The Federal Circuit this week expressly confirmed that there is no presumption of irreparable harm for patent infringement, and injunctions should not be granted automatically in patent cases. That is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Ebay v. MercExchange and the rule in copyright cases as reported in the July 13, 2011 post on this blog.
The following is an excerpt of the relevant portion of the opinion in Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., No. 11-1096 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 12, 2011) (internal citations omitted):
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, this court followed the general rule that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged, absent a sound reason to deny such relief. . . . In addition, at least in the context of preliminary injunctive relief, we applied an express presumption of irreparable harm upon finding that a plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of a patent infringement claim. In eBay, the Supreme Court made clear that "broad classifications" and "categorical rule[s]" have no place in this inquiry. Instead, courts are to exercise their discretion in accordance with traditional principles of equity. The Supreme Court, however, did not expressly address the presumption of irreparable harm, and our subsequent cases have not definitively clarified whether that presumption remains intact. . . . We take this opportunity to put the question to rest and confirm that eBay jettisoned the presumption of irreparable harm as it applies to determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief. In so holding, we join at least two of our sister circuits that have reached the same conclusion as it relates to a similar presumption in copyright infringement matters. Although eBay abolishes our general rule that an in-junction normally will issue when a patent is found to have been valid and infringed, it does not swing the pendulum in the opposite direction. In other words, even though a successful patent infringement plaintiff can no longer rely on presumptions or other shortcuts to support a request for a permanent injunction, it does not follow that courts should entirely ignore the fundamental nature of patents as property rights granting the owner the right to exclude. . . . While the patentee’s right to exclude alone cannot justify an injunction, it should not be ignored either.