Good afternoon.

Please find below our summaries of this past week’s civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario. Topics covered included insurance broker negligence, zoning (use) bylaw enforcement, the wrongful termination of a commercial lease and the automatic right of appeal of bankruptcy orders.

Please join me and Lea Nebel at our “Top Appeals of 2019” CLE dinner program to take place at the OBA on Wednesday, April 15, 2020. Three decisions will be featured. The first is Darmar Farms v Sygenta, which deals with the potential new tort of “premature commercialization” and pure economic loss in product liability context. Our panelists for that decision are Mike Peerless, who represents the plaintiff, and Scott Maidment, who has a depth of experience litigating product liability cases. The second is The Guarantee Company of North America v Royal Bank of Canada regarding the priority of construction trust claims in bankruptcy. Counsel who acted on that case, Miranda Spence and Scott Rollwagen, will be joining us. The third decision is Wright v Urbanek, which deals with the scope of the doctrines of abuse of process and collateral attack. John O’Sullivan, who acts for the appellant in seeking leave to the Supreme Court, will be speaking about this decision. Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Cooper v The Landry Lounge, Inc. , 2020 ONCA 166

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Damages, Set-Off, Commercial Tenancies Act, RSO, 1990, c L-7, s 35

2049390 Ontario Inc. v. Leung , 2020 ONCA 164

Keywords: Torts, Negligent Misrepresentation, Professional Negligence, Insurance Brokers, Duty of Care, Standard of Care, Civil Procedure, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Fletcher v. Manitoba Public Insurance Co., [1990] 3 S.C.R. 191, Fine’s Flowers Ltd. et al. v. General Accident Assurance Co. of Canada et al. (1978), 17 O.R. (2d) 529 (C.A.), Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25

Royal Bank of Canada v. Bodanis , 2020 ONCA 185

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Bankruptcy Orders, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Lifting of Stay, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3, s. 193, 195, Ravelston Corp (Re) (2005), 24 C.B.R. (5th) 256 (ONCA), First National Financial GP Corp. v. Golden Dragon HO 10 Inc., 2019 ONCA 873

Whitchurch-Stouffville (Town) v. Bolender , 2020 ONCA 172

Keywords: Municipal Law, Zoning By-Laws Permitted Uses, Legal Non-Conforming Use, Burlington (City) v. Burlington Airpark Inc., 2017 ONCA 420, 138 O.R. (3d) 309, Saint-Romuald (City) v. Olivier, 2001 SCC 57

Short Civil Decisions

911 Priority Corporation v. Murray, 2020 ONCA 171

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Wrongful Termination, Damages

Das Logistics Transport Inc. v. Artex Environmental Corporation , 2020 ONCA 168

Keywords: Punitive Damages

Greenberg v. Nowack, 2020 ONCA 167

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Contempt

Kivell v. Chatham-Kent Children’s Services , 2020 ONCA 180

Keywords: Torts, Negligent Investigation

Criminal Decisions

R. v. E.-B., 2020 ONCA 160

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, Sentencing, R. v. W.(D.) [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, R. v. Batte (2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), R. v. Jorgge, 2013 ONCA 485

R. v. J.P., 2020 ONCA 162

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, Assault with a Weapon, Uttering Threats, Unlawful Confinement

R. v. M., 2020 ONCA 163

Keywords: Criminal Law, Drug Trafficking, Sentencing, Criminal Code, s. 742.1(c), Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 5(3)(a), R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, R. v. Wong, 2012 ONCA 767, R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, R. v. Ghadban, 2015 ONCA 760

