36034         Gilles Patenaude v. Attorney General of Quebec (Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Standing)

On appeal from the judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal pronounced August 8, 2014. The applicant brought an action in nullity. In it, he argued that s. 254(2) and s. 254(5) of theCriminal Code, which concern testing for the presence of alcohol or a drug and failure or refusal to comply with a demand, were contrary to s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and were therefore invalid.  He further argued that ss. 202.3, 202.4 and 202.5 of the Highway Safety Code provide, via the Criminal Code, for the application of sanctions before judgment and are therefore contrary to theCanadian Charter and to s. 23 of the Charter of human rights and freedoms.  The contested provisions of the Highway Safety Code concern the taking of breath samples, the immediate suspension of drivers’ licences and failure to comply with a demand made by a peace officer. The Attorney General of Quebec, the defendant to the action in nullity, applied for dismissal of the proceeding. The Quebec Superior Court granted the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

36070         Ralph Boehme v. Her Majesty the Queen (Criminal law – Mental disorder)

On appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario pronounced May 12, 2014. In 2011, Mr. Boehme was found not criminally responsible due to mental disorder for criminally harassing behaviour and was ordered to be detained at the Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences.  Mr. Boehme appealed the continued detention order by the Ontario Review Board. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

35991         Deborah J. Kelly Hawkes v. Prince Edward Island Human Rights Commission, et al. (Civil procedure — Applicant having previously been declared a vexatious litigant)

On appeal from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island pronounced June 5, 2014. The applicant filed a complaint with the P.E.I. Human Rights Commission. She sought to have the Commission order that it was a breach of the P.E.I. Human Rights Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988 c. H-12 for the Government of P.E.I. to refuse to pay for her $50 driver’s license renewal fee under the provisions and the regulations of the Social Assistance Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988 c. S-4.3. In late 2012, the Executive Director of the Commission dismissed the applicant’s complaint.  In early 2013, a Chairperson appointed by the Commission to review that decision concurred.  Both found the complaint to be without merit.  The applicant filed an application for judicial review.  That application was the third such application made by the applicant with respect to her initial complaint. At some point after she had filed her application for judicial review, a judge of the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island issued an order declaring the applicant a vexatious litigant. Pursuant to that order, the applicant was required to seek leave of that court in order to institute further proceedings or to continue ongoing proceedings. The Applicant applied to the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island for leave to institute proceedings and her application was dismissed.

35962         Hector Davila Santos, Minerales Y Minas Mexicanas, S.A. De C.V. v. First Majestic Silver Corp., First Silver Reserve Inc., Minera el Pilon, S.A. De C.V. (Civil procedure – Security for trial judgment)

On appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia pronounced June 5, 2014 While he was president and CEO of two of the respondent companies, the individual applicant commenced negotiations for the acquisition of the Bolanos mine in Mexico.  After resigning and selling his interests in those companies to the third respondent, the applicant indirectly purchased the Bolanos mine through the applicant company.  The respondents obtained a trial judgment against the applicants for breach of fiduciary duty and an award of US$93.84 million in damages.  The applicants appealed the judgment, which stays execution of the judgment in Mexico.  The respondents cross-appealed and applied for a Mareva injunction.  They also applied for an order requiring the applicants to post security for the trial judgment.  The applicants are resident in Mexico and do not own assets in Canada.  A judge of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia granted the application and ordered the applicants to pay security or a letter of credit in the amount of $79 million, being the difference between the trial judgment and an amount held in trust by the applicants’ counsel as partial payment of the judgment.  When the applicants failed pay the security or apply for a stay of execution of the order, the respondents applied to have the appeal dismissed as abandoned.  The applicants sought an extension of time to apply to review the security order, to have it varied or set aside.  The Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed the application for an extension of time and dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

36041         Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the province of British Columbia as represented by the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General v. Charles Mzite, British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal (Judicial review — Human Rights Tribunal — Late-filed complaint)

On appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia pronounced June 9, 2014. Mr. Mzite filed a complaint with the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal alleging that the Ministry had discriminated against him on the basis of his physical disability in contravention of the Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, by denying him access to adequate health care while he was on remand at the Vancouver Island Regional Correctional Center (“VIRCC”).  The complaint was filed very late. It alleged that Mr. Mzite had been denied consistent access to the antiretroviral medication used to treat and manage his HIV.  Mr. Mzite explained the delay by saying that he had feared that a complaint would provoke retaliation by staff and could impact his security classification within the federal system, and that Prisoners’ Legal Services (“PLS”) was not available in relation to civil remedies.  However, he decided that he had to take action after another prisoner told him that he had also had difficulty obtaining consistent access to antiretroviral medication, suggesting that there was ongoing systemic discrimination and a continuing threat to other prisoners.  When, in April 2011, a PLS lawyer told him about the purpose and scope of the Human Rights Tribunal, he requested assistance in filing a complaint. On March 2, 2012, the Tribunal accepted the complaint despite the lateness of the filing on the grounds that it was in the public interest to do so and that the delay would not cause any substantial prejudice to any person.  The Applicant filed a petition for an order setting the Tribunal’s decision aside pursuant to the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 241. The Supreme Court of British Columbia set aside the Tribunal’s decision and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration under s. 22(3) of the Code. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.

35913         Jean Coulombe v. Ville de Sept-Îles (Municipal law – By-laws)

On appeal from the judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal pronounced April 1, 2014. In 1981, a lease of land in the domain of the state located on the territory of the city of Sept-Îles (the respondent) was assigned to Jean Coulombe (the applicant).  The contract authorized the lessee to use the land solely for a summer home.  In 1992, a municipal zoning by-law came into force; it provided that the land was located in a recreational-use zone.  In 2010, the applicant applied for a permit to build a summer home on the land.  The respondent refused to issue the permit on the basis that the zoning by-law did not authorize the use of a summer home in a recreational-use zone. The applicant then applied to the Superior Court for a declaration that the municipal by-law was invalid, and to enjoin the Minister to issue him a construction permit by way of mandamus.  He submitted that the provisions of the municipal by-law were incompatible with the Act respecting the lands in the domain of the State and with s. 29 of theRegulation respecting the sale, lease and granting of immovable rights on lands in the domain of the State. The Superior Court dismissed the motion.  On the basis of the principles stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, Huot J. found that the municipal by-law was not incompatible with the provincial statute and regulation, given (1) that the three pieces of legislation did not deal with similar subject matters and (2) that there was no true and outright conflict between them.  An appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.

35944         Louis Pasquin v. Her Majesty the Queen (Criminal law — Interception of communications)

On appeal from the judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal pronounced April 15, 2014. The applicant Mr. Pasquin was a lawyer working mainly in criminal law.  In 2009, he was convicted of offences related to trafficking in narcotics and organized crime.  The evidence at trial was based in part on private communications intercepted with judicial authorization.  The first application for a wiretap, which was authorized on July 13, 2005, did not target Mr. Pasquin.  However, the authorization contained a basket clause authorizing, inter alia, the interception of the communications of any unknown person contacting or being contacted by a target.  The second application for a wiretap, which was authorized on December 20, 2005, targeted Mr. Pasquin specifically based on the fact that, since October 13, 2005, the police had had reasonable and probable grounds to believe that he was involved in the activities of a criminal organization whose purpose was trafficking in narcotics.  However, the authorization stated that the communications involving Mr. Pasquin were to be sealed and could not be listened to until a judge had reviewed them and determined whether they were privileged.  At trial, Mr. Pasquin moved unsuccessfully to exclude the evidence of the intercepted communications.  The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal concerning the admissibility of the wiretap evidence.

35979         Dan Ambrosi v. Attorney General of British Columbia (Criminal law — Private prosecutions)

On appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia pronounced April 4, 2014. The applicant operates solid waste recycling companies.  Both municipal and provincial governments regulate the business.  The applicant disagrees with how the regulatory framework has been applied to his companies.  He delivered a written demand that Ministry employees provide “true, complete, unedited and altered copy of all correspondence and communication of any type” relating to him or the operation of his companies pursuant to s. 337 of the Criminal Code.  The applicant swore six private informations pursuant to s. 504 of the Criminal Code. The charges were failing or refusing to deliver certain demanded information and documentation contrary to s. 337 of the Criminal Code. The  Provincial Court of British Columbia dismissed the Applicant’s application to swear and have process issue on six private informations. The Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the Applicant’s application forcertiorari and mandamus. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

35968         Violeta Duni v. Edward J. Druker and Druker, Narvey, Green, Schwartz (Civil procedure — Appeals)

On appeal from the judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal pronounced June 9, 2014. The applicant Ms. Duni sued her former lawyer, the respondent Mr. Druker, on the ground that he had committed several professional errors in relation to her in a real estate transaction involving her and her husband in 2008.  She claimed $75,000 in damages:  $2,500 for services paid for but allegedly not rendered, $66,500 for loss of investment and $6,000 for legal fees incurred after Mr. Druker was replaced.  She also sought to have Mr. Druker’s firm found solidarily liable.  The Superior Court dismissed the action.  The Court of Appeal allowed a motion to dismiss the appeal from the bench on the ground that the inscription in appeal raised only questions of fact and that the appeal had no reasonable chance of success.

