The Advocate General (AG) of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has handed down an unsurprising opinion on the interpretation of Directive 2003/71/EC (the Prospectus Directive), considering the liability of issuers to qualified investors in respect of inaccuracies in a prospectus: Bankia SA v UMAS (Case C-910/19) EU:C:2021:119 (11 February 2021), (Advocate General Richard de la Tour).
The referral was made by the Spanish Supreme Court on the interpretation of Article 3(2)(a) and Article 6 of the Prospective Directive, which (before its repeal – as discussed further below) provided the framework for a “single passport” for prospectuses throughout the EU. As an EU Directive, it required further implementation measures by EU Member States to be effective. In the UK, the relevant provisions considered by the AG are found at s.90 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA).
The context for the referral was the relatively commonplace scenario in a securities issuance, where an issuer publishes a prospectus to the public at large, and as a consequence it is received by qualified investors as well as retail investors (e.g. where there is a combined offer). The question for the AG was whether the issuer could be liable (under Article 6 of the Prospectus Directive) to qualified investors (as well as retail investors) for any inaccuracies in the prospectus in circumstances where, if the offer had been directed solely at qualified investors, the issuer would have been exempt from publishing the prospectus under Article 3(2)(a) of the Prospectus Directive. If the qualified investor is entitled to bring a claim in these circumstances, the AG was asked if the qualified investor’s awareness of the true situation of the issuer could be taken into consideration.
In response to these questions, the AG’s opinion (which is non-binding but influential on the CJEU) concluded as follows:
- Article 6 of the Prospectus Directive, in light of Article 3(2)(a), must be interpreted as meaning that where an offer of shares to the public for subscription is directed at both retail and qualified investors, and a prospectus is issued, an action for damages arising from the prospectus may be brought by qualified investors; although it is not necessary to publish such a document where the offer concerns exclusively such investors.
- Article 6(2) of the Prospectus Directive must be interpreted as not precluding, in the event of an action in damages being brought by a qualified investor on grounds of an inaccurate prospectus, that investor’s awareness of the true situation of the issuer being taken into consideration besides the inaccurate or incomplete terms of the prospectus, since such awareness may also be taken into account in similar actions for damages and taking it into account does not in practice have the effect of making it impossible or excessively difficult to bring that action, which is a matter for the referring court to determine.
From a UK perspective (and as prefaced above), this is an unsurprising outcome in the context of s.90 FSMA. In particular, because the second point (awareness of the true position of the issuer) is expressly included in the Schedule 10 defences to a s.90 claim.
Securities lawyers will immediately question the impact of the AG’s opinion in the light of the Prospectus Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 and Brexit. Although the Prospectus Regulation repealed and replaced the Prospectus Directive (see our banking litigation blog post), the substance of the Articles considered by the AG have been carried forward into the equivalent Prospectus Regulation provisions.
As to Brexit, although the UK is no longer a member of the EU (following the end of the Brexit transition period on 31 December 2020), the AG’s opinion may still be of relevance to the interpretation of s.90 FSMA claims. S.90 FSMA represents “retained EU law” post-Brexit because it is derived from an EU Directive. In interpreting retained EU law, CJEU decisions post-dating the end of the transition period are not binding on UK courts, although the courts may have regard to them so far as relevant (see our litigation blog post on the practical implications of Brexit for disputes). As noted above, AG opinions are not binding in any event, but this will be the status of the CJEU decision when finally handed down.
The AG’s opinion is considered in more detail below.
In 2011, the appellant Spanish bank (Bank) issued an offer of shares to the public, for the purpose of becoming listed on the Spanish stock exchange. The offer consisted of two tranches: one for retail investors and the other for qualified investors. A book-building period, in which potential qualified investors could submit subscription bids, took place between June and July 2011. As part of the subscription offer, the Bank contacted the respondent (UMAS), a mutual insurance entity and therefore a qualified investor. UMAS agreed to purchase 160,000 shares at a cost of EUR 600,000. The Bank’s annual financial statements were subsequently revised. This led to the shares losing almost all their value on the secondary market and being suspended from trading.
UMAS issued proceedings in the Spanish court against the Bank seeking to annul the share purchase order, on the grounds that the consent was vitiated by error; or alternatively for a declaration that the Bank was liable on the grounds that the prospectus was misleading. Having lost at first instance, the Bank appealed to the Spanish Provincial Court, which dismissed the action for annulment but upheld the alternative action for damages brought against the Bank on the grounds that the prospectus was inaccurate.
On the Bank’s appeal to the Spanish Supreme Court, the court held that neither the Prospectus Directive nor Spanish law expressly provided that it is possible for qualified investors to hold the issuer liable for an inaccurate prospectus where the offer made to the public to subscribe for securities is addressed to both retail and qualified investors.
The Spanish Supreme Court decided to stay the proceedings and referred two key questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling:
- When an offer of shares to the public for subscription is directed at both retail and qualified investors, and a prospectus is issued for the retail investors, is an action for damages arising from the prospectus available to both kinds of investor or only to retail investors?
