Legislation and jurisdiction

Relevant legislation and regulators

What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The Moroccan merger control rules used to be laid down in Law No. 06-99 of 5 June 2000 (Dahir No. 01-00-225) on free pricing and competition and its enforcement Decree No. 2-00-854 (the former legal framework).

Under the former legal framework, the Chief of Government had decision-making power and the Competition Council had a consultative role when the notified concentration was likely to infringe competition. The opinions of the Competition Council mentioned in this article were released by the Competition Council under the former legal framework.

The new Moroccan merger control rules are set out in Law No. 104-12 of 30 June 2014 (Dahir No. 1-14-116) on free pricing and competition (the Competition Law) and its enforcement decree No. 2-14-652 of 1 December 2014 (the Decree) and in Law No. 20-13 relating to the Competition Council of 30 June 2014 (Dahir No. 1-14-117) and its enforcement Decree No. 2-15-109 of 4 June 2015.

The Competition Law and Law No. 20-13 significantly modify the roles of the merger control authorities:

  • the merger control function has been transferred to the Competition Council; and
  • the administration, through the Chief of Government or the delegated governmental authority, retains residual powers (in particular, an evocation power on the decisions of the Competition Council for matters of public interest).

It should be noted that the Competition Law had, in principle, entered into force in December 2015, after the issuance of the ministerial order of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Governance No. 3633 (3 December 2015) referred to the Minimis Rules, but has only been applicable since the appointment of the new president and members of the Competition Council, which occurred in November and December 2018.

When the notified concentration concerns specific sectors, sectoral regulators are consulted by the Competition Council. This includes the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (ANRT) for the telecommunications sector; the High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HACA) for the audiovisual market; the Bank Al Maghrib for banks; the Financial Market Authority (AMMC) for the capital market; the Insurance and Social Security Directorate for insurance; and the National Ports Agency (ANP) for ports.

Article 109 of the Competition Law provides that, unless the relationship between the Competition Council and the sectoral regulators is addressed in the constitutive texts of these institutions, the Competition Council will, from a date defined by a future regulation, exercise its jurisdiction on all sectors.

In the specific case of the telecommunications industry, it should be noted that Law No. 24-96 authorises the ANRT to enforce the concentration control provisions in its industry. To the best of our knowledge, this jurisdiction has never been implemented by the ANRT.

Scope of legislation

What kinds of mergers are caught?

According to article 11 of the Competition Law, a concentration occurs where:

  • two or more previously independent undertakings merge;
  • one or more persons, already controlling at least one undertaking, acquire, directly or indirectly, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, control of the whole or parts of one or more undertakings; and
  • one or more undertakings acquire, directly or indirectly, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, control of the whole or parts of one other or more other undertakings.

The Competition Law also states that the creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an economic entity shall constitute a concentration within the meaning of the Moroccan merger control law.

What types of joint ventures are caught?

Joint ventures might fall under the scope of the Competition Law provided that they perform on a lasting basis all the functions of an economic entity (article 11 of the Competition Law).

Is there a definition of ‘control’ and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The Competition Law defines control under article 11 as resulting from rights, contracts or any other means that confer, either separately or in combination, having regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, the possibility to exercise a decisive influence on the activity of an undertaking and, notably:

  • ownership rights or rights of use over all or parts of the assets of an undertaking; or
  • rights or contracts that confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking.
Thresholds, triggers and approvals

What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The Competition Law and the Decree introduce additional turnover notification thresholds to the pre-existing market-share threshold. Under the new legal framework, a concentration must be notified to the Competition Council when one of the three following conditions is fulfilled:

  • the combined aggregate worldwide pre-tax turnover of all the undertakings or groups of natural or legal persons parties to the concentration is equal to or more than 750 million dirhams;
  • the aggregate Moroccan-wide pre-tax turnover of at least two of the undertakings or groups of natural or legal persons concerned by the concentration is equal to or more than 250 million dirhams; or
  • the undertakings that are parties to the concentration, or that are the subject of the concentration, or the undertakings that are economically linked to them, have generated altogether, during the previous calendar year, more than 40 per cent of the sales, purchases or other transactions on a national market of identical or substitutable goods, products or services, or on a significant part of such market.

