The Supreme Court declined earlier this month to review a decision by the Second Circuit affirming a defense verdict in the Fosamax litigation. See Secrest v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme Corp., U.S., No. 12-1318, cert. petition denied 6/3/13). The case explicates an interesting and somewhat rare evidentiary issue.
Readers may recall that a jury in the Southern District of New York handed down a defense verdict for Merck in October, 2011. One of the key evidentiary issues was the trial court's decision to exclude one of the expert witnesses for plaintiff under the so-called “sham issue of fact” doctrine. Dr. Epstein initially was designated a fact witness, and deposed as such. After Merck moved for summary judgment, Dr. Epstein was designated as an expert, and he was re-deposed, and changed his testimony. The second time around the witness testified that plaintiff took Fosamax in 2004 and 2005, but earlier had said he did not know about her alleged usage.
Because the physician’s expert testimony contained contradictions that were unequivocal and inescapable, unexplained, arose after the motion for summary judgment was filed, and were central to Secrest’s failure-to-warn claim, the Second Circuit held that the District Court did not err in determining that there was no genuine dispute of material fact raised by the later testimony. The Supreme Court refused to entertain plaintiff's appeal.
Specifically, the District Court was entitled to disregard Dr. Epstein’s new testimony relating to his knowledge based on the “sham issue of fact” doctrine, which prohibits a party from defeating summary judgment simply by submitting an affidavit that contradicts the party’s previous sworn testimony. See Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 578 (2d Cir. 1969). Although courts more typically apply the sham issue of fact doctrine where a party submits an affidavit that contradicts the party’s own prior statements, it may also apply when a party attempts to use evidence from an expert witness to defeat summary judgment.
Here, said the Second Circuit, the doctrine applied to stop Secrest from manufacturing a factual dispute by submitting testimony from an expert whom she tendered, where the relevant contradictions between the first and second depositions were unequivocal and inescapable, unexplained, arose after the motion for summary judgment was filed, and were central to the claim at issue. See Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., No. 11-762-cv, 2012 WL 6633938, at *7 (2d Cir. Dec. 21, 2012) (concluding that summary judgment was inappropriate because the inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s testimony were not “real, unequivocal, and inescapable contradiction[s]”). Here, Dr. Epstein’s February 2011 expert deposition testimony inescapably and unequivocally contradicted the testimony he gave in August, 2008.
Also, the relevant contradiction was not only unequivocal but was left unexplained – indeed, was inexplicable – so the trial court could properly determine that plaintiff had manufactured a sham issue of fact. See Rojas, 660 F.3d at 105-06; AEP Energy, 626 F.3d at 735-36. Finally, the sham issue of fact doctrine applied here, continued the Second Circuit, because the relevant contradictions in Dr. Epstein’s testimony were central to Secrest’s failure-to-warn claim. Applicable Florida law required Secrest to show that her treating physician would have recommended that she cease taking the drug if a different, adequate warning had been provided. Here, no reasonable juror could find that Dr. Epstein would have recommended that Secrest cease taking Fosamax if he did not even know she was taking it at the relevant time.
The Supreme Court then denied plaintiff's cert petition.