An extract from The Dominance and Monopolies Review - 7th edition
Malaysian law recognises the same categories of abuse (i.e., exclusionary and exploitative abuses) as the European Union. Section 10(2) of the CA 2010 provides a non-exhaustive list of what an abuse of a dominant position may include:
- directly or indirectly imposing an unfair purchase or selling price or other unfair trading condition on any supplier or customer;
- limiting or controlling production, market outlets or market access, technical or technological development or investment, to the prejudice of consumers;
- refusing to supply to a particular enterprise or group or category of enterprises;
- applying different conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties;
- making the conclusion of contract subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary conditions that have no connection with the subject matter of the contract;
- predatory behaviour towards competitors; and
- buying up a scarce supply of intermediate goods or resources required by a competitor, in circumstances where the enterprise in a dominant position does not have a reasonable commercial justification.
The CA 2010 does not prohibit an enterprise in a dominant position from taking any step that has a reasonable commercial justification or represents a reasonable commercial response to the market entry or market conduct of a competitor. The MyCC adopts an 'effects-based' approach when assessing a potential abuse of dominance.ii Exclusionary abuses
The MyCC assesses exclusionary conduct in terms of its impact on the competitive process and not its effects on competitors. Exclusionary conduct includes predatory pricing, price discrimination, exclusive dealings, loyalty rebates and discounts, refusal to supply and share essential facilities, buying up scarce intermediate goods or resources and bundling and tying.
By adopting an effects-based approach, the MyCC ensures that conduct that benefits consumers will not be prohibited and therefore ensuring that enterprises have the incentives to compete on merits. In assessing whether the effect of an exclusionary conduct is an abuse, the MyCC will use two tests for assessing anticompetitive effects:
- whether the conduct adversely affects consumers; and
- whether the conduct excludes a competitor that is just as efficient as the dominant enterprise.
In July 2018, Dagang Net was provisionally found to have infringed Section 10(2)(c) of the CA 2010 for allegedly abusing its position as a monopoly provider of trade facilitation services under the national single window by refusing to supply electronic mailboxes to end users of the customs operating system. Dagang Net was also provisionally found to have imposed an exclusivity clause on its business partners that would have had the effect of distorting competition in the provision of trade facilitation services under the national single window, thereby creating a barrier to entry. The MyCC imposed a proposed financial penalty of 17,397,695.30 ringgit, as well as a directive on Dagang Net to cease and desist its infringing conduct and any future conduct that may disrupt competition. The directors and senior management of Dagang Net and its related companies were required to undergo a competition law compliance programme within three months of the issuance of the proposed decision.
The MyCC, in its non-infringement finding against Megasteel Sdn Bhd, initially provisionally found that Megasteel had abused its dominant position in the hot rolled coil (HRC) market by charging or imposing a price for its HRC that amounts to a margin squeeze that has an actual or potential effect of constraining the ability of reasonable efficient competitors in the downstream cold rolled coil market. Upon the submission of Megasteel's oral and written representations, the MyCC found that, while Megasteel was a dominant in the upstream market for HRC, it had not abused its dominance.
The MyCC made a non-infringement finding in the Pangsapuri Perdana case, where a complaint was made to the MyCC alleging that there was a monopoly of renovation contracts by a single contractor at the Pangsapuri Perdana apartment building. The alleged abuse was in relation to an exclusivity given to the contractor. The investigations revealed that this was not the case and the owners of Pangsapuri Perdana were free to appoint any contractor to carry out renovation works.iii Discrimination
An abuse of dominant position includes applying different conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties to an extent that may:
- discourage new market entry or expansion or investment by an existing competitor;
- force from the market or seriously damage an existing competitor that is as efficient as the dominant enterprise; or
- harm competition in any market in which the dominant enterprise is participating or in any upstream or downstream market.
An example of MyCC investigating a dominant player that has engaged in discriminatory conduct is the MyEG case. MyEG is an electronic government (e-government) service that enables employers to renew insurances for foreign and domestic workers. MyEG, via its subsidiary, is also engaged in the sale and purchase of insurance as an insurance agent. For renewals to be approved, employees must upload mandatory insurance policies through MyEG's e-government service. However, renewals of insurance policies purchased from other insurers were not approved as fast as renewal policies purchased from MyEG. The MyCC found that, as a dominant concessionaire, MyEG is obliged to grant equal access of its facilities and promote competition in the downstream market. MyEG's conduct of imposing different conditions on equivalent transactions in the purchase of mandatory insurances for the renewal of insurance policies for foreign workers constituted an abuse of dominance as per Section 10(2)(d) of the CA 2010.
MyEG appealed against the MyCC's decision. However, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) upheld the MyCC's decision and, on 22 January 2019, the High Court dismissed MyEG's judicial review application upholding both the MyCC and the CAT's findings of infringement. At the time of writing, MyEG had also filed for an appeal to the Court of Appeal against the MyCC and CAT's findings and against the penalty imposed by the MyCC.iv Exploitative abuses
Exploitative conduct, such as excessive pricing, may result from structural conditions in the market. For example, where there are high barriers of market entry, a dominant enterprise may set high prices to exploit customers. This type of conduct typically occurs where the enterprise is a sole concessionaire and would be able to abuse its dominance by imposing an unfair purchase or selling price to exploit suppliers or customers. The MyCC is only concerned with excessive pricing where there is no likelihood that market forces will reduce dominance in a market.