The Supreme Court of the United States announced a decision in one case this morning:
Levin v. United States, No. 11-1351: Respondent Steven Levin brought a battery suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) stemming from injuries he suffered from a surgery at a U.S. Naval Hospital. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80. The FTCA waives the United States’ sovereign immunity from tort suits, but excepts battery and other intentional torts from this waiver. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The Government moved to dismiss, relying on the FTCA’s intentional tort exception, but Levin responded that the Gonzalez Act, specifically 10 U.S.C. § 1089(e), rendered the FTCA’s exception inapplicable to medical battery allegations against a military physician. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Today, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section 1089(e) in the Gonzalez Act abrogates the FTCA’s intentional tort exception and thus permits Levin’s suit against the United States alleging medical battery by a Navy doctor within the scope of his employment.
The Court's decision is available here.
The Supreme Court also granted review in one case:
Walden v. Fiore, et al., No. 12-574: (1) Whether due process permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose sole “contact” with the forum State is his knowledge that the plaintiff has connections to that State. (2) Whether the judicial district where the plaintiff suffered injury is a district “in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” for purposes of establishing venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) even if the defendant’s alleged acts and omissions all occurred in another district.