Regulators in key global markets are increasingly demanding remedial action to allay competitive concerns.

In the European Union, an increasing number of merger clearances are being given on the condition that the parties offer suitable remedies. During Margrethe Vestager's first three years as Commissioner for Competition, a total of 64 conditional clearances have been granted. This constitutes a 42 per cent uplift compared to previous Commissioner Joaquín Almunia's final three years in office.

A conditional clearance will most likely require the parties to divest a part of their business, as has been the case for more than 80 per cent of remedy cases over the past three years. (In 2015, 90 per cent of conditional clearances required a divestiture of some kind.) In fact, the European Commission's (EC's) policy explicitly prefers structural remedies—which require merging parties to make divestments that change the market structure—over other types of remedies.

Every remedy has a subtle difference. While the divested business should be viable to allow the purchaser to compete effectively with the merged entity on a lasting basis, the structure of the divestiture may vary to account for competitive concerns. For example, it may affect global R&D facilities to tackle innovation concerns (as in Dow/DuPont), employ a transitional supply agreement to address viability concerns (as in Staples/Office Depot), or licensing arrangements to enable the purchaser to market the divested business under the merged entity's stronger brand (as in Danone/The WhiteWave Foods Company).

There is also now a higher chance that the closing of the deal will be delayed as the EC increasingly requires merging parties to agree Merger remedies: The rise of conditions Regulators in key global markets are increasingly demanding remedial action to allay competitive concerns to upfront/fix-it-first purchaser clauses.

Usually, merging parties offering remedies can close a transaction once they receive the EC's conditional clearance. A suitable purchaser has to be identified following clearance within a set period. But when the EC has concerns about whether a suitable purchaser can be identified, an upfront buyer or fix-it-first clause can be used. An upfront buyer clause requires the parties to agree not to close the transaction until the EC approves the purchaser and the underlying agreements. A fix-it-first clause goes one step further, and obliges the parties to find a suitable purchaser and enter into a legally binding agreement during the EC's administrative procedure.

In 2015, one in five remedy decisions included an upfront buyer or fix-it-first purchaser clause. By 2016, this number increased to one in three—a trend that continued into 2017, when approximately 33 per cent of decisions imposed a purchaser clause.

Case of delay

In practice, these clauses provide leverage to remedy buyers: Merging parties anxious to close may settle for a 'fire sale' of the divested assets. Yet Ball/Rexam is an example of the potential sluggishness of the process. This merger within the global canning sector was conditionally cleared on 15 January 2016 with an upfront buyer clause included in the remedy. Ball had noted pre-clearance that there was 'no assurance that buyers satisfactory to Ball and the regulators' could be found. Indeed, it took three months for Ball to propose a suitable purchaser to the EC. It took another three months for the EC to conclude on the suitability of the purchaser and the underlying agreements, demonstrating the delay the process can cause to closing. The deal finally closed six months after the parties received the EC's conditional clearance decision.

Under Italian merger control rules there is no standstill obligation, therefore, in principle, the parties would be free to close a deal, subject to merger control clearance, after the notification. However, the Italian Competition Authority may order the merging parties to refrain from transacting in the case of pursuing an in-depth investigation, although it has rarely done so in the past (see cases Groupe Canal+/Stream and Autogrill/Ristop, both in 2002). In addition, if the authorisation is ultimately not granted, but the transaction has already been implemented, the authority may order all measures required to restore the pre-merger status, including divestment. For this reason, in most cases the parties complete the transaction conditional upon the authorisation of the Italian Competition Authority. As a consequence, if the transaction is authorised with remedies, whether the deal can close prior to the implementation of the remedies will largely depend on what the parties agreed in the transaction agreement. For instance, in case of structural remedies, the parties must determine whether the acquisition may or may not take place prior to finding a suitable buyer for the divested business, and therefore, who should have responsibility for finding a buyer and run the risk of fines from the Italian Competition Authority for transacting without complying with the remedies, if a suitable buyer is not found. As a reference, the first threshold of the two cumulative thresholds that trigger mandatory notification in Italy has just been updated from €492 million to €495 million, i.e. (i) aggregate turnover in Italy of all undertakings involved above €495 million; and (ii) individual aggregate turnover of at least two of the parties of the transaction above €30 million. Although rare, non-structural remedies—such as promises not to act in a certain way in the future—do exist. Over the past three years, 11 out of 64 remedy cases were resolved with a purely behavioural remedy. They are accepted 'only exceptionally in specific circumstances,' such as in 'conglomerate structures'.