R. v. J.H., 2020 ONCA 165

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, Evidence, Admissibility, Prior Bad Conduct, Jury Instructions, Criminal Code, ss. 625.1(2), 645(5), Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5 s. 4(6), R. v. Calnen, 2019 SCC 6, R. v. Robertson, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 918, R. v. F., D.S. (1999), 43 O.R. (3d) 609 (C.A.), R. v. B. (G.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 57, R. v. Evans, 2019 ONCA 715, R. v. Park, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 64, R. v. D.A.R., 2012 NSCA 31, R. v. Chiasson, 2009 ONCA 789, Boucher v. The Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 16, R. v. Mallory, 2007 ONCA 46, R. v. Stirling, 2008 SCC 10, R. v. Batte (2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), R. v. M.B., 2011 ONCA 76

R. v. B., 2020 ONCA 170

Keywords: Criminal Law, Importing Drugs, R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33

R. v. A.G., 2020 ONCA 183

Keywords: Criminal Law, Assault, Sentencing

Ontario Review Board Decisions

Ahmadzai (Re), 2020 ONCA 169

Keywords: Criminal Law, Not Criminally Responsible, Robbery, Assault with a Weapon, Possession of a Weapon, Criminal Code, ss. 672.54(a), 672.54(b), (c), 672.78(1)(a) &(2), 672.78(3)(b), Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625, Kassa (Re), 2019 ONCA 313, R. v. Lamanna, 2009 ONCA 612, Mazzei v. British Columbia (Director of Adult Forensic Psychiatric Services), 2006 SCC 7, Valdez (Re), 2018 ONCA 657


CIVIL DECISIONS

Cooper v The Landry Lounge, Inc., 2020 ONCA 166

[Lauwers, Houriga, and Thorburn JJA]

COUNSEL:

AF on his own behalf and on behalf of The Landry Lounge Inc. K Chator and C Steven, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Damages, Set-Off, Commercial Tenancies Act, RSO, 1990, c L-7, s 35

FACTS:

This appeal arises from a successful application brought by the respondents for an order terminating two commercial leases for non-payment of rent, an order requiring vacant possession of the premises, an order granting leave for the Registrar to issue a writ of possession, and orders requiring payment of arrears of rent and damages for lost future rent. The leases in issue are for two properties on adjoining premises. One property was used as a laundromat, and another was used for a dry-cleaning business. The laundromat lease was executed in 2003 and the dry-cleaning lease was executed in 2010.

In December 2017, the heat failed in the laundromat and subsequently, a frozen pipe burst, causing water damage. The respondents offered to reimburse all expenses related to the loss of heat and further agreed to a rent abatement for both leases for January 2018.

The appellants did not provide any receipts for expenses to the respondents. Instead, starting in February 2018, the appellants stopped paying rent. In March 2018, the appellants brought an action, advancing several claims, including breach of contract, misrepresentation, and loss of income. The appellants did not serve their statement of claim. The respondents commenced their application in August 2018.

In October and November 2018, the respondents took steps to terminate the leases, but the bailiff’s efforts to take possession were unsuccessful. In December 2018, the appellants paid $35,000, and in January 2019, started paying $7,000 per month, about half of what was owing under the leases.

The application judge ruled that the respondents were entitled to the relief sought and that the appellants had not established a right of set-off pursuant to s 35 of the Commercial Tenancies Act. At the hearing of the appeals, the appellants advised that they have vacated the premises. Therefore, the relief they sought was limited to setting aside the orders with respect to rental arrears, lost future rent damages, pre-judgment interest, and costs.

ISSUES:

(1) Did the application judge err in finding that an application was the correct originating process? (2) Did the application judge err in allowing the appellants to exercise their self-help remedies under the Commercial Tenancies Act? (3) Did the application judge err in finding in awarding damages for lost rent for the balance of the lease term? (4) Was the application judge biased?

HOLDING:

Appeal dismissed.

REASONING:

(1) No. An application was the appropriate procedure, given the straightforward factual and legal issues in play. The fact that the appellants commenced an action does not impact that conclusion. (2) No. The Court found there was nothing improper in the appellants exercising their self-help remedies under the Commercial Tenancies Act. (3) No. Implicit in the application judge’s reasons was a finding that given the relatively short period left on the leases, this was a reasonable period to market the properties and obtain new tenants. The respondents failed to make reasonable efforts to re-let the properties and the Court found that the conclusion to award damages was available to the application judge. (4) No. The application judge was under no obligation to reference every fact in his endorsement and the failure to do so does not constitute bias.