The Decree provides that different turnover thresholds may be established for certain specific sectors or geographic areas by the Chief of Government or the governmental authority delegated by the latter for this purpose.

The Moroccan legislation does not define the undertakings that are ‘economically linked’ to the undertakings that are parties to the concentration or the subject of the concentration and we assume that this term includes at a minimum their subsidiaries, their parent companies and their sister companies.

According to the Competition Council, it is necessary to notify a transaction when only one of the parties involved, for example the target company, has a market share exceeding the 40 per cent threshold and when the planned concentration will thus not lead to any addition of market shares. The Competition Council has already examined concentrations where the acquirer was not present in the same sector as the target company in Morocco (for example, Opinion No. 36/13 relating to the acquisition of 6 per cent of the capital of CMA CGM by the Strategic Investment Fund) and where only the target company was active in Morocco (for example, Opinion of November 2011 relating to the acquisition by CCPL of Ono Packaging Maghreb and Opinion No. 37/13 relating to the acquisition of 49 per cent of the shares and voting rights of Terminal Link by China Merchants).

Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Under article 12 of the Competition Law, the filing is mandatory and the Moroccan legislation does not provide for any exception to this rule.

Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified where they fulfil one of the thresholds set out in question 5.

Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Concerning foreign investments, a convertibility regime has been set up in favour of foreign investments by the ‘Instruction Générale des opérations de change 2013’ of the Foreign Exchange Office, amended by ‘Instruction Générale des opérations de change 2019’. Concerning foreign exchange regulations, the convertibility regime guarantees to the foreign investors concerned total freedom to carry out their investment operations in Morocco, transfer any income from such investments, and transfer back any income resulting from the transfer or liquidation of their investments when the investments have been made in foreign currencies. The convertibility regime holds that an investor must, within four months of the date of the foreign investment, file a report with the Foreign Exchange Office including all the details and supporting documents of the transaction (investor’s identity, business sector, amount, bank certificates, etc).

Certain sectoral authorities are in charge of the regulation of special sectors:

  • telecommunications - ANRT;
  • the audiovisual market - HACA;
  • banks - Bank Al-Maghrib;
  • the capital market - AMMC;
  • insurance - the Insurance and Social Security Directorate; and
  • ports - ANP.

According to Law No. 20-13, the Competition Council shall seek the opinions of the sectoral regulators on competition issues relating to their sectors of activity. Article 8 of Law No. 20-13 provides for a consultation procedure.

Article 109 of the Competition Law provides that, unless the relationship between the Competition Council and the sectoral regulators is addressed in the constitutive texts of these institutions, the Competition Council will, from a date defined by a future regulation, exercise its jurisdiction on all sectors.

In the specific case of the telecommunications industry, Law No. 24-96 and its enforcement decree authorises ANRT to enforce the concentration control provisions in its industry. To the best of our knowledge, this jurisdiction has never been implemented by the ANRT.

Moreover, specific turnover thresholds may be established for certain specific sectors or geographic areas by the Chief of Government or the governmental authority delegated by the latter for this purpose.

Notification and clearance timetable

Filing formalities

What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

The transaction must be notified to the Competition Council before its completion, as soon as the parties concerned are able to present a sufficiently concrete file to allow the investigation of the case and, in particular, when they have entered into an agreement in principle, signed a letter of intent, or as of the announcement of a public offer.

The sanctions for not filing are as follows:

  • for legal entities responsible for filing: a fine amounting to a maximum of 5 per cent of the pre-tax turnover made in Morocco during the last fully closed financial year, increased, when applicable, by the turnover made in Morocco during the same period by the acquired company; and
  • for natural persons responsible for filing: a fine of a maximum amount of 5 million dirhams.

Moreover, upon failure to file a notification, the Competition Council compels the parties, subject to a daily penalty payment, to notify the operation, unless they revert to the previous state of affairs.

Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

This notification obligation is the responsibility of the natural or legal persons who acquire control of all or part of an undertaking or, in the case of a merger or the creation of a joint venture, of all parties concerned, who must then notify jointly.

