This was a light week at the Court of Appeal, as there were only three substantive civil decisions.

In Wang v Canada, the Court of Appeal held that habeas corpus applies not only to detention in prison, but in any situation where the applicant’s liberty is curtailed, such as house arrest.

Other topics included a professional negligence claim against a lawyer, a jurisdictional dispute in respect of an oppression claim, a summary judgment for fraud, and an appeal of a jury’s damage award in an MVA trial.

Wishing everyone a Happy Thanksgiving long weekend.

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Wang v. Canada, 2018 ONCA 798

Keywords: Immigration Law, Admissibility, Refugee Claims, Unlawful Detention, Habeas Corpus, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, May v. Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82, Chaudhary v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 ONCA 700, R. v. Gamble, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595

Inspektor v. Solmon, 2018 ONCA 796

Keywords: Solicitor and Client, Professional Negligence, Settlements

RJM56 Holdings Inc. v. Michel Bazinet, 2018 ONCA 791

Keywords: Corporations, Oppression, Torts, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Civil Procedure, Jurisdiction, Forum Non Conveniens, Applications, Canadian Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 44 s. 241, Black v Breeden, 2012 SCC 19, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 666, Incorporated Broadcasters Ltd. v Canwest Global Communications Corp., 63 O.R. (3d) 431 (C.A.), Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 14.05(3)(h)

1802248 Ontario Ltd. (Anytime Fitness) v. Allen, 2018 ONCA 808

Keywords: Torts, Fraud, Damages, Reasonable Foreseeability, Corporations, Remedies, Piercing Corporate Veil, Transamerica Life Insurance Company of Canada v Canada Life Assurance Company et al. (1996), 28 OR (3d) 423 (Gen Div), affd [1997] OJ No 3754 (CA)

Mamado v. Fridson, 2018 ONCA 806

Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Motor Vehicle Accident, Damages, Trial Fairness, Jury Charge, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Kelly v. Palazzo, (2008), 89 O.R. (3d) 111 (C.A.)

Short Civil Decisions

Jensen v. Chicoine, 2018 ONCA 793

Keywords: Real Estate, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Deposits, Contracts, Interpretation

Juneau-Tripp v. Rilkey, 2018 ONCA 797 (Appeal Book Endorsement)

Keywords: Family Law, Child Support, Section 7 Expenses, Access, Costs

McLaughlin v. Canadian Service Management Inc., 2018 ONCA 799 (Appeal Book Endorsement)

Keywords: Real Estate, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Abatement of Purchase Price, Palpable and Overriding Error, Welsh v. Karan, 2018 ONSC 804

McLaughlin v. Canadian Service Management Inc., 2018 ONCA 799 (Appeal Book Endorsement)

Keywords: Real Estate, Easements, Promissory Estoppel, Negligent Misrepresentation, Punitive Damages

Wood v. CTS of Canada Co., 2018 ONCA 804

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Offers to Settle, Costs, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49

Criminal Decisions

R. v. Burnett, 2018 ONCA 790

Keywords: Criminal Law, Drug Trafficking, Evidence, Admissibility, Expert Evidence, Jury Instructions, Mens Rea, Motive, Wilful Blindness, Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c19, s. 6(3)(a)(i)

R. v. Onyedinefu, 2018 ONCA 795

Keywords: Criminal Law,Importing Heroin, Possession of Heroin for the Purpose of Trafficking, Mens Rea, Wilful Blindness, Evidence, Burden of Proof, Trial Fairness, Sentencing, Bell v. The Queen, [1983] 2 SCR 471, R. v. Foster, 2018 ONCA 53

R. v. K.L., 2018 ONCA 792

Keywords: Criminal Law, Assault, Sexual Assault, Trial Fairness, Cross-examination, Jury Charge

R. v. Marshall, 2018 ONCA 794

Keywords: Criminal Law, Fraud over $5,000, Sentencing, Conditional Sentence, R. v. Tran, 2017 SCC 50

R. v. Kizir, 2018 ONCA 781

Keywords: Criminal Law, Conspiracy to Traffic Illegal Substances, Dangerous Possession of Weapons, Conspiracy to Assault, Money Laundering. Sentencing, Principle of Parity, Enhanced Credit

