In this case, plaintiff asserted claims for patent infringement, including claims for willful infringement. Defendant brought antitrust counterclaims, including claims for patent misuse and other anticompetitive behavior. In prior rulings (2010 WL 925864 (D. Del. Mar. 11, 2010); 2010 WL 1544423 (D. Del. April 19, 2010)) (discussed below), the court ordered bifurcation of and stayed discovery on defendant’s antitrust counterclaims. Here, defendant moved for further bifurcation of the patent and antitrust claims and stay of discovery on patent damages. Defendant sought to delay trial on patent damages until after the completion of the trial on patent misuse and other antitrust claims, and to stay discovery on patent damages until antitrust discovery began. Defendant argued that such further bifurcation (and possible trifurcation) and stay would conserve resources in the event the jury in the first trial phase found noninfringement or patent invalidity. Magistrate Judge Thynge denied defendant’s motion for further bifurcation and stay. The court found that defendant failed to demonstrate a probability that its infringement defenses were more likely to prevail than plaintiff’s infringement claims. The court also observed that there was overlap in proof required on plaintiff’s patent claims during the liability phase and the damage phase. Thus, it was not clear that further bifurcation would save resources, because conducting separate trials on patent claims and patent damages would require educating jurors in the second trial regarding issues addressed in the first trial. In addition, by combining patent and antitrust damages in one trial, defendant’s bifurcation proposal would present a danger that the jury would “inadvertently blur the distinction between legitimate patent enforcement and attempts to establish or further an unlawful monopoly.” 742 F.Supp. 2d at 499. Because “patent infringement and infringement damages are distinct and separate from antitrust liability, antitrust damages, and patent misuse,” the court concluded that these distinct types of damages should be tried separately, and “with regard to only the facts pertinent to each issue.” Id. at 500.