There are no filing fees.

What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The Competition Council must rule on the transaction within 60 days of receipt of the complete notification file (Phase I). In case of opening of an in-depth investigative phase, the Competition Council has 90 additional days to take its decision (Phase II). These time limits may be extended or suspended in the cases listed in question 18.

Under article 12 of the Competition Law, the filing has a suspensive effect. The parties are thus not entitled to implement their concentration plan as long as the Competition Council (or the administration, if it takes on the case) has not authorised the transaction.

Nevertheless, in case of duly motivated need, the parties can ask the Competition Council for an exemption to this suspensive effect, allowing them to actually complete all or part of the transaction without waiting for an authorisation decision of the competition authorities and without prejudice of this decision (article 14, paragraph 2 of the Competition Law).

Pre-clearance closing

What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

According to article 19 of the Competition Law, closing a concentration before clearance may lead to the application of the fines imposed for failure to file a concentration as set out in question 9.

Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

No specific rules concerning the sanctions to apply in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers are established by the Moroccan competition legislation and the sanctions for closing before clearance set out in question 12 should be applicable in these cases.

What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Moroccan legislation provides no specific solutions permitting closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger.

In case of duly motivated need, the parties to a foreign-to-foreign merger can, however, ask the Competition Council for an exemption to the suspensive effect to allow them to close the transaction before clearance (article 14, paragraph 2 of the Competition Law).

Public takeovers

Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

No specific merger rules are applicable to public takeover bids. The Competition Council seems to apply the general rules and principles of the Moroccan legislation to assess such concentration, as illustrated in its Opinion No. 9/10 relating to the public takeover bid launched by Kraft Foods Inc over Cadbury Plc.

Documentation

What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The notification file submitted to the Competition Council must contain specific information and documents listed in the Decree as regards:

  • the contemplated operation (including a copy of the agreement subject to the notification);
  • the undertakings concerned and the groups to which they belong (including in particular their annual accounts, a list of their main shareholders, etc);
  • a presentation of the relevant product and geographic markets concerned (including the markets shares of the parties); and
  • when a market is affected, a detailed presentation of this market and of the firms active in this market (including the market shares of the parties).

A market is considered to be affected when:

  • one or more undertakings operate on the concerned market and have an aggregated market share reaching 25 per cent or more;
  • at least one of the concerned undertakings operates on the concerned market and another of the concerned undertakings operates on the upstream, downstream or associated market, whether or not there exist supplier relations, as long as all the concerned undertakings reach a 25 per cent market share; or
  • the operation leads to the eviction of a potential competitor on the market.

In case of wrong or missing information in the notification file, the Competition Council can impose the fines for failure to file a concentration as set out in question 9 and also withdraw its authorisation decision. Unless the parties revert to the previous state of affairs, they must once again notify the transaction within one month from the withdrawal of the decision.

Investigation phases and timetable

What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Upon receiving a notification file, the Competition Council must publish a release containing, in particular, a non-confidential summary of the transaction and the time frame in which interested third parties are invited to make observations.

During Phase I, the Competition Council will examine the file and designate a case officer to follow up the file and conduct the investigation.

If the Competition Council considers, at the end of Phase I, that serious doubts remain as to the risk of infringing competition (or at the request of the governmental authority in charge of competition), a Phase II investigation is opened to conduct an in-depth analysis of the transaction.

During Phase II, a report is sent to the parties and to the Government Commissioner. This report contains a statement of the facts as well as the elements of information on the basis of which the case officer has based its analysis and the observations of the parties, if any.

Hearings at the Competition Council are not public. Only the concerned parties and the Government Commissioner may attend such hearings. The Competition Council may also hear all persons in a position to contribute information on the case.

At the end of Phase II, a draft of the decision is communicated to the concerned parties who may present their observations within 10 days.

What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The timetable for clearance is as follows:

Phase I (60 days)

According to article 15 of the Competition Law, the Competition Council must rule on the transaction within 60 days of receipt of the complete notification file.

If commitments are offered by the parties, this 60-day time limit is extended by 20 days.

