35506 Ontario (Energy Board) v. Ontario Power Generation Inc.
Public utilities — Electricity — Rate setting — Administrative law
On appeal from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (2013 ONCA 359), setting aside a decision of the Divisional Court (2012 ONSC 729, and setting aside a decision of the Ontario Energy Board.
In Ontario, utility rates are regulated through a process by which a utility seeks approval from the Ontario Energy Board for costs the utility has incurred or expects to incur in a specified period of time. Where the Board approves of the costs, they are incorporated into utility rates such that the utility receives payment amounts to cover the approved expenditures. The Board disallowed certain payment amounts applied for by Ontario Power Generation (“OPG”) as part of its rate application covering the 2011‑2012 operating period. Specifically, the Board disallowed $145 million in labour compensation costs related to OPG’s nuclear operations on the grounds that OPG’s labour costs were out of step with those of comparable entities in the regulated power generation industry. A majority of the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed OPG’s appeal and upheld the decision of the Board. The Court of Appeal set aside the decisions of the Divisional Court and the Board and remitted the matter to the Board for redetermination in accordance with its reasons.
The crux of OPG’s argument here is that the Board is legally required to compensate OPG for all of its prudently committed or incurred costs. OPG asserts that prudence in this context has a particular methodological meaning that requires the Board to assess the reasonableness of OPG’s decision to incur or commit to costs at the time the decisions to incur or commit to the costs were made and that OPG ought to benefit from a presumption of prudence. The Board on the other hand argues that a particular prudence test methodology is not compelled by law, and that in any case the costs disallowed here were not committed nuclear compensation costs, but are better characterized as forecast costs.
OPG also raises concerns regarding the Board’s role in acting as a party on appeal from its own decision, arguing that the Board’s aggressive and adversarial defence of its decision was improper, and the Board attempted to use the appeal to bootstrap its original decision by making additional arguments on appeal. The Board argues that the structure of utilities regulation in Ontario makes it necessary and important for it to argue the merits of its decision on appeal.
Held (6:1): The appeal should be allowed. The decision of the Court of Appeal is set aside and the decision of the Board is reinstated.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Gascon JJ.:
The first issue is the appropriateness of the Board’s participation in the appeal. The concerns with regard to tribunal participation on appeal from the tribunal’s own decision should not be read to establish a categorical ban. A discretionary approach provides the best means of ensuring that the principles of finality and impartiality are respected without sacrificing the ability of reviewing courts to hear useful and important information and analysis. Because of their expertise and familiarity with the relevant administrative scheme, tribunals may in many cases be well positioned to help the reviewing court reach a just outcome. Further, some cases may arise in which there is simply no other party to stand in opposition to the party challenging the tribunal decision. In a situation where no other well‑informed party stands opposed, the presence of a tribunal as an adversarial party may help the court ensure it has heard the best of both sides of a dispute. The following factors are relevant in informing the court’s exercise of its discretion: statutory provisions addressing the structure, processes and role of the particular tribunal and the mandate of the tribunal, that is, whether the function of the tribunal is to adjudicate individual conflicts between parties or whether it serves a policy‑making, regulatory or investigative role, or acts on behalf of the public interest. The importance of fairness, real and perceived, weighs more heavily against tribunal standing where the tribunal served an adjudicatory function in the proceeding. Tribunal standing is a matter to be determined by the court conducting the first‑instance review in accordance with the principled exercise of that court’s discretion. In exercising its discretion, the court is required to balance the need for fully informed adjudication against the importance of maintaining tribunal impartiality.
Consideration of these factors in the context of this case leads to the conclusion that it was not improper for the Board to participate in arguing in favour of the reasonableness of its decision on appeal. The Board was the only respondent in the initial review of its decision. It had no alternative but to step in if the decision was to be defended on the merits. Also, the Board was exercising a regulatory role by setting just and reasonable payment amounts to a utility. In this case, the Board’s participation in the instant appeal was not improper.
The issue of tribunal “bootstrapping” is closely related to the question of when it is proper for a tribunal to act as a party on appeal or judicial review of its decision. The standing issue concerns the types of argument a tribunal may make, while the bootstrapping issue concerns the content of those arguments. A tribunal engages in bootstrapping where it seeks to supplement what would otherwise be a deficient decision with new arguments on appeal. A tribunal may not defend its decision on a ground that it did not rely on in the decision under review. The principle of finality dictates that once a tribunal has decided the issues before it and provided reasons for its decision, absent a power to vary its decision or rehear the matter, it cannot use judicial review as a chance to amend, vary, qualify or supplement its reasons. While a permissive stance towards new arguments by tribunals on appeal serves the interests of justice insofar as it ensures that a reviewing court is presented with the strongest arguments in favour of both sides, to permit bootstrapping may undermine the importance of reasoned, well‑written original decisions. In this case, the Board did not impermissibly step beyond the bounds of its original decision in its arguments before the Court. The arguments raised by the Board on appeal do not amount to impermissible bootstrapping.
