An extract from The Dominance and Monopolies Review - 7th edition


i Overview

Monopolisation requires anticompetitive conduct that helps to obtain or maintain a monopoly. Obtaining or maintaining a monopoly through other means, such as 'superior product, business acumen or historic accident', is therefore not a violation.

US courts and antitrust regulators have not established a definitive list of what conduct can be anticompetitive; nor have they adopted clear standards for distinguishing between pro-competitive and anticompetitive conduct. The DOJ did issue guidance on monopolisation in 2008, but withdrew it in May 2009. The list below, although not exhaustive, discusses the most important types of potential anticompetitive conduct that courts and regulators have recognised could support a monopolisation claim.

ii Exclusionary abusesExclusionary pricing

Predatory pricing is charging low prices to try to drive competitors from the market. Because low prices are generally pro-competitive and beneficial to consumers, US law imposes rigorous requirements to sustain a predatory pricing claim. Specifically, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's prices are below cost, and that the defendant has a 'dangerous probability' of recouping the losses that it incurs when charging below-cost prices by raising its prices above competitive levels after driving competitors from the market. The US Supreme Court has not specified the precise measure of cost that should be used in this analysis, although most lower courts have required pricing below some measure of incremental cost.

A price squeeze or margin squeeze is when a firm that is active in upstream and downstream markets charges high prices for the upstream input and low prices for the downstream product. The potential antitrust concern is that a downstream competitor that is not vertically integrated must therefore pay high prices for an input while charging low prices to compete downstream. However, US law does not recognise price-squeeze claims without either an upstream duty to deal with competitors or downstream predatory pricing.

Exclusive dealing

Exclusive dealing can have many pro-competitive benefits, including encouraging investment by reducing uncertainty about future sales, encouraging relationship-specific investments, and encouraging better product promotion and related services. However, exclusive dealing can also have anticompetitive effects when it forecloses rivals from the market and impairs their competitiveness. Under US law, exclusive dealing cannot be anticompetitive unless it forecloses a 'substantial share' of the relevant market. What counts as 'substantial' is unsettled. Some courts have suggested that foreclosure of 30 per cent or less may suffice, while others have suggested that 40 to 50 per cent may be required. Courts have also suggested that the foreclosure required to sustain a claim may be somewhat lower where the defendant is a monopolist.

Loyalty conditions are when a seller charges customers one price if the customer purchases a certain percentage of its needs of a product from the seller and a higher price if the customer does not. Loyalty conditions can pro-competitively reduce costs, shift risk in volatile industries, or lead to efficient contracting such as by encouraging promotional or marketing efforts. However, like exclusive dealing, they can also foreclose rivals and impair their competitiveness. US law on loyalty discounts is unsettled. Some courts have applied a predatory pricing analysis, finding loyalty conditions to be potentially anticompetitive only when the resulting price is below cost. Other courts have applied an exclusivity analysis, finding loyalty conditions to be potentially anticompetitive whenever they foreclose a substantial share of the market. Some courts and regulators may also focus on the loyalty condition's effect on the incremental price of a customer's 'contestable' share that it would be willing to switch to the defendant's rivals.

Most-favoured nation (MFN) clauses provide that a customer will receive pricing or other terms as good as those that the seller offers other customers. MFNs can pro-competitively help buyers obtain low prices and can help prevent opportunism when one party makes relationship-specific investments. However, MFNs can also anticompetitively limit competition by preventing new entrants from obtaining prices as low as they otherwise would have. US case law on MFNs is relatively undeveloped. However, antitrust regulators have pursued enforcement actions against MFNs, most often in healthcare.


Tying is when a supplier conditions its sale of one product (the tying product) on the customer purchasing another product (the tied product). Tying can be accomplished through an absolute refusal to sell the items separately, or through a price difference between the bundle and the separate items if the difference is sufficiently large that most or all customers would purchase the bundle. Tying can pro-competitively lower costs or increase the value of the items to customers, improve quality or protect goodwill, and efficiently meter consumption. On the other hand, tying may anticompetitively allow a company with monopoly power in the tying product to increase its market power in the tied product, help it protect its monopoly power in the tying product or otherwise increase its monopoly profits. A successful tying claim requires that the tying and tied items be separate products. Items are deemed separate products when customers want to buy them separately and when offering them separately is possible and efficient. Additionally, tying requires that the defendant have market power in the tying product. More recent cases have recognised the potential pro-competitive benefits of tying, although some older precedents could be read to suggest that pro-competitive justifications are inadmissible in a tying case. Proving that a substantial share of the relevant market is foreclosed is not a requirement for a tying claim.

