In Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-55486), defendant, a marketing consultant who had entered into an advertising contract with the U.S. Navy, instructed a third-party vendor to send text messages containing ads for the Navy to certain cellular users who had consented to solicitation.  The third-party vendor, however, also sent the messages to others, including plaintiff, who were outside of that target group and had not consented to receive such texts.  Plaintiff sued defendant (but not the third-party vendor) alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.  The court rejected defendant’s argument that it could not be held liable under the TCPA because it did not actually send any of the offending messages, holding that defendants could be vicariously liable under the TCPA.  Although the statute is silent as to such liability, the court reasoned that, absent clear intent to apply another standard, it must be presumed that Congress intended to incorporate ordinary tort liability rules, including vicarious liability.  The court found further support for this interpretation in the fact that the Federal Communications Commission has likewise concluded that the TCPA provides for vicarious liability.  The court also rejected defendant’s argument that any vicarious liability should extend only to merchants whose goods or services are being promoted, stating that the TCPA imposes liability on “any person,” not just “any merchant.