In case of particular necessity, such as the finalisation of the commitments, the parties may ask the Competition Council to suspend the deadline for a maximum of 20 days.

At the end of Phase I, the Competition Council may either:

  • decide that the notified transaction does not fall under the scope of the merger control;
  • authorise the operation subject, where applicable, to the effective implementation of the remedies proposed by the notifying parties;
  • open an in-depth analysis of the transaction (Phase II) if it finds that serious doubts remain as to the risk of infringing competition; or
  • refrain from adopting any of the above decisions.

Within 20 days after having received a copy of the decision or having been informed of it by the Competition Council, the governmental authority in charge of competition may ask the Council to open a Phase II investigation.

The transaction is deemed to be authorised upon the conclusion of this 20-day time limit.

Phase II (90 days)

According to article 17 of the Competition Law, the Competition Council must determine within 90 days whether the transaction is likely to infringe competition, notably by creating or strengthening a dominant position or a buying power that places suppliers in a position of economic dependency. The Competition Council also assesses whether the contemplated transaction brings a sufficient contribution to economic progress to offset the competition infringements.

If the notifying parties offer commitments to remedy the anticompetitive effects of the contemplated operation less than 30 days before the end of the 90-day deadline, the deadline will then expire 30 days after the reception of the commitments. Moreover, the 90-day deadline may be suspended for up to 30 days at the parties’ request in case of particular necessity, notably to finalise their commitments.

The deadline may also be suspended by the Competition Council, in particular when the notifying parties have failed to provide it with the requested information or to inform it of the occurrence of a new material event. The time limit resumes when the cause of the suspension has been addressed.

The Competition Council may, at the end of the Phase II, either:

  • authorise the operation subject to, where applicable, the effective implementation of commitments offered by the notifying parties;
  • authorise the operation, while requiring the parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure sufficient competition or to comply with instructions destined to provide a sufficient contribution to economic progress to offset the competition infringements; or
  • prohibit the concentration and require the parties, when applicable, to take all appropriate measures to re-establish sufficient competition.

Upon receiving a copy of the decision or being informed of it by the Competition Council, the Chief of Government, or the delegated governmental authority, may within 30 days exert its power and issue a decision on the transaction for reasons of public interest (such as industrial development, competitiveness of the companies within the international context or job creation).

The transaction is deemed to be authorised when this 30-day time limit has expired.

The Moroccan competition legislation does not contain any accelerated procedure.

Substantive assessment

Substantive test

What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test for clearance is whether the planned concentration is likely to infringe competition, notably by creating or strengthening a dominant position or a buying power that places suppliers in a position of economic dependency.

During Phase II, the Competition Council also takes into account whether the contemplated concentration brings a sufficient contribution to economic progress to offset the competition infringements.

Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

The Moroccan legislation does not provide for a special substantive test for joint ventures.

Theories of harm

What are the ‘theories of harm’ that the authorities will investigate?

The Competition Council assesses the effects of the concentration on competition and determines whether the transaction would lead to:

  • horizontal effects: the Council examines whether the concentration would lead to an overlap of the merging parties’ activities and to an addition of their market shares that would create or reinforce a dominant position on the relevant market and allow the merging parties to act independently from their competitors and customers;
  • vertical effects: the Competition Council assesses whether the concentration would foreclose the access to the upstream markets (Opinion relating to the acquisition by Vitol and Helios of Shell du Maroc and Butagaz Maroc);
  • conglomerate effects: the Competition Council examines whether the concentration would lead to an expansion and a diversification of the merging parties’ product ranges and trademarks that would increase their market power and enable them to impede competition through practices such as tie-in sales or bundled rebates (Opinion No. 31/12 relating to a concentration concerning the SNI and Kraft Foods Maroc); and
  • coordinated effects: the Competition Council assesses whether the merging parties will, after the transaction, be able to coordinate their behaviour on the market and whether the transaction will thus lead to the creation or the strengthening of a collective dominant position (Opinion No. 9/10 relating to the public takeover bid launched by Kraft Foods Inc over Cadbury Plc).

