In Perona v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., No. 13-0748 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 8, 2014), the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed rulings granting summary judgment for defendants and denying summary judgment for plaintiff, thus finally ending a class action based on unintended acceleration allegations against the car manufacturer commenced a quarter century ago. Carefully examining and comparing plaintiffs’ sixth amended complaint and the cross-motions for summary judgment together with plaintiffs’ supporting expert affidavits, the appellate court concluded that plaintiffs were attempting – again – to shift their theory of liability. The appellate court held that plaintiffs could not seek summary judgment based upon a theory of liability not expressed in their most current complaint. Further, the trial court had not abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs leave to file a seventh amended complaint after 25 years of litigation. In addition, the appellate court held that plaintiffs’ expert’s affidavit was not supported by facts admissible in evidence and thus, the trial court had properly had stricken that affidavit. The appellate court also held that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants was proper where no evidence in the record raised a question of liability based upon the theories advanced in the sixth amended complaint.