In Re J (A Minor)  EWHC 2595 (Fam), Hayden J gave a useful summary of the principles applicable to naming professionals and experts in proceedings relating to children, which is equally applicable to proceedings before the Court of Protection. The facts of the case are not relevance, save that, as is often the case, they were such that there was a risk of “jigsaw” identification. This risk was such, in this case, to lead the judge to agree that the local authority in question should not be named (although he held that the risk was not such that the CAFCASS officers or social workers should be also be anonymised).
In relation to experts, Hayden J set out the key principles thus:
21. In R (on the application of Guardian News and Media Ltd v City of Westminster Magistrates' Court ( 3 WLR 1343;  3 All ER 551;  EMLR 22) Toulson LJ made a succinct and powerful assertion of the importance of transparency in the justice system:
"Open Justice. The words express a principle at the heart of our system of justice and vital to the rule of law"
22. In R (C) v the Secretary of State for Justice (supra) Lady Hale also articulates the reasoning that underpins the principle of open justice thus:
"The principle of open justice is one of the most precious in our law. It is there to reassure the public and the parties that our courts are indeed doing justice according to law. In fact, there are two aspects to this principle. The first is that justice should be done in open court, so that the people interested in the case, the wider public and the media can know what is going on. The court should not hear and take into account evidence and arguments that they have not heard or seen. The second is that the names of the people whose cases are being decided, and others involved in the hearing, should be public knowledge. The rationale for the second rule is not quite the same as the rationale for the first, as we shall see. This case is about the second rule. There is a long-standing practice that certain classes of people, principally children and mental patients, should not be named in proceedings about their care, treatment and property. The first issue before us is whether there should be a presumption of anonymity in civil proceedings, or certain kinds of civil proceedings, in the High Court relating to a patient detained in a psychiatric hospital, or otherwise subject to compulsory powers, under the Mental Health Act 1983 ("the 1983 Act"). The second issue is whether there should be an anonymity order on the facts of this particular case."
23. In M v The Press Association (supra) I reminded myself of some of the key principles which require to be applied. They bear repetition here:
"i. Orders restricting reporting should be made only when they are necessary in the interests of the administration of justice – see Scott v Scott ( AC 417);
ii. The person or body applying for the reporting restriction bears the burden of justifying it - it is not for the media to justify its wish to report on a case;
iii. Such an application must be supported by cogent and compelling evidence – see R v Jolleys, Ex Parte Press Association, ( EWCA Crim 1135;  1 Cr App R 15;  EMLR 16), R v Central Criminal Court ex parte W, B and C ( 1 Cr App R 2) and, in civil cases, the Practice Guidance (Interim Non-disclosure Orders)  1 WLR 1033 and Derispaska v Cherney ( EWCA Civ 1235, per Lewison LJ (at paragraph 14))."
24. Applying these principles along with the President's Guidance ['Transparency in the Family Courts; Publication of Judgments'], it seems to me to be beyond argument that those who offer expert evidence to any Court and to which the Family Court can be no exception, should do so realising that their conclusions and analysis will likely be held to public scrutiny. It is right that this should be the case in the Family Justice system, not least because those conclusions may (and I emphasise may) be relied on by Judges who are required to make some of the most draconian orders in any jurisdiction. These include the separation of families, temporarily or permanently and the revocation of parental rights and responsibilities. Not only is the probity of the process enhanced by scrutiny, so too is its efficacy. Transparency stimulates debate and in so doing provides fertile ground for the growth of knowledge and understanding.