2049390 Ontario Inc. v. Leung, 2020 ONCA 164

[Doherty, Brown and Thorburn JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

R. Lee Akazaki, for the appellant

Barry B. Papazian, Q.C. and Michael Krygier-Baum, for the respondents Keywords: Torts, Negligent Misrepresentation, Professional Negligence, Insurance Brokers, Duty of Care, Standard of Care, Civil Procedure, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Fletcher v. Manitoba Public Insurance Co., [1990] 3 S.C.R. 191, Fine’s Flowers Ltd. et al. v. General Accident Assurance Co. of Canada et al. (1978), 17 O.R. (2d) 529 (C.A.), Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the decision of the trial judge dismissing the appellant’s claim for negligence and breach of contract.

The appellant company is the owner of a commercial property located at 369 Queen Street West (the “Property”). JK is the individual who owns and operates the appellant company. From 2006 to 2008, the Property was insured by ING Insurance (“ING”). In 2006, the policy building limit was $484,531. In 2008, it had increased to $550,000 due to inflation. The building limit increased again in 2008 to $924,000, after the Property was refinanced.

In January 2009, ING provided the appellant with a renewal quote in the amount of $984,060. However, the appellant did not renew the policy. Instead, the appellant contacted the respondent insurance broker, Pacific Insurance Broker Inc. (“Pacific”), and one of its licensed insurance brokers, DL (“DL”) (collectively, the “respondents”), for the purpose of contracting with a new insurer. During their initial discussions, DL asked JK for the Property’s insurance policy that was in effect at the time. JK provided DL with the original 2008 policy, which had a building limit of $550,000. He did not, however, provide her with the revised 2008 policy in the amount of $924,000. The appellant also failed to provide DL with the 2009 renewal quote in the amount of $984,060. Based on the documentation provided, the respondents presented the appellant with a quote from The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company (“Dominion”) with a building limit of $850,000 for 2009, which was set to increase each year thereafter. The appellant purchased the insurance with Dominion.

In 2012, the Property was destroyed by a fire. Dominion refused to cover the cost of reconstruction because the Property was underinsured. Instead, Dominion opted to pay out the policy limit of $1,438,350, less a co-insurance penalty that was imposed for failing to insure the Property by more than 10% of its value.

After Dominion refused to cover the cost of reconstruction, the appellant sued the respondents on the basis that they had failed to secure adequate reconstruction cost insurance for the building and were liable for the appellant’s ensuing losses.

The trial judge ultimately dismissed the appellant’s action in tort and contract. With respect to the appellant’s allegations in tort, the trial judge held that JK was a sophisticated client who was “in a good position to assess whether his insurance coverage was sufficient”. In making her determination, the trial judge noted that JK was a real estate agent and mortgage broker who supervised renovations to the Property. She also found that JK had requested an increase in coverage to reflect the work done on the Property on at least two (2) separate occasions. The evidence of DL was largely accepted by the trial judge. Specifically, the trial judge accepted that when DL prepared the 2009 insurance quote, she told the appellant that she used an industry norm “rule of thumb” calculation of $200 per square foot to arrive at the $850,000 estimate, and that DL had advised the appellant that the full value of the Property would need to be insured to avoid penalty. Moreover, the trial judge accepted that DL told the appellant that the respondents were not cost consultant professionals and that he should obtain a professional appraisal to ensure an accurate estimate of the Property. This evidence was supported by a letter that DL had sent to the appellant on February 23, 2009, which included a warning that stated, “if you have not insured your property up to the amount of insurance required, you may become a CO-INSURER”.

