An extract from The Corporate Governance Review, 10th Edition


Recent years have seen a move internationally towards enhanced rights for shareholders. A significant development in shareholders rights, and one that Ireland shares with its EU neighbours, is the Shareholders Rights Directive, implemented in Ireland by the Shareholders' Rights (Directive 2007/36/EC) Regulations 2009.

An amending Directive, (EU) 2017/828 amending Directive 2007/36/EC, which introduces new provisions in the Shareholder Rights Directive aimed at improving engagement with shareholders, was agreed in May 2017. The basic provisions of the Directive must be implemented into domestic law in Member States by 10 June 2019. Among the provisions of note are the right for companies to be able to identify their shareholders, the transmission of information between companies and shareholders, and provisions relating to remuneration policies of directors. These new provisions substantially reflect current practice in the Irish market, such practice having developed as a result of Irish listed companies that are also listed on the London Stock Exchange opting to comply with the position in the UK on a number of these issues.

i Shareholder rights and powersEquality of voting rights

Every registered shareholder entitled to attend meetings of an Irish company is also entitled to vote on any shareholder matter, unless the company's constitution or articles of association or the terms of issue of the shares dictate otherwise. Many private companies in Ireland have only one class of ordinary shares in issue, with each share carrying equal rights in relation to voting and dividends, and on a winding-up. However, it is also quite common for an Irish company to introduce different classes of shares, for example voting and non-voting, or a share class that might attach weighted voting rights either generally or on a particular matter.

Rights accrue only to those persons who are registered in the register of members of the company and not to beneficial holders. There is some suggestion that in future direct and indirect holders of shares may be given equal rights, but this has yet to materialise in Ireland.

Other rights of shareholders

Shareholders in Irish companies enjoy all the usual rights associated with membership of a company, for example the right to receive copies of financial information, pre-emption rights and the right to wind up the company.

Shareholders of some Irish listed companies also enjoy certain additional and enhanced rights. For example, under the Companies Act, a general meeting can be called by members representing only 5 per cent of the voting capital of a company listed on Euronext Dublin (10 per cent for companies listed on the smaller Euronext Growth). In addition, members holding 3 per cent of the issued capital of a company listed on Euronext Dublin, representing at least 3 per cent of its total voting rights, have the new right to put items on the agenda and table draft resolutions to be adopted at AGMs. Listed companies are allowed to offer members participation in and voting at general meetings by electronic means (although there is likely to be debate about exactly what this means) and will also be allowed to offer the possibility of voting by correspondence in advance. However, neither of the latter provisions is mandatory, and companies are merely permitted to provide these facilities.

Decisions reserved to shareholders

Generally, shareholders do not have a role in deciding or approving operational matters, regardless of size or materiality. An exception to this principle arises under the Listing Rules in relation to large transactions.

Under Irish law, there is a list of structural matters that are reserved to be decided by the shareholders by ordinary resolution (or a simple majority) of those who vote. Examples include the consolidation or subdivision of shares, the payment of compensation to former directors and the purchase 'on market' of the company's own shares. Certain other actions are also reserved but require a special resolution (or 75 per cent of the votes). Examples of these matters include the alteration of the memorandum and articles of association of the company, the giving of financial assistance in connection with the purchase of the company's own shares and the reduction of share capital.

Rights of dissenting shareholders

A number of remedies are open to disgruntled shareholders under Irish law. Perhaps the remedy that is most often talked about is the statutory right of minority shareholders to seek potentially far-reaching redress on the grounds of majority shareholder oppression, where shareholders can also apply to court to have a forced sale of the company or to have the company wound up on just and equitable grounds. Here it must be shown that the act or measure complained of has as its primary motive the advancement of the interests of the majority shareholders as opposed to the interests of the company as a whole. Mere dissent by a minority is insufficient to support a claim for redress. The Companies Act permits the courts to award a wide range of remedies, including forced sale, winding up and/or compensation for any loss or damage as a result of oppressive conduct.

ii Shareholders' duties and responsibilitiesControlling shareholders

The Irish company is legally separate from its shareholders, even its controlling shareholder. The powers, rights, duties and responsibilities of the controlling shareholder, like any other shareholder, will be determined by the terms of issue of the shares, the constitution or articles of association of the company and any applicable shareholders' agreement. However, the actions of a controlling shareholder should always be measured in the context of the various remedies open to minority shareholders.

Institutional investors

Corporate governance is currently a key concern for institutional investors, along with so many other interested parties. The UK Stewardship Code sets out good practice for institutional investors when engaging with UK listed companies and will be relevant to how those institutional investors engage with Irish listed companies. Although there are currently no plans to introduce a similar code in Ireland, it is likely that Irish institutional investors will view this code as a standard of market practice in the area.

iii Shareholder activism and shareholder remedies

Shareholder activism is relatively underdeveloped in Ireland. However, there are a number of signs of change.

Shareholders can bring proceedings where the directors are exercising their powers or conducting the affairs of the company in a manner oppressive to the shareholders or in disregard of their interests. As indicated above, courts can grant relief where it can be proved by a member that the affairs of the company have been conducted in an oppressive manner against him or her or any of the members of the company, including members who are directors themselves.

Aggrieved members may also take a derivative action (i.e., an action in the name of the company itself) where the company has been wronged, with one shareholder representing the body of shareholders. This typically arises in circumstances where the directors of a company are responsible for taking actions in the company's name and refuse to take that action. Derivative actions will be permitted where an ultra vires or illegal act has been perpetrated against the company, where more than a bare majority is required to ratify the wrong in question, where members' personal rights have been infringed or where fraud has been committed on a minority of members.

iv Takeover defences

Certain takeover defence mechanisms may risk conflicting with the Irish Takeover Panel Rules. As a rule, in any defensive action it is imperative that boards ensure that their actions do not amount to frustrating actions, and that a level playing field is afforded to all potential bidders.

A company that has received a bid is not prevented from seeking alternative bids elsewhere (although this may possibly be subject to any inter-party agreement). The offer of the third party may be announced at any time except where the Takeover Panel directs that the third-party white knight make its intentions clear. In general terms, the directors must provide equality of information to all parties.

v Contact with shareholdersMandatory and best practice reporting to all shareholders

Under the Transparency Regulations, companies whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market are required to publish annual and half-yearly financial reports. The annual report contains audited financial statements, a management report and responsibility statements. The half-yearly report contains a condensed set of financial statements, an interim management report and responsibility statements. Responsibility statements contain certain confirmations, including that the financial statements represent a fair and true view of the financial status of the company.

Members also enjoy the right to access certain information from the company, including the company memorandum and articles of association, resolutions and minutes of general meetings, company registers and the annual financial statements, directors' reports and auditors' reports.

Listed companies follow the Corporate Governance Code, which sets out the best practice guidelines for corporate governance. Listed companies must comply with the Code or explain any deviations to shareholders. In addition, the Irish Corporate Governance Annex to the Listing Rules encourages Irish listed companies to provide more detailed explanations of their actions, and in particular any deviation from certain aspects of the Corporate Governance Code to promote dialogue with shareholders.

Twenty-one clear days' notice must be given for an AGM. Extraordinary general meetings (EGMs) of listed companies may be held on 14 days' notice, but only where the company offers all members the facility to vote by electronic means at general meetings and the company has passed a special resolution approving the holding of EGMs on 14 days' notice, at its immediately preceding AGM or at a general meeting held since that meeting. However, if it is proposed to pass a special resolution at the EGM of the listed company, then 21 days' notice must be given.

Notwithstanding the minimum statutory period, for listed companies, 20 business days is the minimum period recommended under the Corporate Governance Code.