REYNOLDS v. CB SPORTS BAR (October 22, 2010)
Loretta Reynolds (according to her complaint) had car trouble while leaving Jerzey’s Sports Bar in O’Fallon, Illinois. The bartender told her no cabs were available and suggested she get a ride from another patron. Two other patrons agreed to give her a ride but first bought her several drinks (and possibly drugged her). Reynolds realized while in their car that they were not driving her to her hotel but were intent on sexually assaulting her. She managed to escape but, in the process, was hit by a car and severely injured. She brought suit against the two other patrons and CB Sports, the establishment’s owner. She alleged alternatively that the bartender “knew or should have known” that the patrons were getting her drunk in order to sexually assault her or that the bar and bartender intentionally aided the patrons in doing so. Judge Gilbert (S.D. Ill.) dismissed the complaint against CB Sports, finding no duty under the circumstances. Reynolds appealed. While her appeal was pending, the court entered a default judgment against one of the individual defendants and held a hearing on damages. At the hearing, Reynolds presented additional facts with respect to the night in question – including that two different bartenders refused her request for a phone book, told her that no taxis were available, and vouched for the character of the two other patrons.
In their opinion, Judges Posner, Ripple (dissenting), and Kanne reversed and remanded. The Court first considered the significance of the testimony at the damages hearing. Prior to Iqbal and Twombly, a plaintiff was free to offer an unsubstantiated version of the events on appeal in support of its position as long as it was consistent with the complaint. The Court concluded that Iqbal and Twombly raised the bar with respect to the content of the complaint but did not limit a plaintiff’s ability to argue facts outside the complaint to show that a complaint should not have been dismissed. Next, to the extent the complaint alleged an intentional tort, the Court noted that CB Sports could not be liable. It turned to the negligence claim and, specifically, the existence of a duty. Under Illinois law, the general rule is that a business owner is liable for foreseeable criminal attacks while an invitee is on the premises. Generally, liability does not attach for an attack off the premises. The Court noted, however, that Illinois courts have recognized some exceptions to the off-premises rule. Illinois courts have extended liability to off-premises attacks In Shortall, Osborne, and Haupt – but in each case the attack took place just off the premises. Here, the attack was over a mile away. Nevertheless, it was the foreseeability of the attack that the courts considered in Shortall, Osborne, and Haupt. And here, taking the facts alleged as true, the attack was foreseeable. Foreseeability is not enough, however. The Court also considered the likelihood of the injury, the burden on the establishment owner, and the consequences of that burden. Here, the likelihood is high given the intentional scheme at play. The burden and consequences of imposing that duty are not high. The Court emphasized that this was not a burden to investigate – only a burden to protect when it was aware of an intent to injure. The Court was satisfied that Reynold’s allegations sufficiently pled a duty. Finally, the Court declined to find an absence of proximate cause as a matter of law and emphasized that it was not accepting Reynold’s “voluntary undertaking” theory of liability.
Judge Ripple dissented. Although he recognized the Illinois courts’ expansion of off-premises business invitee liability, he disagreed with the Court’s further extension of the principle. On the one hand, Reynold’s complaint alleges an intentional act. Judge Ripple would not extend negligence principles to the situation where the employee is a participant in the execution of the planned attack. As for the alternate allegation that the bartender “should have known,” Judge Ripple believed the burden imposed by the panel opinion on the establishment is too great. He saw no facts alleged in the complaint upon which to base a “should have known” conclusion. Either way, Judge Ripple thought the panel opinion extended Illinois law beyond where the Illinois Supreme Court would go.