Superholdings Holdings Plc v Sun Alliance and London Insurance Plc [2014] 2 JIC concerned an application for an order to re-enter an appeal that was dismissed by order of the Supreme Court on 15 March 2004 and seeking leave to admit new evidence.  In 1987, there had been a fire in premises owned by the appellants and a claim was made for the resulting loss against the respondent insurers.  The insurers repudiated liability on the grounds that the claim had been so grossly exaggerated that it constituted a breach of the terms of the insurance policies.  This argument was accepted by the High Court and a finding of fraud was made against the appellants.  Accordingly, the action was dismissed.  This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court where it was found that the finding of fraud could not stand. The claim was therefore remitted to the High Court to determine quantum.

All four insurers made lodgments into Court prior to the re-trial being heard.  The appellants subsequently settled their claim with one of the insurers but the lodgments of the other three insurers, the first three respondents in this appeal, were rejected.  The appellants were ultimately awarded less than the respective lodgments meaning that they were entitled to the re-trial costs up to the date of the lodgment but that the first three insurers were entitled to their costs from the date of their lodgment onwards.  The High Court also granted a Mareva injunction freezing the appellant's assets up to IR£5,000,000.  The appellants then initiated an appeal of these decisions and the Supreme Court made an order for security for costs.  The appellants, however, were unable to provide that security and the appeal was dismissed on 15 March 2004.  The appellants subsequently brought an application to re-enter the appeal.

Fennelly J., delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court on 21 February 2014, held that the appellant's application to re-enter the appeal was misconceived because the appeal had been dismissed by a final order of the Supreme Court made on 15 March 2004, meaning that there was no appeal pending before the Court.  As a result, it was held that the Court did not have jurisdiction to make an order to re-enter the appeal.  For the same reason, leave to admit new evidence could not be granted.

While Fennelly J. upheld the "final and conclusive nature" of decisions of the Supreme Court as enshrined in Article 34, section 4(6) of the Constitution, he also referred to the case of Re Greendale Developments Ltd (No 3) [2002] 2 IR 514 which provides that a final decision of the Supreme Court can potentially be set aside but only in very special and unusual circumstances.  However in this instance, no application to set aside the order dismissing the appeal had been made by the appellants.