On July 25, a Florida judge for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit dismissed criminal charges against an individual engaged in the business of selling bitcoin. Florida v. Espinoza, No. F14-2923 (Fl. Cir. Ct. July 26, 2016). The defendant conducted various bitcoin transactions with an undercover detective. The State of Florida had charged the individual with one count of unlawfully engaging in business as a money services business in violation of § 560.125(5)(a), Fla. Stat. and two counts of money laundering, in violation of § 896.101(5)(a) and (5)(b), Fla. Stat. The State later amended its filing to include charges of unlawfully operating as a “payment instrument seller” in violation of § 560.103(29), Fla. Stat. The judge dismissed the money-transmission-related charges, reasoning that (i) under the plain meaning of § 560.125(5)(a), a “money transmitter” would operate in a similar manner as a middleman in a financial transaction; and (ii) case law “requires that a fee must be charged to meet all the elements of being a money transmitter business.” The defendant, according to the judge, was not a middleman, but rather a seller. The judge further noted that the “difference in the price he purchased the Bitcoin for and what he sold it for is the difference between cost and expenses, the widely accepted definition of profit.” The judge also found that the defendant was not a “payment instrument seller” because bitcoin is not a payment instrument. The judge stated that “[b]itcoin has a long way to go before it is the equivalent of money,” and that “attempting to fit the sale of Bitcoin into a statutory scheme regulating money services businesses is like fitting a square peg in a round hole.” The judge further dismissed the counts of money laundering, ultimately concluding that “[w]ithout legislative action geared towards a much needed updated to the particular language within [the relevant statutes], this Court finds that there is insufficient evidence as a matter of law that this Defendant committed any of the crimes as charged, and is, therefore, compelled to grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Counts II and III.”