The merits issue concerns whether the appropriate methodology was followed by the Board in its disallowance of $145 million in labour compensation costs sought by OPG. The just‑and‑reasonable approach to recovery of the cost of services provided by a utility captures the essential balance at the heart of utilities regulation: to encourage investment in a robust utility infrastructure and to protect consumer interests, utilities must be allowed, over the long run, to earn their cost of capital, no more, no less. In order to ensure the balance between utilities’ and consumers’ interests is struck, just and reasonable rates must be those that ensure consumers are paying what the Board expects it to cost to efficiently provide the services they receive, taking account of both operating and capital costs. In that way, consumers may be assured that, overall, they are paying no more than what is necessary for the service they receive, and utilities may be assured of an opportunity to earn a fair return for providing those services.
The Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998 does not prescribe the methodology the Board must use to weigh utility and consumer interests when deciding what constitutes just and reasonable payment amounts to the utility. However, the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998 places the burden on the applicant utility to establish that payments amounts approved by the Board are just and reasonable. It would thus seem inconsistent with the statutory scheme to presume that utility decisions to incur costs were prudent. The Board has broad discretion to determine the methods it may use to examine costs — but it cannot shift the burden of proof contrary to the statutory scheme.
The issue is whether the Board was bound to use a no hindsight, presumption of prudence test to determine whether labour compensation costs were just and reasonable. The prudent investment test, or prudence review, is a valid and widely accepted tool that regulators may use when assessing whether payments to a utility would be just and reasonable. However, there is no support in the statutory scheme for the notion that the Board should be required as a matter of law, under the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998 to apply the prudence test such that the mere decision not to apply it when considering committed costs would render its decision on payment amounts unreasonable. Where a statute requires only that the regulator set “just and reasonable” payments, as the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998 does in Ontario, the regulator may make use of a variety of analytical tools in assessing the justness and reasonableness of a utility’s proposed payment amounts. This is particularly so where, as here, the regulator has been given express discretion over the methodology to be used in setting payment amounts.
Where the regulator has discretion over its methodological approach, understanding whether the costs at issue are “forecast” or “committed” may be helpful in reviewing the reasonableness of a regulator’s choice of methodology. Here, the labour compensation costs which led to the $145 million disallowance are best understood as partly committed costs and partly costs subject to management discretion. They are partly committed because they resulted from collective agreements entered into between OPG and two of its unions, and partly subject to management discretion because OPG retained some flexibility to manage total staffing levels in light of, among other things, projected attrition of the workforce. It is not reasonable to treat these costs as entirely forecast. However, the Board was not bound to apply a particular prudence test in evaluating these costs. It is not necessarily unreasonable, in light of the particular regulatory structure established by the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998, for the Board to evaluate committed costs using a method other than a no‑hindsight prudence review. Applying a presumption of prudence would have conflicted with the burden of proof in the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998 and would therefore not have been reasonable. The question of whether it was reasonable to assess a particular cost using hindsight should turn instead on the circumstances of that cost.
In this case, the nature of the disputed costs and the environment in which they arose provide a sufficient basis to find that the Board did not act unreasonably in not applying the prudent investment test in determining whether it would be just and reasonable to compensate OPG for these costs and disallowing. Since the costs at issue are operating costs, there is little danger that a disallowance of these costs will have a chilling effect on OPG’s willingness to incur operating costs in the future, because costs of the type disallowed here are an inescapable element of operating a utility. Further, the costs at issue arise in the context of an ongoing repeat‑player relationship between OPG and its employees. Such a context supports the reasonableness of a regulator’s decision to weigh all evidence it finds relevant in striking a just and reasonable balance between the utility and consumers, rather than confining itself to a no‑hindsight approach. There is no dispute that collective agreements are “immutable” between employees and the utility. However, if the legislature had intended for costs under collective agreements to also be inevitably imposed on consumers, it would not have seen fit to grant the Board oversight of utility compensation costs. The Board’s decision in no way purports to force OPG to break its contractual commitments to unionized employees. It was not unreasonable for the Board to adopt a mixed approach that did not rely on quantifying the exact share of compensation costs that fell into the forecast and committed categories. Such an approach represents an exercise of the Board’s methodological discretion in addressing a challenging issue where these costs did not fit easily into one category or the other.
