The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 (the Regulations) protected workers from discrimination in the workplace on grounds of religion or belief. The term “belief” was stated to include “any religious or philosophical belief”.

The Equality Act 2010 (the Act), which replaced those regulations, carried over substantially the same definition of “belief”.

A recent employment tribunal case, brought under the old Regulations but equally relevant to the new Act, serves to illustrate the perhaps not obvious types of belief that can potentially fall within the ambit of the discrimination legislation.

The Claimant in the case (Hashman v Milton Park (Dorset) Ltd t/a Orchard Park), was a lifelong animal rights activist and anti-hunt campaigner. His belief system, as described by him, was that “people should live their lives with mindful respect for animals and we all have a moral obligation to live in a way which is kind to each other, our environment and our fellow creatures”.

He was claiming that he was dismissed because his employer’s shareholders, who supported hunting and were hunt members, found out that he opposed hunting, and that his dismissal was therefore an act of discrimination on the grounds of his philosophical belief in the sanctity of life.

Whether or not the dismissal was indeed an act of discrimination will be determined at a later date, but the issue for the Tribunal in the case at hand was whether or not the Claimant’s strongly held belief constituted a philosophical belief for the purposes of the Regulations.

In coming to its decision, the Tribunal considered an Employment Appeal Tribunal judgment from an earlier case (Grainger plc and others v Nicholson) which set down guidance as to the types of belief that qualified for protection under the Regulations (this guidance will continue to apply under the new Act):

  • The belief must be genuinely held;
  • It must be a belief, not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available;
  • It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour;
  • It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance; and
  • It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, not be incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others.

The Tribunal concluded that the Claimant’s belief in the sanctity of life (including his fervent anti fox-hunting belief) was indeed a philosophical belief for the purposes of the Regulations. It was relevant that the Claimant thought very deeply about the issues arising from his beliefs and that he attempted to live his life in accord with those beliefs.

This was so even where the Claimant had engaged in activities as a hunt saboteur and where the Claimant had remained employed at the Respondent’s premises after he learned that the Respondent’s majority shareholders were members of a local hunt.

The employment judge was very careful to make clear, however, that his judgment was very much based on the particular facts of the case; and that he was not suggesting that everyone who is opposed to fox-hunting necessarily holds a philosophical belief within the meaning of the relevant legislation.

As an employment tribunal decision, this case will not bind other tribunals; its interest is in reminding employers to act with care when dealing with employees with particular belief systems, and not of course just religious beliefs. By way of further example, in another recent tribunal case, Maistry v BBC, the employment judge had to decide whether a belief in the "higher purpose" of public sector broadcasting, to encourage debate and citizenship in a public space, was a philosophical belief that qualified for protection under the Regulations. It was decided that it was. The strength of the Claimant’s feelings was once again found to be relevant, and the weight that tribunals appear to be according to this factor in particular is note-worthy. A very broad spectrum of beliefs can qualify for protection under the discrimination legislation.