On July 8, 2013, ALJ E. James Gildea issued Order No. 14 in Certain Integrated Circuit Devices and Products Containing the Same (Inv. No. 337-TA-873).  In the Order, ALJ Gildea granted-in-part Respondents HTC Corp., HTC America, Inc., LG Electronics, Inc., LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., LG Electronics MobileComm U.S.A., Inc., Motorola Mobility LLC, Nokia Corp., Nokia Inc., Pantech Co., Ltd., and Pantech Wireless, Inc.’s (collectively, “Respondents”) motion to strike certain of Complainant Tela Innovations, Inc.’s (“Tela”) untimely proposed claim constructions and to preclude Tela from offering any construction other than the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms in issue.

According to the Order, Respondents explained that on the deadline for exchanging proposed claim constructions set forth in the Procedural Schedule, Tela only provided proposed constructions for its own designated claim terms and for the Commission Investigative Staff’s (“OUII”) designated claim terms.  Tela failed to provide any proposed constructions for the claim terms that Respondents had designated as needing construction.  Instead, Tela waited until the deadline to meet and confer regarding the claim terms in issue to provide proposed constructions for the Respondents’ designated terms.  Respondents argued that this gave Tela an unfair tactical advantage and prejudiced Respondents and OUII, and that Tela’s proposed constructions for the Respondents’ terms should therefore be stricken as untimely, and that Tela should be barred from offering any construction for the terms other than the plain and ordinary meaning.

Tela opposed the motion, arguing that it had met all of the deadlines in the Procedural Schedule.  According to Tela, Respondents had proposed 172 terms for construction, and Tela did not believe that Respondents were serious in designating so many terms.  Tela further asserted that it had submitted its proposed constructions as part of the meet and confer process, thereby allowing Respondents ample time to consider those constructions.

OUII supported Respondents’ motion.  OUII argued that Tela did not have good cause for failing to provide proposed constructions for Respondents’ terms in accordance with the Procedural Schedule, and that Tela had gained an unfair tactical advantage and prejudiced Respondents and OUII.

After considering the arguments, ALJ Gildea determined to grant Respondents’ motion in part.  In particular, the ALJ struck Tela’s untimely proposed constructions for Respondents’ terms to the extent that Tela had proposed any definition other than the plain and ordinary meaning.  However, the ALJ ordered that Tela would be permitted to provide intrinsic evidence (but not extrinsic evidence) of what the plain and ordinary meaning of the Respondents’ terms may be.  Further, Tela would be permitted to refute Respondents’ and OUII’s proposed constructions provided that Tela does not promote anything other than the plain and ordinary meaning.