In Jones-McNamara v. Holzer Health Systems, Inc., No. 13-cv-00616 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 28, 2014), the plaintiff had been employed as the defendant’s Vice President of Corporate Compliance.  According to her complaint, in May 2010, she began an internal investigation into allegations that employees were disproportionately using the services of an ambulance company in exchange for gifts and luncheons that it provided.  She contended that this conduct violated the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b), and by certifying on Medicaid claim forms that it was in compliance with that statute, the defendant was in violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.  She advised the company to prohibit the conduct and to reimburse the government.  In response, she was instructed not to speak with her informant again, not to reduce her findings and analyses to writing, and not to work on her investigations with anyone other than outside counsel, in order to create the appearance that any materials were covered by the attorney-client privilege. Eventually she was terminated.  Plaintiff contended that she was also conducting six other investigations into compliance issues at the time of her termination, and she brought suit under the whistleblower provision of the FCA.  The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff had not alleged that she was acting in furtherance of filing a whistleblower (qui tam) action under the FCA while defendant was on notice of her investigations.  Rather, relying on Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2003), the defendant contended Plaintiff was simply performing her normal duties as a compliance officer.  Yuhasz had held that performing the ordinary employment duties of informing an employer that certifications were illegal and might incur FCA liability failed to provide notice of protected activity; in order to have a cause of action, such plaintiffs must show that they had made clear their intentions of bringing or assisting in an FCA action.  That holding was based, however, on the version of the whistleblower provision in effect prior to 2009, which applied to retaliation “because of lawful acts done . . . in furtherance of an action under this section.”  In 2009, that provision was amended to apply to retaliation “because of lawful acts done . . . in furtherance of other efforts to stop 1 or more violations of this subchapter.”  The court found that this amendment required a result different from that reached in Yuhasz, and held that the employer need only have known that the employee was engaged in efforts to stop an FCA violation, not that the employee was contributing to an FCA lawsuit.  Accordingly, the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.