman continues to be slow to find that an employer is under a duty to inform members of their pension rights (based on the House of Lords decision in Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board  4 All ER 563). ••Nevertheless, an employer may assume a separate duty to act with reasonable care and skill and to process a member’s application without undue delay. 6.1 Employer not under an implied Scally duty to inform member of future transfer – Mr T (PO-25827) Summary The DPO dismissed a complaint by a member who argued his employer failed to provide clear and timely information about his transfer options in respect of a bulk transfer of his benefits. Facts Following a TUPE transfer, Mr T transferred from the Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme (PCSPS) to the Capgemini Pension Scheme. In December 2015, his employment was transferred back to his original employer and he was re-admitted to the PCSPS. Mr T had decided to take his benefits from the Capgemini Scheme. He was then informed about a bulk transfer from the Capgemini Scheme to the PCSPS, in which he would receive a transfer credit of 1.17 years for each year of service in the Capgemini Scheme. However, it later transpired he was not eligible for the transfer option, as he was already receiving benefits from the Capgemini Scheme and the transfer option was only open to active members. Mr T complained, arguing his employer failed to adequately inform him about his transfer options. Decision The DPO dismissed Mr T's complaint. The employer was not required to inform Mr T of the benefits of deferring as, following University of Nottingham v Eyett  2 All ER 437, this would amount to advice not information. Furthermore, there was no implied Scally contractual duty to provide information, as one of the limbs was not satisfied. Mr T, by having been involved in other TUPE transfers previously, was aware of the terms without the need of it being brought to his attention by his employer. It was also unclear if Mr T would have acted differently even if he had known about the benefits of deferring. 6.2 Employer assumed duty of care to process ill health application in a timely manner – Mrs S (PO-20087) Summary The DPO held that an employer's failure to expedite a member's application, which resulted in the member missing a deadline for more favourable benefits, amounted to maladministration. Mrs S was a member of the NHS Pension Scheme. The Scheme changed its benefit structure but allowed members to continue to apply for IHRP under the previous, more favourable regime until 1 April 2015. Mrs S applied for ill health early retirement in early 2015 but her application was delayed due to a changeover of scheme administrator and delays in the administrator obtaining medical evidence from Mrs S’ GP. As a result, her application was not processed until after 1 April 2015. This meant that her pension would be around £1,600 lower each year. Mrs S complained that had her ill health retirement pension application been processed in a timely manner, she would not have missed the deadline. In addition, had she been told by her employer about the deadline for submitting her application, she would have pushed for her GP to provide the necessary medical evidence more quickly. Decision The DPO held that there had been maladministration on the employer's part for failing to process Mrs S' application before the deadline. Whilst the DPO held that an implied Scally duty did not apply in this case, the employer had, by agreeing to inform staff of the Scheme's benefit changes, voluntarily assumed a duty to act with reasonable care and skill in processing the IHRP applications as the 1 April 2015 deadline approached and to process them without undue delay. The manner in which the employer acted did not reflect the urgency which ought to have been applied. As a result, the DPO ordered Mrs S’ employer to compensate Mrs S for the loss that she had suffered. HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS PENSION DISPUTES BULLETIN 09 7. Pension increases and RPI/CPI Takeaway ••In general, the courts continue to adopt a strict approach to the interpretation of pension increase rules. The recent decision in the Britvic case is a notable exception to this. However, the court’s willingness in that case to adopt a more purposive interpretation is likely to have been aided by the fact that, unlike most of the other cases concerning the interpretation of pension increase rules, this was the interpretation that afforded more protection to members. 