R. v. LaPierre, 2018 ONCA 801

Keywords: Criminal Law, Second-Degree Murder, Assault, Sentencing, Fresh Evidence, Mental Illness, Not Criminally Responsible, Parole Ineligibility, R. v. Palmer, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759

R v. Shute, 2018 ONCA 805

Keywords: Criminal Law, Aggravated Assault, Breach of Probation, Sentencing, Pretrial Custody, Fresh Evidence

CIVIL DECISIONS

Wang v. Canada, 2018 ONCA 798

[Hourigan, Nordheimer and Harvison Young JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R. Galati, for the appellants

J. Todd and N. Dodokin, for the respondents

Keywords:Immigration Law, Admissibility, Refugee Claims, Unlawful Detention, Habeas Corpus, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, May v. Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82, Chaudhary v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 ONCA 700, R. v. Gamble, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595

Facts:

The appellants were foreign nationals who were in Canada on temporary resident visas. The Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”) received information that the appellants had multiple identities, were fugitives from China, and had entered into a scheme in which they had defrauded approximately 60,000 people of approximately $180,000,000.

The CBSA arrested the appellants under s. 55 of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and detained them for an admissibility hearing on the grounds of misrepresentation. That admissibility hearing never occurred. The appellants made refugee claims that, by operation of law, precluded the hearing.

Over a period of 14 months, the appellants were the subjects of three detention reviews. On each occasion, the Immigration Division ordered the appellants’ continued detention, finding they were unlikely to appear and had both the willingness and financial means to elude detection in Canada. The appellants sought judicial review of all three of the Immigration Division’s decisions, and each decision, in turn, was quashed by the Federal Court.

The appellants were released from detention following the third judicial review application, subject to terms and conditions that the appellants had proposed. Those terms and conditions amounted to virtual house arrest. In addition, the appellants were required to pay for the costs of armed security guards to maintain a 24/7 presence outside of their home, one positioned at the front of the home and the other at the rear. The cost of maintaining this security was borne by the appellants and cost approximately $130,000/month.

The appellants later requested and obtained modifications to their terms and conditions of release, which permitted them to spend time outside in their backyard, and to leave their home, under security escort, for outings related to groceries, banking, and church services.

The appellants then filed another application with the Immigration Division to make further modifications to their terms and conditions. That application was rejected. The appellants did not seek judicial review of this decision, instead filing the application for habeas corpus.

The application judge dismissed the application, giving detailed reasons. He identified the central issue as “whether the applicants’ current house arrest amounts to a detention or deprivation of their liberty”. He concluded that once the appellants were released from custody, they were no longer “detained” for the purpose of habeas corpus.

The appellants appealed.

Issues:

(1) Does habeas corpus apply where a person seeks to challenge a deprivation of liberty that arises from a situation other than being held in a custodial facility?

Holding:

Appeal allowed.

Reasoning:

(1) Yes. The Court of Appeal concluded that the application judge erred in two related respects: first, he equated detention for the purposes of habeas corpus with incarceration in a custodial facility; and second, he appeared to have restricted the operation of habeas corpus only to situations where a person is formally detained rather than to broader situations where liberty interests are infringed. Put differently, the application judge wrongly concluded that in order for there to be an infringement of liberty, to which the writ of habeas corpus could apply, there had to be a detention of the individual in a custodial facility.

Undertaking a thorough review of the relevant case law and academic authorities, the Court of Appeal concluded that the application judge’s decision did not accord with the fundamental values that underlie the principle of habeas corpus. Stated in broad terms, that purpose is the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty. The Court of Appeal stressed that the protection was not restricted to imprisonment, instead including any form of restraint upon liberty.

With respect to the authorities on which the application judge relied in reaching his decision, the Court of Appeal concluded first that the application judge misapplied certain case law by misinterpreting the analysis and treating obiter as binding, and second, that some of that case law was itself wrong in law.

Accordingly, the application judge’s ruling was fundamentally compromised and did not accurately reflect the law of habeas corpus in Canada. The appeal was therefore allowed and the matter remitted to the Superior Court for a fresh hearing in accordance with the Court of Appeal’s reasons.

