The UK Competition Commission, in its final months before being absorbed into the new Competition and Markets Authority (for further details please see "New competition authority comes into being"), has had a procedural decision overruled by the Competition Appeal Tribunal (the United Kingdom's specialist judicial body that oversees decisions of the competition authorities). In BMI Healthcare v Competition Commission(1) the tribunal held that the commission had been unfair in the balance that it had struck between, on the one hand, allowing parties under investigation to see information relevant to their case and, on the other, protecting confidential business information. The tribunal held that the commission had erred too much in favour of protecting confidentiality, prejudicing the rights of the parties under investigation.
The case arose in the context of the UK market investigations regime. This allows the UK competition authorities to investigate entire sectors to see whether any features of that sector (or market) have adverse effects on competition. If, on a full investigation (which typically lasts a year or two), the Competition Commission finds that there are such adverse effects, it can order changes to remedy them – ranging from orders to modify business practices to requirements that companies dispose of business units or split up (eg, BAA, the operator of the three main London airports, was recently ordered to reduce the number of London airports under its control).
The particular market investigation in this case concerned the private healthcare sector in the United Kingdom, and is ongoing. The Competition Commission began its investigation in April 2012 and is due to complete it in April 2014. In September 2013 it published its provisional findings, finding that various characteristics of the private healthcare sector had adverse effects on competition – including high barriers to entry for private hospitals and weak competitive constraints in many local markets, such as central London. It also provisionally proposed that three of the major private hospital groups – BMI Healthcare, HCA and Spire – be required to sell off some of their hospitals as a remedy.
A few weeks after the commission published its provisional findings, BMI, HCA and Spire all lodged an appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal, claiming that the commission had treated them unfairly by not giving them sufficient access to relevant information. The tribunal issued its decision on the appeal on October 2 2013.
The appeal concerned procedural fairness. The only grounds on which appeals may be lodged against decisions of the UK competition authorities in market investigations (and in merger control) are judicial review grounds. This is much more limited than a full merits appeal. It generally allows decisions to be overturned only on the basis of:
- procedural unfairness;
- the authority exceeding its legal powers; or
- the substance of the decision being 'irrational' (ie, so unreasonable that no reasonable public authority could have reached the decision).
In the BMI appeal, the appellants claimed that the commission had shown procedural unfairness towards them by unfairly limiting their rights to see relevant material, giving disproportionate and excessive protection to that material on the grounds of business confidentiality.
They founded their appeal on both the English common law judicial review principle of 'natural justice', which includes a right to be properly consulted, and the specific statutory regime governing consultation, disclosure and protection of confidential information in the UK legislation on market investigations and merger control (the Enterprise Act 2002).
Regarding the statutory regime, four main elements strike a delicate balance between the right of the party being investigated to access relevant information and the right of the owner of that information to have confidential business secrets protected from disclosure.
First, there is a presumption of procedural fairness towards the parties being investigated. Section 169 of the Enterprise Act(2) requires the competition authority conducting the market investigation to consult persons (individuals or companies) on whom its decision is likely to have a substantial impact, and to give them reasons for that decision – in both cases, "so far as practicable".
Second, there is respect for the confidentiality of business information, as follows:
- The Section 169 duty to consult and give reasons is qualified by the proviso "so far as practicable", which includes having regard to timetables and confidentiality.
- Section 237 provides for the protection of confidential information, stating that information not in the public domain that relates to a business or an individual's affairs should not be disclosed.
Third, protection of confidential information is itself subject to a proviso – set out in Section 241 – that it may be disclosed "for the purpose of facilitating the exercise by the authority" of its statutory functions.
Fourth, even this disclosure is subject to three considerations set out in Section 244. Information should be excluded from disclosure where:
- disclosure is contrary to the public interest;
- disclosure "might significantly harm" the legitimate business interests of the company concerned (or, in the case of an individual, the individual's interests); or
- disclosure is not "necessary for the purpose for which the authority is permitted to make the disclosure".
The tribunal held that the commission had incorrectly applied the statutory regime, and in common law terms had denied the appellants natural justice, by being excessively restrictive in granting them access to relevant confidential business information.
Confidentiality rings and confidential data rooms
The tribunal recognised the legitimacy of striking a balance by way of 'confidentiality rings'. Under these, disclosure to a party is often limited to the party's external professional advisers in the case – for example, its lawyers and economic advisers – who must give a binding undertaking that they will not disclose the information to anyone else and will use the information only in specified ways.
A variation on this is the confidential data room, a secure location in which the confidential documents are held, and to which only external advisers are granted admission (again, on the basis that they give various undertakings).
The tribunal made clear its acceptance of these in principle:
"We recognise that market investigations involve… considerable amounts of very confidential material, and if that material is not appropriately safeguarded, confidence in Commission investigations will be eroded and – quite possibly – damage done to the operation of markets because of the market sensitivity of information involved(3)… The undertakings given by the professionals who participate in confidentiality rings and data rooms to do, or not to do, certain things are essential to the operation of these confidentiality rings and data rooms."(4)
Rules of access
On the facts of the case, the tribunal saw nothing wrong with the commission putting the confidential information in a confidential data room, to which access was limited to external professional advisers who had to sign undertakings. However, it found those undertakings too restrictive, and said that – given that this was a data room and therefore a secure location – it was unfair that:
- the advisers were not allowed to make notes in the data room about the documents that they found there, given that the making of notes is "plainly required if they are to make effective use of their access" to the data room;
- conversations in the data room had to be as brief and quiet as possible, which meant that "there was no real way in which the advisers could discuss points amongst themselves";
- internet access was unavailable and the advisers were prohibited from bringing in their own electronic devices, so that they had no access to other material that they might need to examine; and
- the period of time allowed for access to the data room (9:00am to 5:00pm on just two consecutive days) was "unreasonably short"; the tribunal thought that, as a "general rule of thumb, a data room ought to be open at reasonable business hours up until the end of the consultation period, and ought to provide for multiple visits".(5)
These helpful guidelines on the rules on disclosure of confidential data have wider application, as follows:
- The UK merger control regime has similar statutory rules governing the balance between procedural fairness and protection of confidential information. For instance, the airline Ryanair, which in August 2013 was subject to an adverse merger control finding by the Competition Commission in connection with its 29.8% shareholding in Aer Lingus, has appealed against that decision – including on the grounds that "[t]he Commission's procedure was unfair, in that the Commission's case relies upon evidence and allegations that have been kept secret from Ryanair."(6)
- The same issues are highly relevant to the delicate balance between protection of confidential information and "access to the file" for parties under investigation in the context of EU and UK prohibitions on anti-competitive agreements and use of a dominant position.
The tribunal's judgment in BMI Healthcare – and its forthcoming judgment in Ryanair – are important contributions to the ongoing process of striking the right balance.
For further information on this topic please contact Michael Grenfell at Norton Rose Fulbright by telephone (+44 20 7444 3597), fax (+44 20 7283 6500) or email (firstname.lastname@example.org). The Norton Rose Fulbright website can be accessed at www.nortonrosefulbright.com.
(1)  CAT 24, Case 1218/6/8/13.
(2) The indicated sections of the Enterprise Act apply to market investigations. Equivalent provisions exist for merger control investigations.
(3) Paragraph 63 of the judgment in BMI Healthcare.
(4) Paragraph 58 of the judgment.
(5) Paragraphs 71 to 73 of the judgment.
(6) Case 1219/4/8/13, Ryanair Holdings v Competition Commission, summary of application, September 24 2013.