7.1 Britvic only entitled to increase default rate of pension increases despite having power to set “any other rate” In January, the High Court held, in Britvic Plc v Britvic Pensions Ltd & Anor  EWHC 118 (Ch), that Britvic could not lower the rate of increases to be applied to pensions in payment despite the fact that the relevant provision under the Britvic Pension Plan stated that the rate of increase to be paid was the percentage increase in RPI (during the previous year subject to a cap of 2.5% or 5% (as applicable)) “or any other rate” decided by the principal employer. The company argued that the words “or any other rate” meant that it could set a rate that was higher or lower than the default amount (subject to the scheme complying with the statutory minimum rates for pension increases). However, the Court disagreed and accepted the argument made on behalf of the representative beneficiary that when the draftsman used the term "or any other rate", he only intended it to mean that the employer could set a higher rate. Hodge J held that this conclusion was supported by: ••the statutory context within which the relevant rule was drafted (namely section 51 Pensions Act 1995), and ••a letter that had been sent to the scheme’s members following the demerger of their employer’s business. This letter had contained a benefit summary which had presented the default increase of RPI (capped at 5% or 2.5%) as being “guaranteed” and said that any discretionary increases that may be awarded by the principal employer would be on top of this. Hodge J cited this as “powerful evidence” of the draftsman’s intention, despite the fact that the benefit summary contained the following disclaimer: "As a summary, it cannot include every detail. The Trust Deed and Rules of the Britvic Plan will set out full particulars of the benefits and conditions on which they are payable and will take precedence in the event of any discrepancy between this or any document and the Trust Deed and Rules." Risk warning ••The Britvic decision illustrates the limitations of wording in member communications which is designed to ensure that a scheme’s trust deed and rules take precedence. The judge placed great reliance on the wording in the benefit summary that was sent to members and used this as an aid to interpret the pension increase rule. 7.2 RPI continues to be relevant index in relation to Atos UK 2011 Pension Scheme In Atos IT Services UK Ltd v Atos Pension Schemes Ltd  EWHC 145 Ch, the High Court considered whether RPI should be used to determine increases to pensions in payment or whether another index (in this case the options being RPI-J2 and CPIH3 ) was permitted under the rules of the Atos UK 2011 Pension Scheme. The Scheme was governed by an interim deed dated 30 June 2011. The definition of RPI was set out in a supplemental document as “the general index of retail prices (all items) published by the Office for National Statistics, or where that index is not published, any substituted index published by that Office…” Counsel for the claimant, the principal employer, put forward a novel argument in an attempt to persuade the Court that the scheme’s rules no longer required pension increases to be set by reference to RPI. He argued that although RPI was defined in the rules as the general index of retail prices in 2011, since 2011, the changes to the status of RPI have been “so profound and extraordinary, and so unthinkable and unforeseeable” that the definition could no longer be construed in the same way. Nugee J agreed that RPI may no longer be the best or preferred measure of inflation. However, he held that the definition meant RPI at the time of drafting and still did today. As a general principle in English law, a written instrument has a single meaning which is fixed when the instrument is executed. Furthermore, Nugee J held that as RPI is still required to be published by the UK Statistics Authority, the part of the definition that stated “where that index is not published, any substituted index published by that Office” was not engaged. The claimant sought to rely on indexation provisions found in other cases and other Atos schemes to support its case. However, Nugee J concluded that this case was to be determined on the wording of the particular provision in question and not by comparing this with other cases, holding that: “It is the duty of a judge to ascertain the construction of the instrument before him and not to refer to the construction put by another judge upon an instrument perhaps similar but not the same.” Comment Counsel for the claimant put forward a novel argument in this case, but was still ultimately unsuccessful in persuading the Court that the scheme could use an alternative index to RPI. 2. A variant of RPI 3. An index derived from CPI 10 PENSION DISPUTES BULLETIN HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS 7.3 Ombudsman finds trustees permitted to switch from RPI to CPI In two recent Ombudsman determinations, the trustees were, separately, permitted to change the rate of increase from RPI to CPI. In both cases, the schemes' rules stated that another index could be used, if approved by HMRC and the trustees had sought legal and actuarial advice before implementing the change. (Determination in a complaint by Mr R, 9 July 2019 (PO-27867) and Determination in a complaint by Mr S, 18 September 2019 (PO-21607)). 