APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL GRANTED
35886 Sanofi-Aventis, et al. v. Apotex Inc., et al. (Intellectual property — Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations)
On appeal from the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal pronounced March 14, 2014. The applicants (collectively, “Sanofi”) are the patentees and have the rights to a series of Canadian patents for the drug, ramipril, used in the treatment of hypertension. The original ‘087 patent issued in 1985 and was set to expire in 2002. In an effort to extend that patent protection, Sanofi obtained a further series of patents for different indications for ramipril and listed them on the Patent Register. Between 2003 and 2008, these “new” ramipril patents were challenged by Apotex Inc. and other generic manufacturers under the PM(NOC) Regulations. Sanofi applied for prohibition orders in each case, triggering a 24-month statutory stay that kept the generic competitors off the ramipril market during that period of time. Only one prohibition application was successful. Apotex received its NOC to market Apo-ramipril in December, 2006. Sanofi commenced separate unsuccessful infringement actions against both Apotex and the other generic manufacturers. Apotex then brought an action under s. 8 of the PM(NOC) Regulations, to claim damages for its net lost profits during the period of the statutory stay. The Federal Court rendered four decisions related to Apotex’s entitlement to damages and the quantum of those damages. These four decisions were all appealed. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by Apotex, dismissed two of Sanofi’s appeals and allowed one of Sanofi’s appeals solely to facilitate redetermination of quantum of damages.
APPLICATIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL DISMISSED
35839 Bennett v. A.G. on behalf of the United States of America, et al. (Criminal law — Extradition)
On appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia pronounced April 14, 2014. The applicant was sought for extradition by the United States on charges equivalent to the Canadian offences of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud. An extradition judge concluded there was admissible evidence that would justify the applicant’s committal for trial in Canada and accordingly ordered him committed to await surrender. The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered the applicant surrendered to the United States and refused his request to reconsider that surrender decision. The applicant simultaneously appealed the extradition judge’s committal order and applied for judicial review of the Minister’s surrender order. The Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review. The Court of Appeal held that the extradition judge did not err, either in her refusal to order a voir dire, or in her refusal to admit evidence the applicant proffered at the committal hearing. The court further held that there was no basis for interfering with the committal order or concluding the Minister’s decision to order surrender was unreasonable.
35950 Whaling v. The Queen (Criminal law)
On appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia pronounced May 3, 2013. The applicant was convicted of several weapons offences. The applicant’s conviction appeal was dismissed.
35919 0802913 BC Ltd., et al. v. Roberts (Limitation of Actions — Bankruptcy)
On appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia pronounced April 2, 2014. The applicants and the respondent invested in Horizon FX Limited Partnership based on representations set out in its Offering Memorandum. Horizon placed their investments in the hands of a foreign exchange trader which operated a Ponzi scheme. When a principal of the foreign exchange trader was arrested for fraud, Horizon notified its investors of the fraud and the identity of the trader. The respondent commenced an action against Horizon based on misrepresentations in the Offering Memorandum. The applicants did not commence similar actions. The respondent was awarded judgment against Horizon. Horizon, its associated companies, and its principal were declared bankrupt. On August 12, 2009, the Trustee-in-bankruptcy issued a Report of the Trustee setting out the misrepresentations in the Offering Memorandum and on Horizon’s Website. The Investors fild 650 proofs of claim. The Trustee allowed the proofs of claim on a global basis under the deemed reliance provision in s. 132.1 of the Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418, finding that the Investors reasonably first ought to have known of the misrepresentations when the Report of the Trustee was released. The respondent asked the Trustee to expunge or reduce the claims on the basis that the limitation period in s. 140 of the Securities Act expired before the proofs of claim. The Trustee declined and the respondent petitioned the Supreme Court of British Columbia to expunge or reduce the claims. The Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the petition, but the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the proofs of claim.