To carry out this assessment, the Competition Council defines the relevant product or services market and the geographical dimension of these relevant markets and conducts in particular an analysis of the market structure, the market shares of the parties involved and of their actual and potential competitors, the entry barriers, the importations and exportations on the relevant markets, the customers and the suppliers of the parties involved.

Non-competition issues

To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

During Phase II, the Competition Law requires the Competition Council to assess whether the operation concerned provides a sufficient contribution to the economic progress to offset the competition infringements.

Thus, the Competition Council conducts not only a competitive assessment, but also an economic assessment of the concentration.

For example, in its Opinion relating to a concentration concerning the SNI and Danone (No. 32/12), the Competition Council had taken into account the fact that Danone’s strategy was in line with the goals of a Moroccan environmental programme.

Therefore, the parties involved in the concentration are also asked by the Competition Council about the aim of the transaction and its impact on Moroccan economic situation (the contemplated investments, the anticipated impact of the transaction on the employment situation, the evolution of the range of products or services offered to the consumers, etc).

Non-competition issues are also taken into account when the Chief of Government, or the delegated governmental authority, exercises its power and issues a decision on the transaction for reasons of public interest (such as industrial development, competitiveness of the companies within the international context or job creation).

Economic efficiencies

To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Economic efficiencies should be taken into account in Phase II of the review process, during which the Competition Council has to assess whether the concentration provides a sufficient contribution to economic progress to compensate for its anticompetitive effects.

The efficiencies that are taken into account by the Competition Council are, in particular, the improvement of product quality, product diversification, technical improvement in the relevant sector, price reductions, job creations, increase in exports, and the stimulating effect of the transaction on the competitive environment of the relevant market.

Remedies and ancillary restraints

Regulatory powers

What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Competition Council may prohibit a transaction at the end of Phase II and, if necessary, require the parties to take all appropriate measures to re-establish sufficient competition.

The Council can also authorise the operation, while requiring the parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure sufficient competition or to comply with instructions destined to provide a sufficient contribution to economic progress to offset the competition infringements.

Similarly, at the end of Phase II, the Chief of Government or the delegated governmental authority may prohibit a transaction after having considered the case.

In addition, according to article 20 of the Competition Law, if an undertaking abuses its dominant position or a state of economic dependency, the Competition Council may enjoin the undertakings concerned to modify, complete or terminate all of the agreements and measures that gave rise to the concentration of economic power that enabled these abuses. The Competition Council can apply these provisions even if these measures have already been subject to the merger control process.

Remedies and conditions

Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Structural or behavioural remedies can be proposed by the notifying parties or imposed by the Competition Council to remedy or compensate the adverse effects of the planned concentration on competition.

In 2012, the Competition Council rendered its first opinion regarding commitments (Opinion No. 31/12 relating to a concentration concerning the SNI and Kraft Foods Maroc) where it recommended the Chief of Government authorise the transaction subject to Kraft Foods respecting various behavioural commitments, such as not practising tie-in sales or offering bundled rebates, and complying with the competition code of conduct and compliance programme. The Council highlighted the fact that these commitments should be made public.

What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The parties are allowed to propose commitments:

  • along with the notification file;
  • at any moment before the end of Phase I; or
  • during Phase II, as soon as they have been informed of its opening.

When commitments are offered by the parties during Phase I, the 60-day time limit is extended by 20 days and may be suspended for a maximum of 20 days at the parties’ request to finalise their commitments.

If commitments are offered by the parties during Phase II less than 30 days before the end of the 90-day deadline, the deadline will expire 30 days after the reception of the commitments. The Phase II deadline may also be suspended for up to 30 days at the parties’ request to finalise the commitments.

The Competition Council, at the end of Phase I or Phase II, and the Chief of Government (or the delegated governmental authority) if it evokes the case, may authorise the operation subject to the effective implementation of commitments by the parties.

What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

To the best of our knowledge, the Competition Council, which was reactivated in 2009, has not yet required remedies in a foreign-to-foreign merger.

Ancillary restrictions

In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

To date, this is uncertain. The Competition Law and the Decree do not address this issue. The decisional practice of the Competition Council will certainly clarify this point in the future and should follow the position of the European Commission.

