Seyfarth Synopsis: After an employer circulated a letter to 146 employees discussing an employee’s EEOC Charge that alleged discrimination on the basis of his disability in violation of the ADA, a federal district court in Connecticut denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment.
This ruling provides valuable lessons for employers on the risks of widespread internal communication regarding pending EEOC charges.
In EEOC v. Day & Zimmerman NPS, Inc., Case No. 15-CV-1416, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133918 (D. Conn Aug. 22, 2017), a Day & Zimmerman NPS, Inc. (“DZNPS”) employee filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that DZNPS violated the ADA by denying him a reasonable accommodation. As part of its investigation of the Charge, the EEOC sought information from DZNPS, including the names and contact information of other DZNPS employees. Prior to providing the requested information to the EEOC, DZNPS sent a letter to approximately 146 employees that identified the Charging Party by name, and noted that he had filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC alleged that by sending the letter, DZNPS retaliated against the employee for filing a charge with the EEOC in violation of the ADA and interfered with the Charging Party and letter recipient employees’ exercise and enjoyment of rights protected by the ADA.
As we previously blogged about here, the Court previously denied DZNPS’s motion to dismiss. After the EEOC filed a motion for partial summary judgment on its interference claim under the ADA, and DZNPS filed a motion for summary judgment as to the Complaint in its entirety, Judge Victor A. Bolden of the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment.
For employers considering whether to communicate internally about the pending EEOC charges, this ruling illustrates they should be careful to avoid creating the perception that they are retaliating against employees who bring charges or interfering with other employees’ rights to file future charges.
In or around the fall of 2012, DZNPS hired 147 temporary electricians, including the Charging Party, who was a member of Local 35 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“Local 35”). Id. at *4. After the Charging Party began training for the position, he provided a doctor’s note to a DZNPS representative indicating that he could not work around radiation. The note requested a reasonable accommodation. After receiving the doctor’s note and the request for a reasonable accommodation, DZNPS terminated the Charging Party’s employment.
In October 2012, the Charging Party filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that DZNPS failed to accommodate his disability reasonably and unlawfully terminated his employment. Id. at *5. In March 2014, the EEOC sought information from DZNPS as part of its investigation of the employee’s charge, including the names and contact information of other electricians who had worked for DZNPS at the Millstone Power Station in Waterford, Connecticut in the fall of 2012.
In June 2014, before providing the requested information to the EEOC, DZNPS sent a letter to approximately 146 individuals, all of whom were members of Local 35 and all of whom had worked or continued to work for DZNPS. Id. at *6-7. In the June 2014 letter, DZNPS identified the allegedly aggrieved employee by name and indicated that he had filed a charge of discrimination on the basis of disability. The letter identified his union local, the medical restrictions on his ability to work, and the accommodation he had requested. It further informed the recipients of their right to refuse to speak to the EEOC investigator, and offered them the option to have DZNPS counsel present if they chose to speak to the EEOC.
The EEOC moved for partial summary judgment on its interference claim under the ADA. DZNPS moved for summary judgment as to the Complaint in its entirety, arguing that: (1) the EEOC’s legal theories would violate DZNPS’s free speech rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; (2) that the June 2014 letter is protected by the litigation privilege under Connecticut law; (3) that the EEOC cannot, as a matter of law, make out a claim for retaliation under the ADA; (4) that the EEOC cannot, as a matter of law, make out a claim for interference under the ADA; and (5) that the EEOC lacks standing to bring this case under Article III of the United States Constitution.
The Court’s Decision
The Court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment. First, the Court rejected DZNPS’s claim that the EEOC lacked Article III standing to bring the case because no punitive or compensatory damages were available to the EEOC. Id. at *13-14. The Court noted that DZNPS cited to no legal authority supporting that proposition. DZNPS also argued that if the Court found that its sending of the letter was either retaliation or interference in violation of the ADA, then the Court would be establishing a content and speaker-based restriction on speech that violated the First Amendment. The Court rejected this argument on the basis that DZNPS identified no authority supporting its argument that the First Amendment protects speech from a defendant if that speech gives rise to liability under the ADA or other employment discrimination statutes. Id. at *16-19. Further, after analyzing Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981), and subsequent cases interpreting Gulf Oil, the Court held that the Gulf Oil line of cases did not prevent courts from imposing restrictions on employer communications in situations where those communications could amount to “coercion” or prevent employees from exercising their rights. Id. at *20-22.
Turning to the ADA retaliation claim, DZNPS argued that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that the EEOC would not be able to establish the third and fourth prongs of the prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, either an adverse employment action or a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Id. at *26-28. DZNPS also argued that, even if the EEOC showed a genuine dispute of material fact as to the prima facie case for retaliation, the EEOC did not rebut DZNPS’s legitimate non-retaliatory reasons for sending the letter. The Court found that when an employer disseminates an employee’s administrative charge of discrimination to the employee’s colleagues, a reasonable factfinder could determine that such conduct constitutes an adverse employment action. In regards to DZNPS’s proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for sending the letter, to “minimize business disruption” and notify the recipients that DZNPS had disclosed their “home telephone numbers and addresses . . . to the EEOC,” the Court found that a reasonable jury could also conclude that DZNPS’s explanation was pretextual because the letter did not need to explain that recipients need not speak to the EEOC investigator and that counsel for DZNPS could be present if the recipient chose to speak to the EEOC. Id. at *34.
Finally, the Court addressed both parties’ motion for summary judgment on the ADA interference claim. Id. at *35-39. The EEOC argued that DZNPS interfered with the rights under the ADA of all the letter recipients because a reasonable jury would need to conclude that the letter had a tendency to chill recipients from exercising their rights under the ADA. Citing its previous order denying DZNPS’s motion to dismiss, where the Court held that the disclosure of sensitive personal information about an individual could well dissuade that individual from making or supporting a charge of discrimination under the ADA, the Court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that the letter could have the effect of interfering with or intimidating the letter’s recipients with respect to communicating with the EEOC about possible disability discrimination by DZNPS. Accordingly, explaining that because this question should be reserved for the jury, the Court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment.
Implications For Employers
For employers considering whether to internally disclose information on a widespread basis regarding charges of discrimination filed by employees, this ruling should serve as a cautionary tale. Further, it illustrates how widespread internal communication regarding such charges could potentially be viewed as retaliation or interference under the ADA in the context of motions for summary judgment. As such, employers should exercise caution when considering when and to whom it should internally disclose information about pending administrative charges.