7.4 Consultation on reform of RPI delayed The Treasury has confirmed that it now plans to launch the consultation on changes to RPI on 11 March 2020 alongside the Budget. The consultation will seek views on whether the UK Statistic Authority’s proposal to align the calculation of RPI with the methodology used to calculate CPIH should be implemented before 2030 and, if so, when between February 2025 and 2030 this should be done. CPIH is generally around 0.7% to 1% below the value of RPI, which means that aligning RPI with CPIH could have a material impact on the calculation of DB scheme benefits, scheme liabilities and on future returns from RPI-linked investments . Comment Several more cases dealing with the operation and interpretation of pension increase rules are due to be heard in 2020, including one in relation to Mitchells & Butlers’ pension scheme. However, the courts are unlikely to deviate from the strict approach that they have taken to date. At the same time, the outcome of the consultation on the proposed reform of RPI should give us a clearer idea of how this issue will play out over the longer term. 7. Pension increases and RPI/ CPI (continued) HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS PENSION DISPUTES BULLETIN 11 8. Pension protection 8.1 The Bauer judgment: what will the PPF do next? Takeaways ••The CJEU has ruled that Member States are not required to secure 100% of members’ occupational pension benefits on their employer’s insolvency. ••However, it has introduced a new poverty threshold below which an employee’s retirement benefits should not be allowed to fall. ••This raises a number of potential practical difficulties for the Pension Protection Fund (PPF). The PPF which will now need to determine (together with the DWP) how this should be applied in the context of the UK’s pension protection regime. Summary The CJEU’s decision in PSV v Bauer, which was handed down in December 2019, will have come as a relief to many in the pensions industry because the CJEU rejected the Advocate General's opinion that Article 8 of the Insolvency Directive requires Member States to guarantee employees’ occupational pension benefits in full on their employer’s insolvency. If the ruling had gone the other way, it is likely that this would have had significant funding implications for the PPF, the PPF levy and the funding regime for defined benefit schemes in the UK. The CJEU did however go on to say that any reduction which “seriously compromises” a former employee’s ability to meet his or her needs must be regarded as manifestly disproportionate. According to the CJEU, this would be the case where, even though a former employee is receiving at least half of the amount of the pension benefits to which they were entitled, the individual is already living, or would have to live, below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold determined by Eurostat for the Member State concerned, as a result of the reduction in their benefits (note: we understand that the Eurostat at-risk-of-poverty threshold for a single adult in the UK was £11,044 in 2018). In addition, following the ECJ decision in Grenville Hampshire v The Board of the Pension Protection Fund  (Case C-17/17) which held that, under EU law, members are entitled to an “individual minimum guarantee” of 50% compensation upon employer insolvency, the PPF has started to increase payments to pensioners whose compensation amounted to less than 50%. However, the PPF also confirmed that proceedings have been brought which challenge the way in which it intends to calculate the increases for pensioners affected by the Hampshire judgment. This was postponed pending the outcome of Bauer but, now that Bauer has been decided, we can expect this case to be rescheduled for a hearing in 2020/21. Comment It is surprising that the CJEU has been so prescriptive regarding the measure of poverty in retirement that should be used, whilst at the same time saying that Member States have “considerable latitude” over the means and level of pension protection which should be provided for in their own country. However, the fact that the CJEU has held that any reduction to an individual’s benefits must not result in the individual having to live below the Eurostat at-risk-of-poverty threshold raises a number of issues that will now need to be considered. In particular: ••Does this mean that the PPF is required to assess and monitor the income levels of members to ensure that they are above the Eurostat threshold and, where necessary, to adjust their compensation levels accordingly? If so, this will likely prove to be a significant administrative challenge. ••How does this interact with the UK’s state pension system and an individual’s entitlement to state benefits in retirement, such as Pension Credit? ••What does this mean for schemes entering into and already in a PPF assessment period? ••What are the implications for PPF+ buy-outs (past and future)?