As for the appellant’s allegations grounded in contract, the trial judge found that DL advised JK that she was not a position to provide accurate advice on the replacement cost value of the building on the Property and that the appellant should thus obtain a professional opinion to ensure an accurate assessment was obtained. The trial judge rejected the appellant’s submission that it requested higher limits but that DL advised that Dominion would not increase the amount of coverage. Instead, the trial judge found that it was made clear to the appellant through both DL’s words and the documents which were sent to the appellant that the appellant alone was responsible for ascertaining the value of the Property. As such, the trial judge held that the respondents did not act in breach of any contractual obligation, and the appellant’s claim was thus dismissed. The appellant appealed.

ISSUES:

(1) Did the trial judge err by invoking the wrong test to determine whether there was a breach of the broker’s duty to the insured? (2) Did the trial judge adopt a flawed approach to causation and damages? (3) Did the trial judge’s reasons give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias?

HOLDING:

Appeal dismissed.

REASONING:

(1) No. The Court held that the trial judge’s conclusion that the respondents met their obligations in tort and contract was fully supported by the evidence and the law. With respect to the appellant’s allegations in tort, the Court found that there was no error in the trial judge’s articulation of the duty of care or in her conclusion that it was met. The Court further found that there was no indication of negligent misrepresentation, as DL was found to have provided full disclosure in accordance with the duty to be met. In finding that there was no breach in the duty of care, the Court noted that insurance brokers owe a duty of care to their clients to provide information and advice about “which forms of coverage they require in order to meet their needs” and the limits of that coverage: Fletcher v. Manitoba Public Insurance Co., [1990] 3 S.C.R. 191, at p. 216; Fine’s Flowers Ltd. et al. v. General Accident Assurance Co. of Canada et al. (1978), 17 O.R. (2d) 529 (C.A.). However, the respondents discharged their duty to the appellant by advising JK that the appellant should obtain adequate coverage, that the respondents did not have the expertise to provide an accurate estimate of the appellant’s reconstruction costs, and that the appellant should obtain expert advice. The Court found no error in the trial judge’s conclusions in this regard. In making its determination, the Court noted that both the appellant’s and respondents’ experts agreed that insurance brokers were not qualified to give replacement cost advice to their clients and that the best practice was to advise clients about the need to obtain expert advice. Moreover, based on the expert evidence before her, the trial judge accepted that the respondents met the standard of care as articulated by the experts for both parties.

The Court further held that the trial judge did not err in concluding that the respondents did not act in breach of any contractual obligation. To the extent that a contractual term was created out of the respondents’ promise to strive to provide suitable, affordable and adequate insurance, the Court held that the respondents had satisfied it. In this regard, the Court found that DL strove to provide suitable insurance when she provided a quote based on industry norms, made it clear that she was not qualified to provide an accurate value, and advised the appellant to obtain an opinion from a qualified expert. As was explained by the Court, a promise to “strive to provide insurance products that are suitable, affordable and adequate” is different from a guarantee that they will be adequate. Based on the evidence, the Court found that the respondents had not agreed to provide a guarantee. Accordingly, the respondents did not act in breach of any contractual term.

(2) In light of the answer to issue 1 above, the Court held that it was not necessary to address the appellant’s remaining grounds of appeal regarding causation and the trial judge’s assessment of damages. The trial judge’s conclusion was sufficient to dispose of the appeal on the merits.

(3) No. The trial judge’s reasons did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. As was noted by the Court, a party alleging bias has a “high burden” to meet given the “strong presumption of judicial impartiality”: Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25, at paras. 25-26. However, this high burden was not discharged as the appellant pointed to no evidence that substantiated its allegation. In making its determination, the Court found, inter alia, that the trial judge’s approach to liability and damages was sound and there was no indication that the trial judge engaged in backward reasoning. The Court also rejected the appellant’s argument that the trial judge’s reasons did not reflect her genuine assessment of the evidence and the issues, and were produced as an expedient way to dispose of the case before her.