For instance, on 25 February 2016, the EC conditionally cleared the conglomerate concerns in Dentsply/ Sirona with a behavioural remedy. The EC maintained that the merging parties would have significant market power that could foreclose competing suppliers of dental 'blocks' from a sizeable part of the 'chairside CAD/CAM system' market. To remedy this, the EC required an access remedy from the parties, including the extension of existing licensing agreements with competing block suppliers until 2026. The EC took the unusual step and noted that 'remedies other than divestiture remedies appear best suited to directly address the [conglomerate] concerns raised.'

In November 2017, Qualcomm updated its remedy package to allay the EC's concerns in Qualcomm/NXP Semiconductors. Qualcomm first offered a set of commitments on 5 October 2017. It is understood that the October package offered to carve out all standard essential patents (SEPs) from the transaction, and committed Qualcomm not to assert certain patents owned by NXP (in particular Near Field Communication Technology – NFC). This package was market tested and viewed as inadequate by market participants. The November package added on the behavioural obligation on Qualcomm to ensure the interoperability of NXP's NFC platform with other parties.

Notably, in the most recent merger cases authorised with remedies, the Italian Competition Authority has often imposed a combination of structural and behavioural remedies and in some cases only non-structural remedies. In the RTI/ Gruppo Finelco case (2016) the authority requested only behavioural measures, including prohibitng the merged entity from concluding other advertising 85% Of the 33 transactions on which MOFCOM has imposed conditions since the Anti- Monopoly Law (AML) entered into force in 2008, all but five involved foreign-toforeign transactions concession contracts, to limit potential vertical and conglomerate effects which could be produced by the merger. In April 2017, in the Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso/ Italiana editrice case the authority also only imposed behavioural measures considered capable of neutralising the horizontal overlaps between the merging parties in the relevant market. In January 2018, in case 2I Rete Gas/Nedgia, the most recent merger case authorised with remedies, the authority imposed structural measures consisting of the divestment of certain local activities as well as behavioural remedies aimed at lowering barriers to entry to the market.

US approach

In early 2017, the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released a report analysing the effectiveness of past merger remedies (between 2006 and 2012) and outlining best practices going forward. The report confirms the FTC's preference for structural remedies, such as divestitures, over behavioural remedies that often require extensive monitoring to enforce. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has not released a similar official report, but Makan Delrahim, the recently confirmed head of the DOJ Antitrust Division, echoed the FTC's preference for divestiture over behavioural remedies in a recent appearance at New York University.

The FTC report found divestiture of an ongoing business (a set of assets immediately capable of being a stand-alone business) to be more effective than divestiture of selected assets. The distinction focuses on the ease with which a standalone business divestiture may be transitioned to the buyer, compared to assets that take more effort to be incorporated into the buyer's existing framework before successfully competing in the market. For the FTC to accept a divestiture of selected assets, the parties may be expected to show why divestiture of an ongoing business is infeasible and demonstrate how the selected assets can operate as a viable and competitive business.

The FTC also expressed concern over the 'hold-separate' period, during which assets identified to be divested remain in the control of the seller. The FTC stressed the importance of independent managers empowered to make real-time decisions to maintain the assets' competitive value during the interim period before divestiture is complete. Recent FTC and DOJ enforcement actions have been consistent with this policy directive. For example, the FTC recently required Abbott Laboratories and Alere Inc. to divest two product lines to obtain clearance, and the DOJ ordered CenturyLink and Level 3 Communications to divest certain overlapping aspects of their telecommunications businesses.

China attracts controversy

In China, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has increasingly imposed patent-related remedies on merging parties as a condition to approval. This approach has been criticised for diverging from enforcement approaches taken in other jurisdictions. However, it appears to be an ongoing trend that may create uncertainty, particularly for mergers involving high-tech companies.

To date, a majority of mergers drawing mandatory remedies in China are foreign-to-foreign mergers. Of the 33 transactions on which MOFCOM has imposed conditions since the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) entered into force in 2008, all but five involved foreign-to-foreign transactions.

Merging parties should be prepared for a prolonged review waiting period, particularly in mergers involving the technology industry. MOFCOM recently imposed a hold-separate period on a high-tech consolidation, a remedy that has not been used in at least four years. This controversial remedy requires the merging parties to ensure various aspects of their operations remain independent for two years. MOFCOM's reviews of proposed high-tech mergers are often influenced by local vendors' objections to sector consolidation.

Since the end of 2014, MOFCOM has penalised non-compliance with imposed remedies, including monetary fines up to ¥500,000 (approximately €64,000). That trend continued into 2017. In addition, MOFCOM maintains jurisdiction to order the dissolution of the merger, disposal of shares or assets, the transfer of the business, or adoption of other measures to restore the market situation. Despite this position, MOFCOM has never yet ordered dissolution of a non-complying merger. To date, all 19 MOFCOM penalties have been monetary fines imposed for failure to file, rather than for post-filing noncompliance.