Involvement of other parties or authorities

Third-party involvement and rights

Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

After receiving the complete notification file, the Competition Council publishes a press release that contains a non-confidential summary of the transaction and indicates the time frame in which interested third parties are invited to make observations.

In addition, the Competition Council has the faculty to hear any third party in a position to contribute to its information and to conduct a market test.

Publicity and confidentiality

What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Upon receipt of a notification file, the Competition Council publishes a press release that indicates:

  • the name of the concerned parties;
  • the nature of the transaction;
  • the concerned economic sectors;
  • the time frame in which interested third parties are invited to make observations; and
  • a non-confidential summary of the transaction provided by the parties.

When parties communicate documents or information to the Competition Council, they must indicate which elements they consider as business secrets (article 31 of the Competition Law). The General Rapporteur ensures that this information is reserved to the Competition Council and the Government Commissioner and that a non-confidential version of the documents is prepared, if needed.

Except in cases where the communication or the consultation of documents containing business secrets is necessary to the exercise of the rights of defence of a concerned party, the president of the Competition Council may deny to a party the communication or consultation of these documents.

Moreover, the disclosure by one of the undertakings involved of information obtained during the process concerning another party or a third party is punishable by a 10,000 to 100,000 dirham fine (article 32 of the Competition Law).

According to article 13 of the Decree, the merger decisions of the Competition Council and of the governmental authority in charge of competition are published in the Official Bulletin and are available on their websites.

Cross-border regulatory cooperation

Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Since its reactivation in 2008, the Moroccan Competition Council has started to liaise with foreign antitrust authorities.

Indeed, an association between Morocco and the member states of the European Communities was established by the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement in 2000 and a mechanism of cooperation between European and Moroccan competition authorities was put into place by decision No. 1/2004 of the EU-Morocco Association Council of 19 April 2004 adopting the necessary rules for the implementation of the competition rules.

In the framework of this cooperation, the Moroccan Competition Council has developed a twinning cooperation with the German competition authority thanks to which it has benefited from training conducted by European experts, technical assistance and study visits in European competition authorities.

A bilateral cooperation has also been established with Tunisia and many exchanges have since taken place (training courses, conferences, etc).

Furthermore, the Competition Council has been a member of the International Competition Network (ICN) since April 2010 and the 2014 annual conference of the ICN took place in Marrakech.

The Moroccan Competition Council is also a founding member of the Euro-Mediterranean Competition Forum (EMCF), an informal regional network that was set up in 2012, and is presiding over the Coordinating Committee of the EMCF together with the Austrian Federal Competition Authority.

In 2017, the Moroccan Competition Council also entered into a cooperation agreement with the competition authority of China.

Moreover, in 2019, the Moroccan Competition Council announced a strengthening of its bilateral cooperation with the Portuguese Competition Authority and a cooperation with the Chilean National Economic Prosecutor.

Judicial review

Available avenues

What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Merger decisions of the Competition Council and of the Chief of Government (or the delegated governmental authority) may be appealed to the administrative chamber of the Moroccan Supreme Court.

Time frame

What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Article 46 of the Competition Law provides that an appeal against merger decisions must be lodged by the concerned parties or the Government Commissioner within 30 days of receipt of the merger decision notification.

Enforcement practice and future developments

Enforcement record

What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The Competition Law has only been enforced by the Competition Council since it became operational again at the end of year 2018. Therefore, the enforcement concerns of the Competition Council still have to be identified.

Reform proposals

Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

There are no current proposals to change the legislation, as the Competition Law and Law No. 20-13 were adopted in June 2014 and have only been applicable since the appointment of the new president and members of the Competition Council in November and December 2018.

Update and trends

Key developments of the past year

What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

Key developments of the past year36 What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The application of the Competition Law and Law No. 20-13 relating to the Competition Council, which transfer the merger control function to the Competition Council, has taken effect after the appointment of the Competition Council’s new president and members in November and December 2018.

During the first semester of 2019, the Competition Council has received several merger notifications and issued its first merger decisions.