Inspektor v. Solmon, 2018 ONCA 796

[Simmons, Miller and Fairburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

E. R. Inspektor, acting in person

I. McKellar, for the respondent

Keywords:Solicitor and Client, Professional Negligence, Settlements

Facts:

The appellants claimed that the respondent was professionally negligent in failing to protect their interests in the negotiation of the settlement of an action against them. They also maintained that the respondent failed to account for funds paid towards their legal bill and misappropriated other funds secured by a mortgage, and consequently owed them money. The respondent brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the appellants’ action. The motion judge observed that the record demonstrated that the appellants were fully informed of the terms of the settlement agreement, had chosen to agree to those terms, and that the terms inured to their benefit. Moreover, there was no evidence to suggest that the respondent’s billings were inappropriate or excessive. The motion judge dismissed the appellants’ action on the basis that there was no genuine issue for trial.

The appellants raised three grounds of appeal. On the first ground of appeal, the appellants submitted that the motion judge erred in three respects in characterizing the allegations in their statement of claim. First, the motion judge characterized the claim as being about an improvident settlement when it actually was about the respondent’s failure to negotiate a non-disparagement clause. Second, the motion judge misconstrued their position regarding the respondent’s billings by characterizing the issue as whether the respondent charged them too much for services rendered, when their complaint was that the respondent had misappropriated $150,000 from a mortgage given to his firm to secure specific legal fees. Third and finally, the respondent should not have been permitted to address certain facts in his affidavit filed in response to their claim.

On the second ground of appeal, the appellants submitted that the motion judge failed to review and give sufficient weight to the documentary evidence they filed, and in particular to give effect to documentary evidence relating to fees charged by, and monies paid to, the respondent. On the third and final ground of appeal, the appellants submitted that the motion judge erred in concluding that there was no genuine issue for trial.

Issues:

(1) Did the motion judge err by characterizing the allegations in the statement of claim:

(a) As being about an improvident settlement?

(b) As being excessive billing and not misappropriation of funds? and

(c) As allowing the respondent to address certain facts in his affidavit?

(2) Did the motion judge err in failing to review and give proper weight to documentary evidence filed by the appellants?

(3) Did the motion judge err in concluding that there was no genuine issue for trial?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

(1) No. The Court found that the motion judge had properly characterized the issues contained in the statement of claim:

(a) The motion judge specifically addressed the issue raised on appeal, and simply rejected the allegation made. The motion judge noted that the record showed that the respondent advised the appellants that a non-disparagement clause would not be agreed to by the plaintiffs in the predicate action, but that the settlement was still advantageous, which was acknowledged by the appellants.

(b) The Court found that read contextually, the statement of claim showed that the appellants alleged that the respondent charged too much for services rendered. Moreover, the appellants’ factum to the Court alleged that the respondent charged them too much. The Court found that the motion judge had accurately summarized the appellants’ complaint and rejected it. Moreover, as a practical matter, nothing turned on this issue as one of the appellants had signed a statutory declaration acknowledging that he owed the respondent an amount of money far exceeding the $150,000 claim.

(c) The Court found that the appellants alleged serious misconduct on the part of the respondent, and it was open to him to address the issues raised in order to defend against those allegations.

(2) No. The Court found that it was unnecessary for the motion judge to review the entire record before him in his reasons. The failure to advert to some evidence did not mean it had not been considered. Read contextually, the reasons of the motion judge made clear that he had regard to the whole record and relied on documents that were material to the issues before him. Moreover, the Court found that the referenced documents did not contradict the documentary evidence provided by the respondent concerning fees charged, fees reimbursed by the insurer or monies acknowledged by the respondent as having been paid.

(3) No. The Court found that the motion judge understood the test for granting summary judgment and correctly reviewed the law on this point. The test focuses on material facts, and the facts in dispute on the appeal were not material to the resolution of this matter. It was open to the motion judge to find that there was no genuine issue for trial.

