Tanya Rebello v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario represented by the Minister of Transportation for the Province of Ontario


Charter of rights — Civil procedure — Commencement of proceedings


E.W. v. M.R.


Family law — Compensatory allowance


Her Majesty the Queen v. J.F.(Que.)

In February 2011, the accused was charged with several offences involving sexual acts committed between 1986 and 2001. While judgment was reserved, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27. Following the first trial, the accused was acquitted in February 2017. The total delay between the charges and the verdict was 72 months and 2 days. In June 2018, the Quebec Court of Appeal ordered a new trial because of errors of law in the trial judgment. The delay between that order and the anticipated end of the new trial was 10 months and 5 days. The accused filed a motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter in December 2018. The trial judge found that the delay for the first trial was unreasonable and that the accused had never waived his right to be tried within a reasonable time. She granted the motion and ordered a stay of proceedings in February 2019. In a unanimous judgment, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s order.


Jesse Dallas Hills v. Her Majesty The Queen(Alta.)

Charter of Rights — Criminal law — Sentencing

Mr. Hills pled guilty to four charges from an incident in May 2014 where he swung a baseball bat and fired a shot with his rifle at an occupied vehicle, smashed the window of a parked vehicle and shot a few rounds into an occupied family residence. One of the charges was the intentional discharging of a firearm into or at a place, knowing that or being reckless as to whether another person is present in the place under s. 244.2(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which carries a minimum four‑year imprisonment sentence. Mr. Hills alleged that the minimum sentence under s. 244.2(3)(b) of the Criminal Code violated the constitutional right to not be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment by virtue of s. 12 of the Charter. The trial judge found that the mandatory minimum sentence contravened s. 12 and could not be saved by s. 1 of the Charter. As a result, he declared s. 244.2(3)(b) of the Criminal Code to be of no force and effect. Mr. Hills was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three and a half years. The Alberta Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s finding that the provision was unconstitutional and set aside the declaration of invalidity. The appeal against the sentence for discharging a firearm was allowed and Mr. Hills’ sentence was increased to four years.


Peel Regional Police Service v. Her Majesty the Queen, Dyllan Ali, Diquan Taylor, Constable Sean Osborne(Ont.)

Police had a Motel 6 in Brampton under observation because prostitution and drug trafficking offences had been occurring in and around the motel. Dyllan Ali and Diquan Taylor were two of four passengers in a taxi that was stopped by members of the police. The stop was based on an allegation that the taxi proceeded through a red traffic light. Cst. Sean Osborne and Cst. Erik Grant testified at the preliminary inquiry that as they approached the stopped taxi, they made observations of movements inside the taxi that justified their removing the occupants and conducting a search for officer safety. The search revealed firearms and cocaine. As a result, Dyllan Ali faces numerous firearms offences and Diquan Taylor is charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. They are to be tried together. Mr. Ali and Mr. Taylor have applied for an order requiring disclosure of the full contents of disciplinary and criminal investigation files relating to Cst. Osborne. To the extent these have not already been provided or agreed to be provided, Mr. Ali and Mr. Taylor submit that they should be part of first party disclosure from the Crown pursuant to R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66, and R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, [1991], S.C.J. No. 83. In the alternative, they submit that they have met the likely relevance threshold at the first stage of the third party disclosure regime developed in R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411. The application for further disclosure of the investigative files regarding Cst. Osborne’s previous disciplinary proceeding was dismissed. The application for disclosure of the investigative files for Cst. Osborne’s outstanding criminal charges was granted pursuant to the Crown’s first party disclosure obligations.


Nadine Galy, André Couture, Pierre Laframboise, George Amyot, Claude Malenfant and Michel Verreault v. Ville de Québec(Que.)

The applicants own immovables in the block formed by La Porte and Terrasse‑Dufferin streets and St‑Denis and Sainte Geneviève avenues inside the fortifications of the respondent city, Ville de Québec. In 2011, a residential project for a lot in that block was submitted to the city. The lot was subject to certain restrictions because of its inclusion in the zone described as [translation] “steep slopes and approaches to steep slopes” in the city’s zoning plan. As a result of reviews done in 2014 in connection with the granting of permits for that real estate project, it was recommended that the city remove the lot from the steep slopes zone through a by‑law amendment, provided that a geotechnical study confirmed that the contemplated work presented no risk to the stability of the embankment. Once the study showing that this requirement was met had been submitted, the proposed by‑law amendment was approved by the borough council in July 2015. In September 2015, a public consultation was held concerning the proposed by‑law amendment. It resulted in a recommendation, through a resolution passed by the neighbourhood council, that the by‑law not be adopted because of the lack of available information about the planned residential development. On December 9, 2015, the applicants served the city with a formal notice to suspend the adoption of the by‑law. After certain amendments were withdrawn, the by‑law entitled Règlement modifiant le Règlement de l’Arrondissement de La Cité‑Limoilou sur l’urbanisme relativement à la modification d’une zone de fortes pentes dans le secteur de la rue de la Terrasse‑Dufferin, R.C.A.1V.Q. 241, was adopted and came into force in mid‑December 2015. The applicants filed an application for judicial review and for the annulment of a municipal by‑law with the Superior Court, which annulled the by‑law. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the trial judgment.


