This past March, in Matter of SunGard Securities Finance LLC, DTA No. 824336 (N.Y.S. Tax App. Trib., Mar. 16, 2015), the Tax Appeals Tribunal held that certain data analysis services performed by SunGard for members of the financial services industry constituted the furnishing of taxable information services for sales tax purposes (discussed in the April 2015 issue of New York Tax Insights). On June 1, 2015, SunGard filed a motion to re-argue and for reconsideration. The Tribunal has now issued an Order denying SunGard’s motion. Matter of SunGard Securities Finance LLC, Order and Opinion, DTA No. 824336 (N.Y.S. Tax App. Trib., Sept. 25, 2015).

In support of its motion, SunGard first claimed that the transcript of the oral argument before the Tribunal contained “extensive material inaccuracies that cannot be otherwise adequately corrected.” While the Tribunal acknowledged that there were inaccuracies in the transcript, it pointed out that there was no evidence that SunGard had attempted to correct the transcript prior to receiving the adverse decision from the Tribunal in March 2015. Most significantly, the Tribunal found that even if there were mistakes in the transcript of the oral argument, those errors would not preclude the courts, on appeal, from conducting a meaningful review of the case, which would include SunGard’s brief filed with the Tribunal.

Next, SunGard contended that the Tribunal incorrectly based its decision upon inconsistencies between documents in evidence and SunGard’s affidavits in evidence, asserting that there were no such inconsistencies. The Tribunal noted that a motion to re-argue “must be founded upon an allegation that this Tribunal has ‘overlooked or misapprehended the relevant facts, or misapplied any controlling principle of law.’” The Tribunal pointed out that it had found certain information in the affidavits to be at odds with the documentary evidence regarding the nature of the information that SunGard was providing, and that SunGard had failed to adequately resolve those discrepancies.

In the end, the Tribunal saw no reason to permit re-argument to, as it explained, “impermissibly ‘permit the unsuccessful party to argue once again the very questions previously decided.’”