The Board’s disallowance may have adversely impacted OPG’s ability to earn its cost of capital in the short run. Nevertheless, the disallowance was intended to send a clear signal that OPG must take responsibility for improving its performance. Such a signal may, in the short run, provide the necessary impetus for OPG to bring its compensation costs in line with what, in the Board’s opinion, consumers should justly expect to pay for an efficiently provided service. Sending such a signal is consistent with the Board’s market proxy role and its objectives under s. 1 of the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998.
Per Abella J. (dissenting):
The Board’s decision was unreasonable because the Board failed to apply the methodology set out for itself for evaluating just and reasonable payment amounts. It both ignored the legally binding nature of the collective agreements between Ontario Power Generation and the unions and failed to distinguish between committed compensation costs and those that were reducible.
The Board stated in its reasons that it would use two kinds of review in order to determine just and reasonable payment amounts. As to “forecast costs”, that is, those over which a utility retains discretion and can still be reduced or avoided, the Board explained that it would review such costs using a wide range of evidence, and that the onus would be on the utility to demonstrate that its forecast costs were reasonable. A different approach, however, would be applied to those costs the company could not “take action to reduce”. These costs, sometimes called “committed costs”, represent binding commitments that leave a utility with no discretion about whether to make the payment. The Board explained that it would evaluate these costs using a “prudence review”. The application of a prudence review does not shield these costs from scrutiny, but it does include a presumption that the costs were prudently incurred.
Rather than apply the methodology it set out for itself, however, the Board assessed all compensation costs in Ontario Power Generation’s collective agreements as adjustable forecast costs, without determining whether any of them were costs for which there is no opportunity for the company to take action to reduce. The Board’s failure to separately assess the compensation costs committed as a result of the collective agreements from other compensation costs, ignored not only its own methodological template, but labour law as well.
The compensation costs for approximately 90 per cent of Ontario Power Generation’s regulated workforce were established through legally binding collective agreements which obligated the utility to pay fixed levels of compensation, regulated staffing levels, and provided unionized employees with employment security. The obligations contained in these collective agreements were immutable and legally binding commitments. The agreements therefore did not just leave the utility with limited flexibility regarding overall compensation or staffing levels, they made it illegal for the utility to alter the compensation and staffing levels of 90 per cent of its regulated workforce in a manner that was inconsistent with its commitments under the agreements.
The Board, however, applying the methodology it said it would use for the utility’s forecast costs, put the onus on Ontario Power Generation to prove the reasonableness of all its compensation costs and concluded that it had failed to provide compelling evidence or documentation or analysis to justify compensation levels. Had the Board used the approach it said it would use for costs the company had no opportunity to reduce, it would have used an after‑the‑fact prudence review, with a rebuttable presumption that the utility’s expenditures were reasonable.
It may well be that Ontario Power Generation has the ability to manage some staffing levels through attrition or other mechanisms that did not breach the utility’s commitments under its collective agreements, and that these costs may therefore properly be characterized as forecast costs. But no factual findings were made by the Board about the extent of any such flexibility. There is in fact no evidence in the record, nor any evidence cited in the Board’s decision, setting out what proportion of Ontario Power Generation’s compensation costs were fixed and what proportion remained subject to the utility’s discretion. Given that collective agreements are legally binding, it was unreasonable for the Board to assume that Ontario Power Generation could reduce the costs fixed by these contracts in the absence of any evidence to that effect.
Selecting a test which is more likely to confirm the Board’s assumption that collectively‑bargained costs are excessive, misconceives the point of the exercise, namely, to determine whether those costs were in fact excessive. Blaming collective bargaining for what are assumed to be excessive costs, imposes the appearance of an ideologically‑driven conclusion on what is intended to be a principled methodology based on a distinction between committed and forecast costs, not between costs which are collectively bargained and those which are not. While the Board has wide discretion to fix payment amounts that are just and reasonable and, subject to certain limitations, to establish the methodology used to determine such amounts, once the Board establishes a methodology, it is, at the very least, required to faithfully apply it.
Absent methodological clarity and predictability, Ontario Power Generation would be unable to know how to determine what expenditures and investments to make and how to present them to the Board for review. Wandering sporadically from approach to approach, or failing to apply the methodology it declares itself to be following, creates uncertainty and leads, inevitably, to needlessly wasting public time and resources in constantly having to anticipate and respond to moving regulatory targets. Whether or not one can fault the Board for failing to use a particular methodology, what the Board can unquestionably be analytically faulted for, is evaluating all compensation costs fixed by collective agreements as being amenable to adjustment. Treating these compensation costs as reducible was unreasonable.
The appeal should accordingly be dismissed, the Board’s decision set aside, and the matter remitted to the Board for reconsideration.
Reasons for decision of the majority written by Rothstein J. Dissenting reasons by Abella J.
Neutral Citation: 2015 SCC 44. Docket No. 35506