- In the event that an action for damages arising from the prospectus is also available to qualified investors, is it possible to assess the extent to which they were aware of the economic situation of the issuer of the offer of shares to the public for subscription otherwise than through the prospectus, on the basis of their legal and commercial relations with that issuer (e.g. being shareholders of the issuer or members of its management bodies etc)?
We consider below each of the issues addressed by the AG in his opinion.
Issue 1: Inaccurate prospectus as the basis for a qualified investor’s action for damages
The AG concluded that Article 6 of the Prospectus Directive, in the light of Article 3(2)(a), must be interpreted as meaning that, where an offer of shares to the public for subscription is directed at both retail and qualified investors, and a prospectus is issued, an action for damages arising from the prospectus may be brought by qualified investors, although it is not necessary to publish such a document where the offer concerns exclusively such investors.
In the AG’s view, this interpretation was supported by both a literal/systematic interpretation of the Prospectus Directive, and a teleological interpretation (paying attention to the aim and purpose of EU law).
Before considering each approach to interpretation below, and by way of reminder, Article 3(2)(a) of the Prospectus Directive contains an exemption from the obligation to publish a prospectus where the offer is limited to qualified investors. However, the publication of a prospectus is mandatory where there is a combined offer to the public (i.e. both non-qualified and qualified investors) (Article 3(1)); or in the event of an issue of shares for trading on a regulated market (Article 3(3)).
Considering first the linguistic interpretation of the words used, the AG noted that Article 6 establishes a principle of liability in respect of inaccurate/incomplete prospectuses, but does not provide for an exception to that principle based on the nature of the combined offer, whether it is offered solely to the public or is intended for trading on a regulated market.
The AG contrasted the approach in other provisions of the Prospectus Directive, which do provide for exemptions from the obligation to publish a prospectus, based either on the person to whom the offer is addressed (Article 3(2)(a)), the number of shares or total offer issues (Article 3(2)), or on the nature of the shares issued (Article 4). However, those exemptions from the publication obligation do not prohibit voluntary publication of a prospectus by an issuer who will then benefit from the “single passport” if the shares are issued on a regulated market.
From a systematic perspective, the AG pointed out that the effect of the exemptions was to create circumstances in which qualified investors will receive a prospectus, even if they would not have received one if the offer had been directed solely at qualified investors. For example, where there is a combined offer (as in the present case) or where the prospectus is published voluntarily to benefit from the “single passport”.
The AG commented that the referring court appeared to start from the premise that, since the prospectus was intended solely to protect and inform retail investors, qualified investors could not rely on the inaccuracy of the prospectus in order to bring an action for damages. In the AG’s view, a literal and systematic interpretation of the Prospectus Directive cast doubt on the idea that a prospectus is produced merely in order to protect non-qualified investors.
Teleological interpretation (looking at the aim and purpose of EU law)
The AG said the interpretation of Article 6 of the Prospectus Directive must have regard to and balance two objectives: (i) the completion of a single securities market through the development of access to financial markets; and (ii) the protection of investors whilst taking account of the different requirements for the protection of the various categories of investors and their level of expertise.
Again, in the AG’s view, the presence of exemptions in Articles 3 and 4 versus the lack of any exemptions in Article 6, must lead to an interpretation that where a prospectus exists it must be possible to bring an action for damages on the basis of the inaccuracy of that prospectus irrespective of the type of investor.
The AG also commented that if it were accepted that each Member State could determine itself whether or not qualified investors may bring an action for damages in the event of an inaccurate prospectus, that would lead to possible distortions occurring among Member States that would undermine, disproportionately, the objective of completing the single securities market. A uniform interpretation of Article 6 is required, therefore, concerning persons who may bring proceedings against the issuer in connection with an offer.
Issue 2: Qualified investor’s awareness of the true situation of the issuer
The AG concluded that a Member State has the discretion to provide in its legislation or regulations that awareness by a qualified investor of the true situation of the issuer should be taken into account, in the event of an action for damages being brought by a qualified investor on the grounds of an inaccurate prospectus (i.e. that Article 6(2) does not preclude this principle). However, this is subject to the condition that the principles of effectiveness and equivalence are observed.
The AG said that the extent of liability for inaccuracies in a prospectus is a matter for Member States (in terms of whether to take account of the contributory fault of the investor and questions of causation). Accepting that Member States may factor in the awareness of a qualified investor in their legislation, the AG drew an analogy with the reasoning of the CJEU’s decision in Hirmann C‑174/12, EU:C:2013:856. In Hirmann, the court accepted that a Member State may limit the civil liability of the issuer by limiting the amount of compensation by reference to the date on which the share price is determined for the compensation (although again, the Member State must observe the principles of equivalence and effectiveness).
In terms of observing those principles of equivalence and effectiveness, the AG emphasised the need to take the investor’s awareness into consideration specifically in a given situation, which will require the courts of Member States to assess the evidence of such awareness and of the extent to which that awareness has been taken into consideration.