The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) provides that a court may award a defendant its attorney’s fees and costs if an action is brought against it under the statute “in bad faith and for the purposes of harassment.” In Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166 (2013) (No. 11-1175), the Supreme Court held that a court may also award costs to prevailing defendants in FDCPA actions pursuant to FRCP 54(d), without finding that the plaintiff brought the action in bad faith and for the purposes of harassment. In this case, plaintiff Marx defaulted on a student loan, and the defendant (GRC) was hired to collect the debt. Marx sued GRC, alleging that GRC violated the FDCPA by harassing her with multiple phone calls and false threats. GRC made an offer of judgment of $1,500 plus fees and costs. Marx did not accept, and after a bench trial in which the court found in favor GRC, the court ordered that Marx pay more than $4,500 in costs pursuant to FRCP 54(d)(1). On appeal, Marx argued that the FDCPA displaced Rule 54 and did not provide for the payment of costs absent a finding of bad faith. Both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that there was nothing in the text, history or purpose of the FDCPA that indicated it was meant to displace Rule 54(d)(1). Recognizing that Rule 54 provides that a court may award costs unless a federal statute “provides otherwise,” the Court concluded that the FDCPA fee-shifting provisions were not contrary to Rule 54(d)(1), and thus did not “provide[] otherwise” with respect to a court’s authority to award costs. Rather, the FDCPA was merely silent on costs in actions where there was no bad faith, “and silence does not displace the background rule that a court has discretion to award costs.”