The principal issue is excessive pricing; … the reason for our conclusion is that the judge erred in holding that the economic value of the pre-race data was its competitive price based on cost +. This method of ascertaining the economic value of this product is too narrow in that it does not take account, or sufficient account, of the value of the pre-race data … and in that it ties the costs allowable in cost+ too closely to the costs of producing the pre-race data.

Thus concluded the Court of Appeal some 10 years ago in overturning a High Court judgment identifying an abuse of dominance through excessive pricing, in that case of pre-race data about British horse races.

The chequered history of excessive pricing cases has repeated itself in 2018, with the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s 7 June judgment in the appeals by Pfizer and Flynn of the CMA’s excessive pricing Decision in relation to phenytoin sodium capsules (we’ve previously covered this here, here, and here). In a blow to the CMA’s ground-breaking case, the CAT has taken issue with the CMA’s analysis of abuse. As a result, it is considering whether to remit this part of the Decision (and consequential findings, such as the penalties imposed) back to the CMA, and essentially let the CMA try again.

The CAT has succinctly summarised its main conclusions here. The findings on market definition and dominance have been upheld, but the controversial findings on abuse have been set aside. This post guides readers through the key points.

What was the CMA actually arguing?

In its Decision, the CMA sought to apply the Court of Justice’s United Brands ‘two-limb’ test for excessive and unfair pricing, and it was on this that the grounds of appeal focussed.

During the appeal hearing, however, the CMA seemed to place greater emphasis on the comparison of prices before and after the Pfizer-Flynn agreement, perhaps in reliance on AG Wahl’s opinion in the AKKA/LAA case that competition authorities should have flexibility to determine their own framework for assessing prices. While the CAT acknowledged that significant price increases over time may be a useful indicator of a potential competition problem, and a reason for starting an investigation, this “should not be confused with the test for unfair pricing itself” (439). This therefore does not seem to be an easy route for the CMA to take on remittal.

The CAT’s analysis of the United Brands test

Taking the CAT’s approach to the two limbs of the United Brands test separately:

(i) Whether the difference between the costs actually incurred and the price actually charged is excessive

The CAT did not conclude that facts established by the CMA could not give rise to a finding of excessive prices. Rather, it was the CMA’s narrow approach to the assessment of excessive pricing which could not support such a conclusion. The CMA’s use of only a Cost Plus methodology resulted in a price that would have existed under conditions of “idealised competition”, rather than in the ‘real world’. If the Cost Plus figure was not the normal competitive price, then it was not the right price for the purposes of the United Brands test. Instead, the CAT should have looked at wider evidence to establish a benchmark price (or range) based on circumstances of “normal and sufficiently effective” competition. If the Decision is remitted back to the CMA, it may use Cost Plus as part of the methodology, but it will also need to put those theoretical figures in their full market and commercial context.

As to the benchmark figures themselves, which used the PPRS derived 6% return on sales, the CAT seemed to accept the PPRS was a potentially relevant indicator, but found the CMA placed too much reliance on it – particularly as Department of Health evidence expressed doubts as to its relevance. The CAT cautioned that the PPRS was intended to apply in different circumstances to those in this case.

(ii) Whether a price has been imposed which is either unfair in itself or when compared to competing products

The second limb of the United Brands test appears to give regulators two options: the issue here was whether these were genuine alternatives (as the CMA had only considered the first, ‘unfair in itself’), or whether the CMA should have considered both. The CAT found that, although the CMA did not need to succeed under both to show a price was unfair, it did need to consider whether the alternative would show a price is one that undermines the basis of a finding of unfairness, in particular where a party under investigation has raised the issue. While the CAT does not refer to the recent Intel judgment of the CJEU, there is a flavour of its ruling here.

The CMA had determined that there were no products which could provide a ‘meaningful comparison’, but the CAT found that the CMA’s argument to support this was at fault, and it should have considered the suitability of comparators in more depth. In particular, tablets produced by Teva were around twice the price of the Pfizer-Flynn Capsules; but this price came from an agreement with the Department of Health which reflected the economic value of the Teva tablets. Even though those tablets were accepted by the CAT to be outside the relevant market as defined, they appeared to be sufficiently comparable to be worthy of more in-depth consideration. The contrast drawn between the narrow function of market definition and the wider consideration of competitive constraints relevant in considering abuse is an important and sensible contribution to Article 102 case law generally.

The CAT found that the question of the ‘economic value’ of the Pfizer-Flynn Capsules (which the CMA had considered separately) was best addressed in the context of the ‘Unfairness Limb’. The CMA had found that the economic value did not exceed the Cost Plus price it had calculated, and considered that there were no non-cost factors which served to increase it. However, the CAT expressed concern that the evident economic value derived from the benefit patients received had been rejected. Although the CAT acknowledged that patients did only have limited choices, the CAT found that the CMA should still have attempted a qualitative assessment of this benefit. Assigning a monetary value to this benefit and assessing by how much it should be reduced due to patients’ limited choices is likely to be difficult.

Findings of abuse set aside

The CAT decided that further assessment of competitive conditions using information beyond the scope of the Decision would be required. For that reason, the CAT could not make its own findings as to whether there was an abuse by either company. Instead, it has provisionally proposed to remit the abuse section Decision back to the CMA, but will now fix a further hearing for the parties to address it on this point.

Given the policy issues surrounding price increases in the pharmaceutical sector, remitting the Decision for more a comprehensive analysis with the benefit of further clarity in a novel area (from the CAT and the CJEU in AKKA/LAA) is probably the best outcome for all concerned – although the recent closure of the regulatory ‘loophole’ that allowed unregulated price-rises perhaps reduces the long-term benefit. This ‘have another go’ approach was also the outcome in the CAT’s first hearing for a collective proceedings order – another novel area where policy objectives would have been frustrated by an outright refusal.

There have been immediate knock-on effects: the CMA has indicated that other active investigations it has in the area may now be severely delayed. The end of the CMA’s investigation into hydrocortisone seemed to be in sight, and it will be interesting to see how the CMA proceeds with that, as well as the Pfizer / Flynn case.

The CAT’s difficulties in applying the United Brands test are also likely to be of interest to the Commission, given that it has opened an excessive pricing investigation (into Aspen Pharma) – its first of that type in the pharmaceutical industry.

But while the CMA will clearly have its work cut out (assuming the CAT goes ahead with the remittal), it should not be assumed that this judgment is the end of the story for excessive pricing cases in the UK.