Bundling is when a supplier charges one price if a customer purchases two or more products together, but charges a higher price when the products are purchased separately. Bundling can pro-competitively lower costs or increase the value of the products to customers, but raises similar potential anticompetitive concerns as tying. Bundling can also be combined with loyalty conditions, such that obtaining a lower price requires that the customer buy a certain share of its needs across multiple products from a particular company. Similar to loyalty conditions, US case law on bundling is unsettled. Some courts have ruled that bundling cannot be anticompetitive unless it results in prices that are below 'an appropriate measure' of cost. In applying this cost-based test, some courts have used a 'discount attribution test' that applies the entire price 'discount' across all bundled products to the standalone price of the competitive product, and then compares the resulting price to the cost of the competitive product. Other courts have instead found that bundling can be potentially anticompetitive whenever it forecloses a substantial share of the market.

Exclusionary product design – where a company designs its product in a way that makes it difficult for competitors to develop compatible or interoperable products – can raise similar concerns as tying. Although exclusionary product designs can in certain circumstances be actionable, antitrust laws encourage innovation, and US courts are generally reluctant to second-guess product design decisions. Unless the product design clearly has no benefits to customers, a court is relatively unlikely to sustain an exclusionary product design claim.

Refusal to deal

US law generally does not impose a duty to deal with competitors, because the possibility of obtaining monopoly power and the ability to exclude rivals encourages investment and innovation, and because setting the terms of dealing and monitoring would be administratively burdensome. However, in limited circumstances, a refusal to deal with rivals can be anticompetitive conduct. The cases where courts have found a duty to deal generally involve the defendant ceasing a prior, voluntary and profitable course of dealing with its rivals and the defendant dealing with rivals on different terms than with non-rivals (such as where the defendant refuses to sell a product to rivals that the defendant sells at retail). Even when other US regulations mandate dealing between competitors, US courts generally will not find an antitrust duty to deal.

iii Discrimination

Discriminatory pricing occurs when a seller charges different customers different prices for the same product. Unless the pricing is predatory, price discrimination alone is not anticompetitive conduct. However, a separate statute called the Robinson-Patman Act, which is not specific to monopolists, prohibits discriminatory pricing in the sale of commodities where the effect may be to reduce downstream competition between customers. This aspect of the Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticised, and enforcement of it is relatively rare. Although the statute requires an effect on competition, US courts typically infer that effect from the fact of differential pricing. Discriminatory pricing is not prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act if the sale does not involve commodities; if the customers do not compete with one another downstream; or if the price differential is justified by differential costs, an effort to meet competitors' pricing or changing conditions. The Robinson-Patman Act therefore does not prohibit price discrimination between final consumers, as they do not compete downstream.

iv Exploitative abuses

As noted, exercising monopoly power is generally legal under US law. US law therefore does not in general recognise exploitative abuses.

v Miscellaneous

A variety of other types of conduct can, in certain circumstances, support a monopolisation claim. A non-exhaustive list is discussed here.

Monopoly leveraging is using monopoly power in one market to gain an advantage in a second market. However, under US law, monopoly leveraging likely cannot support a monopolisation claim unless it involves some anticompetitive conduct (such as tying, exclusive dealing or a refusal to deal) and it helps the defendant obtain or maintain a monopoly in the second market (or creates a dangerous probability of doing so).

Monopolisation claims have been brought against patent holders for abusing standard-setting processes. Such claims might be brought where the patent holder induces a standard-setting organisation to adopt a standard that includes its patents but either deceptively promises to license the patents on FRAND terms and reneges or fails to disclose the existence of its patents in the first place. The concern is that such abuses may result in monopoly pricing that otherwise could have been avoided. Some courts have allowed such claims to go forward, while others have suggested they do not constitute monopolisation. The FTC has also used Section 5 of the FTC Act to pursue enforcement actions against alleged abuses of the standard-setting process.

Monopolisation claims can also be brought against companies that abuse government processes. For example, 'sham' litigation and other abuses of the litigation process can be monopolisation. Similarly, enforcing intellectual property rights obtained through fraud can be monopolisation. Other abuses of governmental processes are also possible.

'Reverse payment' settlements – that is, payments made by a branded drug manufacturer to a generic competitor as part of a patent settlement that can delay generic entry – can also be challenged as monopolisation in some situations. The FTC has pursued several enforcement actions against these types of settlements and there has also been active private litigation.

Additionally, in extreme cases, more general tortious conduct can support a monopolisation claim. For example, one US court allowed a monopolisation claim when a defendant removed its rival's products and advertising from retail stores without permission.

Mergers that help obtain or maintain a monopoly can constitute monopolisation, although typically mergers are challenged under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 USC Section 18, which prohibits mergers that 'substantially … lessen competition' or 'tend to create a monopoly'.