35129         Thomas Leslie Armstrong v. Her Majesty the Queen (Criminal law – Sentencing)

On appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia pronounced May 6, 2014. The applicant was convicted on four of five counts of uttering threats to cause death or bodily harm (s. 264.1 of the Criminal Code) and two counts of threatening a justice system participant to impede him or her in the performance of his or her duties (ie., his probation officer and the staff at the halfway house, s. 423.1). The s. 264.1 convictions were stayed under the Kienappleprinciple.  The Crown applied under s. 753 of the Criminal Code to have the applicant designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of detention in a penitentiary.  The applicant was declared a dangerous offender and an indeterminate period of incarceration was imposed.  The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal with respect to count five and affirmed the indeterminate sentence.  The sentence appeal with respect to count six was allowed, and the indeterminate sentence was set aside, and a sentence of five years concurrent to the indeterminate sentence was imposed.

36061         Old Navy Property Corporation v. Her Majesty the Queen (Criminal law – Controlled Drugs and Substances Act – Forfeiture)

On appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario pronounced June 16, 2014. The corporate applicant (“ONPC”) owns property used as a clubhouse by the Downtown Toronto Hells Angels Motorcycle Club.  In 2012, the Crown applied for the forfeiture of the property pursuant to s. 16(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 (“CDSA”). Instead of challenging the forfeiture order pursuant to s. 20 of the CDSA, a challenge made after the order is issued, ONPC chose to participate in the forfeiture hearing pursuant to s. 19 of the CDSA to advance its property interest.  The Crown’s application was ultimately successful.  Essentially, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that the clubhouse facilitated the networking and discussions necessary for committing certain trafficking offences under theCDSA. ONPC appealed to the Court of Appeal, but the appeal was quashed on the basis that s. 16(3) of the CDSA only provides a right of appeal from a forfeiture order to the person convicted of a designated substance offence or the Attorney General. In this case, ONPC was a third party.  The Court of Appeal explained that while “there is an anomaly between the absence of a right of appeal under s. 16 for third parties and the availability of an appeal under s. 20 from an application for relief from forfeiture brought by the same party”, that anomaly could not assist ONPC in the face of the clear language of s. 16(3) of the CDSA (para. 2).

36000         Ashiqur Rahman v. Her Majesty the Queen

(Charter of Rights and Freedoms – Criminal law)

On appeal from the judgment of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal pronounced June 23, 2014. The applicant was convicted of aggravated assault and manslaughter.  The conviction appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.

36051         Dale Conners v. Her Majesty the Queen

36052         Victoria Hollinrake v. Her Majesty the Queen

36053         Anthony Van Edig v. Her Majesty the Queen (Civil procedure – Costs)

On appeal from the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal pronounced June 6, 2014. A number of individuals including Mr. Connors, Ms. Hollinrake, and Mr. Edig commenced actions against the Crown in the Federal Court seeking constitutional relief and damages in relation to certain changes to the legal regime governing the medical use of marihuana.  They all appealed an interlocutory case management order of the Federal Court and filed, in the context of his or her appeal, a motion seeking an interim constitutional exemption pending the outcome of the trial.  The Crown filed a motion record in each case opposing the motion and argued that the appeal is moot based on changes taken by the Federal Court.  In a direction dated March 7, 2014, Chief Justice Crampton of the Federal Court directed a stay of a number of Federal Court proceedings, including the action of Mr. Connors.  It was further directed that no further steps were to be taken pending the completion of certain steps in a similar matter (Allard et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen).  On March 31, 2014, Chief Justice Crampton made an order assigning Phelan J. as the Case Management Judge and ordering that the Registry shall accept no further filings or correspondence on the matters until further instructions were issued. On April 3, 2014, Justice Phelan made an order lifting the stay imposed by the March 31, 2014 order.  On April 8, 2014, the Crown moved in the Federal Court for a new stay of a number of Federal Court proceedings, including the proceedings commenced by Mr. Connors, pending the final disposition of the Allard matter.  On May 7, 2014, Justice Phelan granted that motion. The Federal Court of Appeal determined that the order of Phelan J. on May 7, 2014 rendered moot the March 31, 2014 order of Chief Justice Crampton which was the order under appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal.  As a result, the appeals and related motions were dismissed for mootness.  Costs were payable to the Crown in each case in the amount of $500 inclusive of all disbursements and taxes.