RJM56 Holdings Inc. v. Michel Bazinet, 2018 ONCA 791

[Simmons, Miller and Fairburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Solmon and C. Wetmore, for the appellants

C. Colraine and M. Di Giovanni, for the respondent, M.B.

L. Fuerst and T. Brook, for the respondent, Replicor Inc.

Keywords: Corporations, Oppression, Torts, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Civil Procedure, Jurisdiction, Forum Non Conveniens, Applications, Canadian Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 44 s. 241, Black v Breeden, 2012 SCC 19, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 666, Incorporated Broadcasters Ltd. v Canwest Global Communications Corp., 63 O.R. (3d) 431 (C.A.), Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 14.05(3)(h)

Facts:

This appeal arose from a motion judge’s characterization of the appellants’ claim as one for oppression under the Canadian Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 44 (the “CBCA”). Relying on Incorporated Broadcasters Ltd. v Canwest Global Communications Corp., 63 O.R. (3d) 431 (C.A.), the motion judge found that Ontario was forum non conveniens. Although many of the factors in the analysis did not satisfy what he described as “the heavy burden at play” for a stay of the Ontario application, he concluded that the core of the dispute involved shareholders’ dissatisfaction with internal management issues of a company based in Quebec, which dictated that any proceeding be dealt with there.

The appellants appealed the motion judge’s decision, arguing that he erred by misconstruing their claim as simply for oppression, and by failing to appreciate that it also included a common law claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. The appellants further contended that had the motion judge understood the broader scope of the claim, he would have understood that it had a strong connection to Ontario, where the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations were made. The appellants argued on appeal that this was an error in principle.

Issues:

(1) Did the motion judge err in construing the appellants’ claim as simply being for oppression and not including a common law claim for fraudulent misrepresentation?

(2) Did the motion judge err by failing to consider or give proper weight to relevant factors and by taking account of irrelevant factors in holding that Ontario was forum non conveniens?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

(1) No. The motion judge made no error in characterizing the claim that was in front of him. In a factum filed before the motion judge, the appellants characterized their claim as an “oppression application brought pursuant to s.241 of the [CBCA]” and “a statutory oppression application based on material misrepresentations”. They commenced their proceeding by application and chose not to sue by action for fraudulent misrepresentation. The appellants claimed that pursuant to rule 14.05(3)(h) of the Rules of Civil Procedure any common law claim for fraudulent misrepresentation they may wish to pursue could proceed by application even where an action would be the norm. However, the Court found that argument was a significant stretch. The rule requires that “it will unlikely that there will be any material facts in dispute”, and the Court found that the chance this would be satisfied was remote given the nature of the claim.

(2) No. The motion judge did not err in his analysis. The motion judge properly took account of the ongoing Ontario defamation action in reaching his decision, and the Court found that the appellant’s argument concerning this issue was no more than a request to have the Court reweigh the relevant considerations. The Court stated that the forum non conveniens analysis is discretionary and that it is not the Court’s function on appeal to exercise its own discretion anew, citing Black v Breeden, 2012 SCC 19, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 666. The motion judge was correct in noting that there would be no extraordinary costs involved in moving the case to Quebec given the early stage in the proceeding, and the presence of case management in Ontario failed to convince the Court that the case would necessarily proceed more quickly or effectively in Ontario than in Quebec. The motion judge also did not err in his references to the Quebec oppression proceeding or in considering events following the alleged misrepresentations.

1802248 Ontario Ltd (Anytime Fitness) v Allen, 2018 ONCA 808

[Hourigan, Miller and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

E. Spong, for the appellants

S. R. Fairley, for the respondents

Keywords: Torts, Fraud, Damages, Reasonable Foreseeability, Corporations, Remedies, Piercing Corporate Veil, Transamerica Life Insurance Company of Canada v Canada Life Assurance Company et al. (1996), 28 OR (3d) 423 (Gen Div), affd [1997] OJ No 3754 (CA)

Facts:

The respondents operated a fitness club business that they owned through 1802248 Ontario Ltd. (“180”). The respondents and appellants executed an Asset Purchase Agreement (the “Agreement”) with 2487048 Ontario Ltd. (“248”) as the purchaser, acquiring 180’s equipment, goodwill, and interest in its leased premises. This Agreement was drafted without counsel.

248 was wholly owned and controlled by the appellants, and was incorporated for the sole purpose of acquiring the assets of 180. The appellants took possession of the premises and equipment and began operating the business as of November 1, 2015. 248 was to assume 180’s obligation under the lease and to assume two loans to 180 for equipment and leasehold improvements.

While the respondents entered into an agreement for the assumption of the lease by 248, 180 remained jointly and severally liable for the tenant’s obligations for the remainder of the term of the lease. The respondents remained personally liable under the lease in the event that 248 defaulted, and personally liable under a previous rent deferment agreement.

