Sometimes simpler is better. In product liability litigation nothing is more basic, perhaps, than proof the plaintiff used defendant's product. Last week, a federal judge granted summary judgment against two plaintiffs' making claims in multi-district litigation over injuries allegedly related to the painkillers Darvocet and Darvon. See In Re: Darvocet, Darvon and Propoxyphene Products Liability Litigation, No. 2:11-md-02226 (E.D. Ky.). The issue was this basic cause in fact element.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Defendant argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because neither plaintiff demonstrated the ingestion of a propoxyphene product manufactured, sold, or distributed by the defendant. In their Amended Complaint, both plaintiffs allege that they ingested propoxyphene products manufactured by Lilly. It is indeed a general principle of products liability law in Texas and Georgia (the applicable rules under choice of law in an MDL) that a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to allow the reasonable inference that the injury-causing product was sold, manufactured, or distributed by the defendant. Plaintiffs could not dispute that they failed to establish the ingestion of a Lilly product.
Instead, Lilly presented evidence demonstrating that plaintiffs represented that they intended to pursue only claims that relate to generic drugs; that is, they would seek to hold Lilly liable for the injuries allegedly arising out of their taking of generic drugs made by someone else.
Such arguments were already rejected by the Court in this MDL. The Court had previously found unpersuasive the plaintiffs’ argument that a brand-name manufacturer may be held liable under a misrepresentation theory of liability to a plaintiff who ingested generic propoxyphene. The prevailing rule regarding misrepresentation claims against brand-name manufacturers has its origins, noted the Court, in Foster v. American Home Products Corp., 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994), which rejected “the contention that a name brand manufacturer’s statements regarding its drug can serve as the basis for liability for injuries caused by another manufacturer’s drug.” Id. at 170.
The majority of courts that have addressed similar claims have followed the Fourth Circuit’s lead. Notably, federal district courts in Texas have repeatedly found that “the Texas Supreme Court would conclude that a brand-name manufacturer does not owe a duty to warn users of the risks related to another manufacturer’s product.” Finnicum v. Wyeth, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 2d 616, 621 (E.D. Tex. 2010); see also Burke v. Wyeth, Inc., No. G-09-82, 2009 WL 3698480, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2009). And, similarly, there can be no recovery under Georgia law, “[u]nless the manufacturer’s defective product can be shown to be the proximate cause of the injuries . . .” Hoffman v. AC&S, Inc., 548 S.E.2d 379, 382 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (“To survive summary judgment, [the plaintiff] clearly needed to present evidence that she was exposed to defendants’ products.”).
Defendant thus sufficiently established that there was no genuine dispute concerning the only material fact that determined the viability of these plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims: the identity of the propoxyphene product ingested. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claims failed as a matter of law.