A Reuters story is hyperventilating over the new sanctions on North Korea and their impact on the discovery in 2014 reported by the Wall Street Journal that there might be North Korean gold in the U.S. supply chain. In reviewing conflict minerals issues, some companies discovered that electronic components purchased by them might have contained gold refined by the Central Bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. So do the new sanctions make this problem worse?
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To begin with, imports from North Korea have required licenses since Executive Order 13570 in 2011 and are not affected or changed by the new sanctions. But if I purchase an electronic component from China that uses North Korean gold, have I imported that North Korean gold into the United States when I import the electronic component? The WSJ article linked above quotes an “attorney at Nixon Peabody LLP, who specializes in sanctions,” as saying this: “It’s a problem, even if the raw materials are coming very indirectly through suppliers.”
This is far from clear. Neither the Executive Order nor the implementing North Korea Sanctions Regulations define what constitutes an import from North Korea. There is no reverse de minimis rule that covers imports of items with any particular level of North Korean content, say, one atom, one molecule, 10 percent or 25 percent. In the absence of any specific rule, it seems reasonable that if the North Korean gold has been substantially transformed into another product outside the United States, import of the transformed item is not the import of any good from North Korea within the meaning of E.O. 13570.
Perhaps the most relevant provision in the new sanctions imposed by Executive Order 13722 is section 2(a)(i) which permits OFAC to block any person that OFAC determines
to have sold, supplied, transferred, or purchased, directly or indirectly, to or from North Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of the Government of North Korea or the Workers’ Party of Korea, metal, graphite, coal, or software, where any revenue or goods received may benefit the Government of North Korea or the Workers’ Party of Korea, including North Korea’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs.
Although that seems to pose some peril, in my example, for the Chinese company buying Nork gold for its electronic components, it is far from clear that it covers, or would be used to block, a U.S. company that buys the electronic component incorporating the Nork gold. This seems even clearer given that section 1702(a)(1)(B) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, under which Executive Order 13722, only provides blocking authority for “property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest” and would not permit the blocking of U.S. company (and all its property) simply because it imported some items incorporating some North Korean content.
Of course, given that the foreign manufacturer using North Korean gold risks blocking, U.S. importers would be well advised to remove Nork gold from their supply chain, both because of the risk to their supply chain and the commercial optics of dealing with a foreign manufacturer that winds up being blocked under the new sanctions.
Photo Credit: KCNA