Since Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez , 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016), left open whether a TCPA class claim is moot if a defendant actually tendered complete relief to the named plaintiff, at least one court of appeals and multiple district courts have held in the negative. See, e.g. , Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co. , No. 13-16816, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6627, at *28 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2016); see also Wilson v. Gordon , No. 14-6191, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9374, at *36-*37 (6th Cir. May 23, 2016) (accord in Medicaid class action).
Chief Judge Patti Saris of the District of Massachusetts noted the widespread agreement among courts since Campbell-Ewald in a TCPA class action, South Orange Chiropractic Center, LLC v. Cayan, LLC , No. 15-13069, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70680 (May 31, 2016). After denying the defendant’s request to tender payment and have judgment entered against it, she denied the motion to certify her decision for interlocutory appeal because there was no “substantial ground for difference of opinion” on the issue of law given the harmony of decisions. Id. at *8 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)) (citing cases). The denial was without prejudice to allow the defendant another motion for interlocutory appeal if a case law split develops.
A Southern District of New York case, Leyse v. Lifetime Entertainment Services, LLC , No. 13-5794, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47877 (Mar. 17, 2016), remains the outlier because of a key factual difference. In Leyse , the court held that it would enter judgment for the plaintiff after the defendant tendered full relief, including costs, to the court clerk because it had already denied the motion for class certification. Only the plaintiff’s individual TCPA claims remained. The limited opening to pick off a named TCPA plaintiff with a tender of complete relief, before a certification motion, appears to be closing.