The National Childhood Injury Compensation Act of 1986 (“Vaccine Act”) was designed to compensate individuals injured by routine childhood vaccines through a streamlined adjudication process. See 42 U.S.C § 300aa-13; H.R. Rep. No. 99–908 (1986), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344. In tandem with this compensation scheme, the Vaccine Act also contained an express preemption clause precluding civil actions for damages arising from unavoidable side effects of properly prepared and labeled vaccines. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., -- F. Supp. 2d -- , 2007 WL 2463378, at *6 (E.D. Pa. August 24, 2007).

Recent vaccine preemption cases include Sykes v. GlaxoSmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2007), in which the court upheld preemption for strict liability and negligence claims based on Congress’ intent to limit tort liability to cases in which the vaccine deviated from its FDA-approved design or label. Id. at 301–303.

The court in Bruesewitz, 2007 WL 2463378, at *9–*14, similarly found in favor of preemption. It declined to follow an adverse vaccine preemption case, Ferrari v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 2007 WL 1933129 (Ga. Ct. App. July 5, 2007), which found the Vaccine Act ambiguous regarding preemption.