35978 Sandhu v. The Queen (Charter of Rights — Self-incrimination — Investigative detention)
On appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario pronounced May 2, 2014. The applicant was driving a tractor-trailer when he was stopped by the owner of a truck-stop who had been following him, wrongly believing that that he had stolen the truck. Shortly thereafter, an enforcement officer with the Ministry of Transportation arrived on the scene and, after asking him for his driver’s licence, asked the applicant “What’s going on?” He replied “They put a gun to my head.” Several minutes later, two police officers arrived at the scene and requested the applicant’s registration and permit. He then uttered that two guys had come to him with a gun and told him to put bags in the back of the truck. As the officers walked to the back of the truck, The applicant repeated that statement. Approximately 500 pounds of cocaine were subsequently discovered in the back of the truck. At a voir dire held during his second trial for the offence of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, the applicant was unsuccessful in his attempt to have the three utterances excluded from evidence. In the judge’s view, the applicant was not detained when he made them and they were clearly spontaneous and voluntary. He was ultimately convicted. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
35942 1681625 Alberta Ltd. v. Summer Village of Parkland Beach (Municipal law — Planning and development — Stop work orders)
On appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Alberta pronounced April 17, 2014. Focaccia Holdings (“Focaccia”), is a land developer that owned property in the respondent municipality, Summer Village of Parkland Beach (“Summer Village”). In April, 2009, Focaccia received subdivision approval from the municipality to develop parcels of land, subject to certain conditions. Focaccia and Summer Village then negotiated and signed a development agreement as required by the subdivision approval. The development agreement provided for the installation of certain infrastructure, including “road construction and installation to agreed standards including asphalt paving”. All of the infrastructure improvements were to be designed and completed to standards acceptable to Summer Village. In addition to the usual common law remedies for breach of contract, the development agreement also provided that it would be protected by a caveat, which would be a first charge on the lands. The agreement also provided that disputes could be referred to arbitration. Focaccia Holdings proceeded to subdivide the land into 75 lots, and sold a number of those lots to members of the public. Before it could complete the paving of the roads and perform all of the covenants in the development agreement, it ran into financial difficulties. In May 2012, the municipality issued a stop order against Focaccia pursuant to s. 645 of the Municipal Government Act, (“MGA”), and a notice of default under the development agreement. Days later, Focaccia Holdings conveyed 17 unsold lots to 1681625 Alberta Ltd. (“168”), a corporation controlled by former directors of Focaccia. On July 31, 2012 the municipality issued a second stop order against 168. Both stop orders were appealed to the Subdivision and Development Appeal Board, which concluded that the respondent had authority to issue the stop order on the basis of breach of condition. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
35792 City of Montréal v. Agence métropolitaine de transport (Municipal law — By‑laws — Occupation of public domain)
On appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Quebec pronounced January 28, 2014. The City of Montréal claimed nearly a million dollars from the Agence métropolitaine de transport (“AMT”) for the partial occupation of parks and streets during the construction of the extension of subway line 2 east toward Laval between May 2003 and November 2006. In the absence of a specific agreement with the AMT, the City determined that compensation under theBy-law concerning the occupancy of public property and theBy-law concerning fees applicable for the 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 fiscal years. The City alleged that it was entitled to compensation for the loss of its parks and streets for 41 months. As trustee of the public domain, it argued that it had a duty to claim such compensation on behalf of its citizens. In its view, the AMT, a state-owned enterprise, had a right to expropriate under its enabling legislation but no right to occupy without compensation. As a result, the AMT’s occupation was subject to the By-law concerning the occupancy of public property, which required that a permit be obtained, and the By-law concerning fees, which provided for the collection of 15% of the value of the public property occupied. The AMT argued that, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, it had no obligation to pay compensation for occupying the public domain in the performance of its mandate. It relied on general Crown immunity and a specific provision of its enabling legislation exempting it from the mode of municipal tariffing. The Municipal Court of the City of Montréal dismissed the action for fees and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
35865 Lacey v. The Queen (Civil procedure — Motion for summary dismissal — Security for costs)
On appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario pronounced April 22, 2014. The applicant claims he was employed as an undercover agent of the respondent in a clandestine operation with Urban intelligence and as a confidential agent for other federal and provincial agencies. He commenced proceedings claiming that his 1991 contract entitled him to be paid $28,000 per month until 2009, and that since no payment was made, he is owed millions of dollars. The respondent denies that it has had a contractual relationship with the applicant since his release from military service in 1991. It brought a motion for security for costs on the ground that the applicant’s action is frivolous and vexatious. The Superior Court of Justice granted the respondent’s motion and ordered the applicant to deposit $20,000 with the court within 60 days and to pay the respondent’s motion costs. The Divisional Court dismissed his application for leave to appeal that decision. Despite the applicant’s claim that he had deposited security for costs, the Superior Court of Justice found that he had not, and granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss the applicant’s action for his failure to follow the court’s order. The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal.
35933 The Queen v. Wehmeier (Charter — Criminal law — Prosecutorial discretion)
On appeal from the judgment of the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada pronounced April 15, 2014. The respondent, a former Canadian Forces member, was employed as a peer educator at a “third location decompression center” operated by the Canadian Forces in Germany. A Standing Court Martial was convened regarding offences alleged to have been committed by the respondent. The respondent brought an application seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The proceedings were terminated pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter. The appeal was dismissed.