Grasshopper Solar Corporation, GSC Solar Fund I Inc., One Point Twenty One Gigawatts Inc., Egerton Polar Power LP, MPI GM Solar 1 LP v. Independent Electricity System Operator(Ont.)

Contracts — Interpretation

Independent Electricity System Operator entered into a standard form contract with each of the applicants. The contract set a milestone date by which the renewable energy company was required to achieve commercial operation of solar power facilities. The energy companies failed to meet their milestone dates. Independent Electricity System Operator terminated the contracts without paying damages. The applicants jointly applied for a declaration that Independent Electricity System Operator did not have the right to terminate contracts. The applications judge dismissed the application. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal.


KL Solar Projects LP, Highlands Solar Projects LP, Madawaska Solar Projects LP, McNab Solar Projects LP, PB Solar Projects LP, Ramara Solar Projects LP, Sudbury Community Solar Projects LP, Sustainable Ottawa Project LP v. Independent Electricity System Operator(Ont.)

Independent Electricity System Operator entered into a standard form contract with each of the applicants. The contract stipulated time was of the essence and set a milestone date by which the renewable energy company was required to achieve commercial operation of solar power facilities. The energy companies failed to meet their milestone dates. Independent Electricity System Operator terminated the contracts without paying damages. The applicants jointly applied for a declaration that Independent Electricity System Operator was estopped by convention from terminating the contracts. The applications judge dismissed the application. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal.


Tanya Rebello v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario represented by the Minister of Transportation for the Province of Ontario(Ont.)

Charter of rights — Civil procedure — Commencement of proceedings

The applicant, Ms. Tanya Rebello, attempted to sue the Province of Ontario, as represented by the Minister of Transportation, in respect of allegations concerning the transfer of the ownership of her vehicle, the removal of her licence plate from the Ministry’s system, and the suspension of her driver’s licence. Ontario contested the action, noting that Ms. Rebello had failed to provide proper notice of the claim, as required by the provincial Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27. Ontario brought a motion to strike Ms. Rebello’s underlying action against the Province.

A motion judge at the Superior Court granted Ontario’s motion to strike, and dismissed Ms. Rebello’s underlying action against Ontario; however, Ms. Rebello was allowed to file a new claim on the same issues. The Divisional Court denied Ms. Rebello leave to appeal that decision, finding that the dismissal order was final and the appropriate route was an appeal to the Court of Appeal; the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed Ms. Rebello’s motion seeking leave to appeal the Divisional Court decision.


William McHarg Bone v. Judith Lynn Bone(Alta.)

Mr. and Ms. Bone were married in 1974, separated in 2001 and divorced in 2003, having raised four children together. Ms. Bone was employed until the birth of the first child but, after that, became a full‑time homemaker while Mr. Bone pursued his career. In 2003, after a summary trial, the court ordered a matrimonial property division and spousal support in the amount $8,000 per month payable to Ms. Bone. Ms. Bone was also entitled to share in any bonuses that Mr. Bone might receive. Mr. Bone was further required to maintain a term life insurance policy of $200,000 in favour of Ms. Bone. Each party received more than $1 million in assets and an equalization of Mr. Bone’s pension and supplemental pension. Mr. Bone complied with every aspect of the 2003 order. In 2019, he applied to vary the spousal support and life insurance provisions of the original order on the basis that his retirement and reduction in income constituted a material change in circumstances. Ms. Bone was by then receiving approximately $10,000 per month in spousal support, but had very little income of her own. She had dissipated all of the assets that she had acquired years before in the division of matrimonial assets. In contrast, Mr. Bone had significantly increased his net worth by continuing to work and taking advantage of various investment opportunities. At the time of the applications, Mr. Bone was 73 and Ms. Bone was 71. The chambers judge varied the spousal support payable to $3,000 per month and terminated the order requiring Mr. Bone to maintain life insurance. Ms. Bone’s appeal was allowed and her spousal support was increased to $4500 per month. Mr. Bone was also required to obtain life insurance with a face amount of $100,000.


Mary Wagner v. Her Majesty the Queen(Ont.)

Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Criminal law

Ms. Wagner was subject to two probation orders that in part prohibited her from being on the premises of any abortion provider in Ontario and from communicating with any person in such premises. She entered an abortion clinic, disrupted the operations and spoke to patients. Ms. Wagner was convicted of mischief and breach of probation. A summary judgment appeal was dismissed. The Ontario Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal.


Dan Kennedy v. Public Guardian and Trustee(Ont.)

The respondent, the Public Guardian and Trustee (“PGT”) refused an application by the applicant, Mr. Daniel Kennedy, to become the statutory‑appointed guardian of his brother’s property.