Royal Bank of Canada v. Bodanis, 2020 ONCA 185

[Nordheimer J.A. (Motions Judge)]

COUNSEL:

Rachel Moses, for the moving party Scott Rosen, for the responding parties

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Bankruptcy Orders, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Lifting of Stay, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3, s. 193, 195, Ravelston Corp (Re) (2005), 24 C.B.R. (5th) 256 (ONCA), First National Financial GP Corp. v. Golden Dragon HO 10 Inc., 2019 ONCA 873

FACTS:

In this case, both appellants owed monies to the moving party and others pursuant to various judgments and costs awards. They owed these monies, in some cases, for many years. The moving party commenced bankruptcy applications against the appellants. A trial was held on these applications and the trial judge granted bankruptcy orders. The appellants appealed from those orders. There were companion motions in these two bankruptcy proceedings that sought directions. The moving party asserted that the appellants did not have an appeal as of right but rather must seek leave to appeal. In the alternative, the moving party said that the automatic stay that would result from an appeal as of right ought to be lifted.

ISSUES:

(1) Is there an appeal as of right? (2) Should the automatic stay that results from an appeal be lifted?

HOLDING:

Motion granted. Automatic stay lifted.

REASONING:

(1) Yes. This issue turned on the wording of s. 193 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3 (“BIA”). Nordheimer J.A. agreed that neither ss. 193(a) nor (b) applied. Based on the analysis contained in Ravelston Corp (Re) (2005), 24 C.B.R. (5th) 256 (ONCA), he concluded that a bankruptcy order does not involve future rights. However, he held that s. 193(c) applied to this case because the value of the property involved exceeded $10,000. The moving party submitted that the bankruptcy orders, which appoint a Trustee in Bankruptcy, simply preserve the assets of the bankrupt and therefore do not “involve” property of more than $10,000. Nordheimer J.A. rejected this argument and held that the appellant’s entire property had been taken out of their control and placed into the hands of a Trustee in Bankruptcy, who has the right to dispose of that property and distribute it among the creditors, without further court intervention.

(2) Yes. In considering whether the automatic stay under section 195 of the BIA should be lifted, the court will principally consider two factors: (1) the merits of the appeal and (2) the relative prejudice to the parties: First National Financial GP Corp. v. Golden Dragon HO 10 Inc., 2019 ONCA 873. In this case, while the appeals may not have been entirely meritless, they were ones that appeared to only challenge either the trial judge’s exercise of discretion in refusing an adjournment, or his factual findings that an act of bankruptcy had been committed. Therefore, their chances of success could not be seen as being very high. In addition, Nordheimer J.A. failed to see any prejudice to the responding parties if the automatic stay was lifted.


Whitchurch-Stouffville (Town) v. Bolender, 2020 ONCA 172

[Feldman, Huscroft and Harvison Young JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

Al Burton, for the appellants John Hart, for the respondent Keywords: Municipal Law, Zoning By-Laws Permitted Uses, Legal Non-Conforming Use, Burlington (City) v. Burlington Airpark Inc., 2017 ONCA 420, 138 O.R. (3d) 309, Saint-Romuald (City) v. Olivier, 2001 SCC 57

FACTS:

The appellants own two properties in the respondent municipality, one since the late 1960s and the other since the late 1970s. They have carried on the business of harvesting peat moss and making triple mix on the properties, which are zoned for rural use. They have also, in the past, altered the sites without obtaining a permit as required by a site alteration by-law. The town obtained an interim and then a permanent injunction to stop these activities in 2013 and 2014, but the injunction was set aside by the Court of Appeal in July 2015 on the basis that a trial of the issues was required, and such a trial was ordered.

