It took barely 11 pages for the Board to dismiss this Section 2(d) opposition to registration of the mark MISS G-STRING INTERNATIONAL & Design for "entertainment services in the nature of conducting beauty pageants and talent contest (sic)" [G-STRING INTERNATIONAL disclaimed]. Finding the first du Pont factor to be dispositive, the Board concluded that the applied-for mark is not likely to cause confusion with the registered mark MISS NUDE INTERNATIONAL for "entertainment services in the nature of promoting and conducting beauty pageants" [NUDE INTERNATIONAL disclaimed]. The World Pageants, LLC and Camila Productions Ltd. v. Miss G-String International LLC, Opposition No. 91200183 (July 29, 2013) [not precedential].

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Standing: Applicant G-String claimed that it was the owner of the registration relied on by Opposer Nude by way of a certain court judgment in Florida, but the Board pointed out that it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate issue arising under Florida law. According to the records of the USPTO, Opposer Nude is the owner of the pleaded registration, and that sufficed to establish standing.

Likelihood of Confusion: Beginning with the second and third du Pont factors, the Board found the involved services to be identical. It therefore presumed that the services are offered in the same channels of trade to the same classes of consumers. Nonetheless, "confusion in not likely because of the crucial difference in the marks."

The Board found that the dominant portion of Applicant G-String's mark is comprised of the word G-STRING, which is depicted in gold script and is larger than the other words in the mark, and the depiction of a pink g-string. The words MISS and INTERNATIONAL, the only elements common with Opposer Nude's mark, are very small in comparison.

[W]e find that the overall commercial impression of Applicant's mark is dominated by the word G-STRING and its design feature, a pink G-STRING, which emphasizes the word "G-STRING," and that this weighs heavily against a conclusion that confusion is likely.

The Board acknowledged that when the services of the parties are identical, a lesser degree of similarity between the marks is necessary to support a finding of likely confusion. "But Applicant's mark is so different from the registered mark that even when used on identical services, confusion is unlikely. 'No mechanical rule determines likelihood of confusion, and each case requires weighing of the facts and circumstances of the particular mark.'" In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

Citing Kellogg Co. v. Pack’em Enterprises Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 21 USPQ2d 1142, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("We know of no reason why, in a particular case, a single du Pont factor may not be dispositive"), the Board dismissed the opposition.