The PGT found that Mr. Kennedy was an “unsuitable” candidate to manage his brother’s property, and that he lacked a suitable property management plan. The PGT also noted the brother’s own objection to Mr. Kennedy’s proposed appointment as his guardian, and the objections of other family members and care providers.

The PGT successfully obtained a court order approving the refusal to name Mr. Kennedy as guardian of his brother’s property. Mr. Kennedy was unsuccessful in his appeal of that order.


E.W. v. M.R.(Que.)

The parties divorced after eight years of marriage. The respondent had owned a property management company since before the marriage. During their relationship, the parties had purchased, renovated and sold several residences. The applicant sought to have the value of the shares held by the respondent included in the partition of acquests. The Superior Court granted the parties a divorce and ruled on the corollary relief. It found that the applicant had a claim in the partition of the family patrimony and in the partition of acquests. However, it refused to include the increase in the value of the respondent’s shares in that claim, finding that he had owned his management company since before the parties were in a relationship and that the shares were therefore private property. It awarded the applicant a compensatory allowance as compensation for her contributions, in time and services, to the renovation projects. The Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s principal appeal in part for the sole purpose of correcting an error and reducing the applicant’s claim in the partition of acquests by effecting compensation. It rejected the applicant’s ground of incidental appeal concerning the inclusion in the acquests of the increase in value, during the marriage, of the shares the respondent had owned at the time of the marriage. However, it accepted the alternative ground of appeal by which the applicant sought to increase the value of the other claims against the respondent with respect to the compensatory allowance and the lump sum.


Romeo V. Lim v. Minister of Justice, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration(F.C.)

On December 9, 2019, Mr. Lim was deported from Canada after having been found to be inadmissible for serious criminality under s. 36(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as a result of a criminal conviction. He challenged the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration’s decision not to issue him a work permit. He also sought a compelled apology for having breached his Charter rights, a declaration that previous judicial decisions were unconscionable and costs of no less than $15,000. The Minister brought an application for an order to strike Mr. Lim’s application for a work permit on the basis that it was an abuse of process, was an attempt to circumvent s. 72(1) of the IRPA that required leave to commence an application for judicial review of any matter under the IRPA, and was moot. The Prothonotary found that an order directing the Minister to reconsider Mr. Lim’s application for a work permit would serve no practical purpose. She struck out Mr. Lim’s Notice of Application for judicial review without leave to amend. The Federal Court dismissed his appeal and the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed his motion for an extension of time in which to file his notice of appeal.


Timothy Aaron Barth v. Leah Faye Barth(Sask.)

The parties are the parents of a child who will be six years of age in 2021. In October 2017 there was an interim order of the court establishing a regime of joint and shared parenting between the parties. In 2019, the Ministry of Social Services, in child protection proceedings, obtained orders eventually placing the child in the custody of the mother, with supervised access for Mr. Barth and his girlfriend. Also in 2019, in previously filed custody proceedings, Mr. Barth filed a series of applications. A number of those matters, as well as Ms. Barth’s application, were dealt with by fiat on separate appearances by two different Chambers Judges. The First Chambers Judge dismissed Mr. Barth’s applications, including his application to have the law firm representing Ms. Barth barred from representing her. That Judge found it unnecessary to deal with Mr. Barth’s contempt application on the basis that it had been previously dismissed by another Judge. The Second Chambers Judge Adjourned both Ms. Barth’s custody application and the child protection matter. She also dismissed Mr. Barth’s application to quash an affidavit filed by the Minister. Mr. Barth’s appeals from the two fiats were quashed with the exception of the contempt issue in the First Appeal.


Her Majesty the Queen v. Cameco Corporation(F.C.)

Cameco Corporation, together with its subsidiaries, is a large uranium producer and supplier of the services that convert one form of uranium into another form. Cameco has facilities in Saskatchewan and Ontario along with subsidiaries which own assets in the United States. In 1999, a subsidiary of Cameco, Cameco Europe S.A. (CESA), and other companies purchased Russian uranium that was formerly used in its nuclear arsenal. The uranium was provided for sale through a Russian state-owned company “Techsnabexport” (Tenex). Later in 1999, CESA entered into an agreement with Urenco Limited (Urenco) (a uranium enricher) and three of its subsidiaries to purchase uranium that Urenco would be receiving from Tenex. Cameco formed another subsidiary in Switzerland which changed its name in 2001 to Cameco Europe AG (SA, Ltd) (CEL). In 2002, CESA transferred its business to CEL. The profits realized by CEL from buying uranium from Tenex, Urenco, and Cameco and then selling it were substantial. The Minister of National Revenue reassessed Cameco’s income for the taxation years 2003, 2005, and 2006. The Minister added more than $480 million for those taxation years due to transfer pricing adjustments. Cameco appealed the reassessment to the Tax Court of Canada who referred the reassessments back to the Minister for reconsideration. The Minister’s subsequent appeal was dismissed.