The claimant obtained a worldwide freezing order over assets which are being held under discretionary trusts (on the basis that the defendant had sufficient control over those assets). The trustees sought to discharge that order on two grounds:

  1. That there had been non-disclosure by the claimant when the order was obtained. For example, it was argued that only a "glancing reference" had been made to restrictions registered over certain properties owned by one of the trusts. Mann J agreed that the restrictions were a relevant matter. Any points going to illiquidity have to be disclosed if they are not obvious. However, it was clear that the judge had been fully aware of the point and there had been no need to flag up the issue in a more prominent way. In a separate point, it was held that the claimant did not need to send someone to search the full roll of solicitors held by the Law Society where a publicly available database had provided a nil return. The judge rejected other arguments relating to non-disclosure.
  2. That there had not been sufficient evidence of a risk of dissipation. That argument was also rejected by the judge. The trusts did not have a transparent structure and the evidence showed that the defendant had full powers to appoint and dismiss the trustees. That was sufficient to give rise to a risk of dissipation, even if the defendant could not order the disposition of any trust property: "It is not said that [the defendant] had somehow put in place his own "staff" as directors. The case is more subtle than that. It is said that the new trustees would be expected to do his bidding because if they did not they would be removed, and that that is in fact what happened to the old trustees. I accept that that is a plausible inference from the facts as currently known".