Standard of liabilityGeneral standard
What is the standard for determining whether a board member or executive may be held liable to shareholders in connection with an M&A transaction?
There are three primary standards for assessing director conduct in M&A transactions: the business judgement rule, enhanced scrutiny and entire fairness.
Business judgement rule
When the business judgement rule applies, courts generally will not second-guess the decisions of directors.
This is an intermediate standard of review applicable to M&A transactions involving control of a company that requires directors to satisfy certain conditions before they will enjoy the benefits of the business judgement rule. For example, forms of enhanced scrutiny apply to transactions involving a break-up of a corporation and to defensive measures adopted by directors in response to a potential change in control.
Courts will require directors to prove the entire fairness of an M&A transaction in which a majority of directors are interested or that involves a controlling shareholder. The defendants bear the burden of proving entire fairness.
In many litigations involving M&A transactions, the standard of review that the court chooses to apply will be dispositive. Where a court applies the business judgement rule, decisions made by a board of directors are upheld in the vast majority of cases. In contrast, an entire fairness review strongly favours plaintiff shareholders because it switches the burden of proof by forcing the defendant directors to affirmatively prove that all aspects of the process and price were fair.Type of transaction
Does the standard vary depending on the type of transaction at issue?
Yes, in certain cases. For example, enhanced scrutiny applies and ‘Revlon duties’ are implicated when a company initiates an active bidding process involving a clear break-up of the company; when, in response to an offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction; or when approval of a transaction results in a ‘change of control’.
Interested transactions (eg, a going private transaction with a controlling shareholder) are subject to the entire fairness test. Other M&A transactions (eg, a merger of equals between two public corporations with no controlling shareholder) are, generally, subject to the business judgement rule.Type of consideration
Does the standard vary depending on the type of consideration being paid to the seller’s shareholders?
Yes, in certain cases. In a cash-out merger where shareholders will have their investment in the ongoing enterprise terminated, Revlon duties will apply and courts will consider whether directors have taken reasonable steps to provide shareholders with the best transaction reasonably available. A stock-for-stock merger in which control of the combined entity will remain in a fluid market, by contrast, generally will not trigger enhanced scrutiny. Transactions involving a mixture of cash and stock are assessed on a case-by-case basis, although enhanced scrutiny will generally apply when 50 per cent or more of the consideration that shareholders receive is in cash.Potential conflicts of interest
Does the standard vary if one or more directors or officers have potential conflicts of interest in connection with an M&A transaction?
A transaction in which a majority of directors are interested will be subject to the entire fairness test. Under the entire fairness test, the burden of proof is on the board of directors to show that the transaction was the product of a fair process that resulted in an objectively fair price. The entire fairness test is fact-intensive by nature and often requires resolution by trial (and not pretrial motion practice).Controlling shareholders
Does the standard vary if a controlling shareholder is a party to the transaction or is receiving consideration in connection with the transaction that is not shared rateably with all shareholders?
Yes. A transaction in which a controlling shareholder is a party or has an interest different from other shareholders ordinarily will be scrutinised under the entire fairness test. However, the business judgement rule can apply to a transaction with a controlling shareholder if the transaction is conditioned upon approval by a fully empowered special committee of disinterested and independent directors; and the transaction is conditioned upon approval by an informed and non-coerced vote by a majority of the minority shareholders.
Where only one of these two conditions is met, the entire fairness test will continue to apply, but the burden will shift to the plaintiff to prove the unfairness of the transaction.