248 was unable to obtain approval from the respondents’ bank to assume 180’s two loans. The respondents arranged to repay the loans, in exchange for a promissory note from 248. Once in possession of the premises and operating the fitness club, the appellants refused to sign the promissory note, placed a stop payment on a cheque provided to the respondents, and raised objections with respect to the two loans. 248 immediately defaulted on the obligations under the lease, triggering the respondents’ obligation to indemnify the landlord.

The motion judge found there was no genuine issue for trial. He found 248 liable and awarded judgment against it. After a supplementary hearing on the issue of personal liability, the motion judge found that the appellants were the controlling minds of 248, and had “used 248 to engage in improper and dishonest conduct.”

Issues:

(1) Did the motion judge err in his interpretation of the Agreement?

(2) Did the motion judge err finding that 248’s breach of the Agreement made it liable for damages the respondents incurred when they were unable to pay rent to the landlord?

(3) Was there evidence of the appellants committing fraud?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

(1) No, the motion judge did not err in his interpretation of the Agreement. The motion judge made no error in observing the ambiguity in the language of the Agreement. The motion judge applied the only contractually reasonable interpretation of the Agreement, which was that the purchase price included equipment and leasehold improvements.

(2) No, the motion judge did not err in finding that 248’s breach of the Agreement made it liable for damages the respondents incurred. There was no merit to this argument. The appellants breached the Agreement by failing to make any of the required payments. It was entirely foreseeable that a consequence of this breach would be that the respondents would be unable to meet their obligations to the landlord and would become liable under the rent deferment agreement.

(3) Yes, there was substantial evidence that the appellants committed fraud. The motion judge ably chronicled the appellants’ actions and drew the inference that the appellants took the respondents’ business without intending to pay for it: 2017 ONSC 7041. These findings were available on the evidence and there was no basis to interfere with them.

Mamado v. Fridson, 2018 ONCA 806

[Hourigan, Miller and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S. G. Ross and E. Crochetière, for the appellants

J. V. Katz and J. J. Adair, for the respondent

Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Motor Vehicle Accident, Damages, Trial Fairness, Jury Charge, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Kelly v. Palazzo, (2008), 89 O.R. (3d) 111 (C.A.)

Facts:

The respondent was injured in a car accident. She sued the appellants. Just before the trial, the appellants admitted liability. The trial proceeded as an assessment of damages before a jury. The appellants alleged that the respondent was malingering. They were ordered to pay substantial damages.

The appellants appealed on three grounds.

Issue:

(1) Did the trial judge fail to properly address the transgressions of the respondent’s counsel at trial?

(2) Did the trial judge unfairly summarize the evidence in her instructions to the jury, resulting in an unbalanced and unfair charge?

(3) Did the trial judge display a reasonable apprehension of bias?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

(1) No. Many of the complaints on appeal were not objected to at the time. The Court of Appeal noted that while a failure to object will not sanitize all imperfections in a trial, it is nevertheless often a good indicator of the events in question being harmless.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants’ claim that trial fairness was sacrificed when the appellants’ psychiatrist was cross-examined, finding that there was little, if any, prejudice in this evidence, the accuracy of which was not disputed.

The Court of Appeal similarly rejected the appellants’ complaint about the trial judge’s decision to issue a correcting instruction, rather than declare a mistrial, with respect to a comment by the respondent’s counsel in his opening address about the appellants’ late admission of liability. The trial judge instructed the jury that the timing of the admission was irrelevant, which was appropriate in the circumstances. The appellants declined to object to a similar comment by respondent’s counsel in his closing address.

(2) No. The appellants complained of how the trial judge framed the potential range of general damages by improperly indicating that the minimum amount should be $20,000, but the Court of Appeal noted that this was simply a reflection of the amount that the appellants’ counsel indicated during pre-charge discussions that she would be suggesting. In other words, the trial judge was simply indicating the amount that the appellants’ counsel had herself suggested.

Similarly, purported inaccuracies in the jury instructions were taken out of context. The trial judge was simply summarizing the respondent’s evidence, ultimately instructing the jury that they alone were to be the sole judges of the facts.

Lastly, the Court of Appeal rejected the appellants’ argument that the trial judge showed a negative attitude towards the defence experts. Any comments in the trial judge’s ruling on admissibility would not have been before the jury, and in any event, there was nothing inappropriate in that ruling. Moreover, the trial judge’s comments in her instructions were accurate and balanced.