After a 12-day trial, the trial judge rendered the following judgment: (1) the open storage of heavy equipment constitutds a lawful non-conforming use at that address; (2) that the Respondents were prohibited from extracting peat, assembling triple mix and receiving waste, and any activities incidental thereto; (3) that the receipt and accumulation of waste or fill, the extraction of peat and the compilation of triple mix, and the incidental uses thereto, were not and have never been permitted uses under the various Zoning By-laws; (4) that the Respondents had breached the provisions of the Site Alteration Bylaw; (5) that the Respondents were restrained from contravening Section 2.2 of the Site Alteration By-law which provides that no person shall undertake, cause, or permit any site alteration of any Property within the Town without the owner first receiving a permit issued under the said Bylaw by the Director, as defined therein, authorizing the Site Alteration; (6) that costs may be spoken to by the parties.

ISSUES:

(1) Did the trial judge err by giving the 2017 by-law retroactive effect by using evidence from 2012 and 2013 to substantiate an injunction? (2) Did the trial judge err in making orders 1 to 3 by failing to find that the peat moss extraction, triple mix compilation, and related activities constituted legal non-conforming uses of the properties?

HOLDING:

Appeal dismissed.

REASONING:

(1) No. The Court did not agree that any error was made in order 5. While the appellants discontinued their activities on the properties in response to the injunction and did not recommence pending the trial and disposition by the court, they did not give evidence at the trial that they did not intend to carry on their business on the North Property in the future. The Court was satisfied that in those circumstances, the evidence of what occurred before the interim injunction was ordered in 2013 was the only relevant evidence that could be led on the trial. The Court held that there was no improper retroactive effect by that approach. The effect of order 5 was to require the appellants to comply with the 2017 by-law in the future by obtaining a permit before doing any site alteration, in the face of evidence that they failed to obtain the required permits, contrary to previous by-laws, in the past.

(2) No. The trial judge gave reasons for finding that the activities carried out by the appellants constituted industrial rather than rural or agricultural uses, that these activities were prohibited from their commencement by the bylaws, and that they were not an extension of the storage of heavy equipment, within the meaning of the Saint-Romuald factors.


Fermar Paving Limited v. 567723 Ontario Ltd. o/a Winter’s Pit, 2020 ONCA 173

[Lauwers, Hourigan and Thorburn JJA]

COUNSEL:

Marco Drudi, for the appellant Charles C. Chang, for the respondent Keywords: Contracts, Breach, Damages, Gholami v. The Hospital of Sick Children, 2018 ONCA 783

FACTS:

The respondent is an Ontario road builder who entered into a construction contract and required aggregate. The appellant approached the respondent to discuss his needs. After some discussion, the respondent sent the appellant a document setting out the proposed terms of an agreement for the appellant to provide the respondent with the two types of aggregate needed for the construction contract. Both parties signed the document. The appellant subsequently informed the respondent that it would not be able to provide enough aggregate in accordance with the signed document. The respondent sought damages for breach of contract. The trial judge found that the document was enforceable, the agreement was not void, and that the appellant repudiated the terms of the agreement and should pay damages.

ISSUES:

(1) Did the trial judge make errors of fact and mixed fact and law in finding that the document was an enforceable contract? (2) Did the trial judge err in her determination of damages?

HOLDING:

Appeal dismissed.

REASONING:

(1) No. The appellant asserted that the document was only an agreement in principle rather than a binding agreement, and that it was void because the respondent was aware that it was illegal for the appellant to extract the amount of aggregate stipulated in the document. The appellant also argued that the terms of the document were unclear and the trial judge should have favoured the appellant’s interpretation of the terms, because the respondent was the one who drafted the document (the rule of contra proferentum).

The Court held that the document was a valid agreement. The respondent visited the appellant’s site, tested the aggregate, and revised the terms of the document at the appellant’s request. The appellant subsequently signed the document, which used language such as ‘warrants and represents.’ More so, it was incumbent on the appellant to revise the terms of the agreement to comply with licensing requirements before signing.

(2) No. The appellant asserted that the respondent should not be entitled to damages because there was no breach of contract. Since there was a breach of contract, the Court upheld the trial judge’s decision that the respondent be restored to the position that it would have been in had the appellant met its obligation to supply all necessary aggregate.


SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

911 Priority Corporation v. Murray, 2020 ONCA 171

[Feldman, Huscroft and Harvison Young JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

Spencer Toole, for the appellants Jordan Moss, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Wrongful Termination, Damages

Das Logistics Transport Inc. v. Artex Environmental Corporation , 2020 ONCA 168

[Tulloch, Benotto and Jamal JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

Jaspal Sangha, for the appellant Tyler H. McLean, for the respondent

Keywords: Punitive Damages

Greenberg v. Nowack, 2020 ONCA 167

[Tulloch, Benotto and Jamal JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

Norman Groot, for the respondents Paul Slansky, for the appellant

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Contempt

Kivell v. Chatham-Kent Children’s Services, 2020 ONCA 180

[Tulloch, Benotto and Jamal JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

Raymond G. Colautti, for the appellants Sheila Handler, for the respondents

Keywords: Torts, Negligent Investigation


CRIMINAL DECISIONS

R. v. E.-B., 2020 ONCA 160

[Simmons, van Rensburg and Harvison Young JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

Lance Beechener, for the appellant Natalya Odorico, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, Sentencing, R. v. W.(D.) [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, R. v. Batte (2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), R. v. Jorgge, 2013 ONCA 485

R. v. J.P., 2020 ONCA 162

[Lauwers, Trotter and Fairburn JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

Mark C. Halfyard, for the appellant Eric W. Taylor, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, Assault with a Weapon, Uttering Threats, Unlawful Confinement

R. v. M., 2020 ONCA 163

[Miller, Fairburn and Thorburn JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

Gregory Furmaniuk, for the appellant Catriona Verner, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Drug Trafficking, Sentencing, Criminal Code, s. 742.1(c), Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 5(3)(a), R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, R. v. Wong, 2012 ONCA 767, R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, R. v. Ghadban, 2015 ONCA 760

R. v. J.H., 2020 ONCA 165

[Watt, Huscroft and Jamal JJ.A]

COUNSEL:

Ian B. Kasper, for the appellant Megan Petrie, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, Evidence, Admissibility, Prior Bad Conduct, Jury Instructions, Criminal Code, ss. 625.1(2), 645(5), Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5 s. 4(6), R. v. Calnen, 2019 SCC 6, R. v. Robertson, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 918, R. v. F., D.S. (1999), 43 O.R. (3d) 609 (C.A.), R. v. B. (G.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 57, R. v. Evans, 2019 ONCA 715, R. v. Park, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 64, R. v. D.A.R., 2012 NSCA 31, R. v. Chiasson, 2009 ONCA 789, Boucher v. The Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 16, R. v. Mallory, 2007 ONCA 46, R. v. Stirling, 2008 SCC 10, R. v. Batte (2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), R. v. M.B., 2011 ONCA 76

R. v. Bernard , 2020 ONCA 170

[Rouleau, Benotto and Harvison Young JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

Maija Martin and David Reeve, for the appellant Victoria Rivers, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Importing Drugs, R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33

R. v. A.G., 2020 ONCA 183

[Benotto, Paciocco and Thorburn JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

Brian Irvine, for the appellant Nicole Rivers, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Assault, Sentencing


ONTARIO REVIEW BOARD DECISIONS

Ahmadzai (Re), 2020 ONCA 169

[Benotto, Huscroft and Jamal JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

Michelle O’Doherty, for the appellant

Emily Marrocco, for the respondent, Attorney General of Ontario Marie-Pierre T. Pilon, for the respondent, Person in Charge of Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre

Keywords: Criminal Law, Not Criminally Responsible, Robbery, Assault with a Weapon, Possession of a Weapon, Criminal Code, ss. 672.54(a), 672.54(b), (c), 672.78(1)(a) &(2), 672.78(3)(b), Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625, Kassa (Re), 2019 ONCA 313, R. v. Lamanna, 2009 ONCA 612, Mazzei v. British Columbia (Director of Adult Forensic Psychiatric Services), 2006 SCC 7, Valdez (Re), 2018 ONCA 657