(3) No. The Court of Appeal noted that it was unclear why this ground of appeal was advanced, and cautioned that alleging bias is a matter not to be undertaken lightly. The appellants’ complaints did not come remotely close to satisfying the very high standard required to displace the strong presumption of impartiality of Canadian judges.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Jensen v. Chicoine, 2018 ONCA 793

[Simmons, Miller and Fairburn JJ.A.]

D. G. Christie, for the appellants

B. R. Kelly, for the respondents

Keywords: Real Estate, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Deposits, Contracts, Interpretation

Juneau-Tripp v. Rilkey, 2018 ONCA 797 (Appeal Book Endorsement)

[Hourigan, Miller and Trotter JJ.A.]

J. D. Juneau-Tripp, acting in person

E. A. Rilkey, acting in person

Keywords: Family Law, Child Support, Section 7 Expenses, Access, Costs

McLaughlin v. Canadian Service Management Inc., 2018 ONCA 799 (Appeal Book Endorsement)

[Hourigan, Miller and Trotter JJ.A.]

J. S. Winny, for the appellants

No one appearing for the respondent

Keywords: Real Estate, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Abatement of Purchase Price, Palpable and Overriding Error, Welsh v. Karan, 2018 ONSC 804

Visnjic Estate v. LaSalle (Town), 2018 ONCA 803

[Hourigan, Miller and Trotter JJ.A.]

L. Di Pierdomenico, for the appellants

P. Brennan and S. Mulholland, for the respondent

Keywords: Real Property, Easements, Promissory Estoppel, Negligent Misrepresentation, Punitive Damages

Wood v. CTS of Canada Co., 2018 ONCA 804

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Brown and Trotter JJ.A.]

T. Pinos, K. Taylor and C. Russell, for the appellants

S. Moreau and G. Cantin, for the respondents

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Offers to Settle, Costs, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49

CRIMINAL DECISIONS

R. v. Burnett, 2018 ONCA 790

[LaForme, Watt and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

P. Alexander, for the appellant

L. Mathews, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Drug Trafficking, Evidence, Admissibility, Expert Evidence, Jury Instructions, Mens Rea, Motive, Wilful Blindness, Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c19, s. 6(3)(a)(i)

R. v. Onyedinefu, 2018 ONCA 795

[LaForme, Watt and Trotter JJ.A.]

P. Calarco, for the appellant

S. Shaikh, for the respondent

Keywords:Criminal Law,Importing Heroin, Possession of Heroin for the Purpose of Trafficking, Mens Rea, Wilful Blindness, Evidence, Burden of Proof, Trial Fairness, Sentencing, Bell v. The Queen, [1983] 2 SCR 471, R. v. Foster, 2018 ONCA 53

R. v. K.L., 2018 ONCA 792

[LaForme, Watt and Trotter JJ.A.]

A. Ostroff, for the appellant

D. Friesen, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Assault, Sexual Assault, Trial Fairness, Cross-examination, Jury Charge

R v. Marshall, 2018 ONCA 794

[LaForme, Watt and Trotter JJ.A.]

G. Lafontaine, for the appellant

E. Whitford, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Fraud over $5,000, Sentencing, Conditional Sentence, R. v. Tran, 2017 SCC 50

R. v. Kizir, 2018 ONCA 781

[Pepall, Lauwers and Fairburn JJ.A.]

I. B. Kasper, for the appellant

N. Somji, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Conspiracy to Traffic Illegal Substances, Dangerous Possession of Weapons, Conspiracy to Assault, Money Laundering. Sentencing, Principle of Parity, Enhanced Credit

R. v. LaPierre, 2018 ONCA 801

[MacPherson, Huscroft and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

J. C. Fleming, for the appellant

E. H. Siebenmorgen, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Second-Degree Murder, Assault, Sentencing, Fresh Evidence, Mental Illness, Not Criminally Responsible, Parole Ineligibility, R. v. Palmer, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759

R v. Shute, 2018 ONCA 805

[Sharpe, Lauwers and van Rensburg JJ.A]

S. C. Hutchison and Karen Heith, for the appellant

N. Rivers, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Aggravated Assault, Breach of Probation, Sentencing, Pretrial Custody, Fresh Evidence