This one is actually binding on a very small number of people, being an appeal from the Cayman Islands -- but given that it's a Privy Council decision, it's likely to be influential: Crawford Adjusters v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd, [2013] UKPC 17. The case arose from building works undertaken to repair hurricane damage. Sagicor, the insurer of a residential development, retained Alastair Paterson as a loss adjuster and made payments to Hurlstone, a building company, to repair the development in accordance with the terms of the policy. There were other storms brewing. A senior VP at Sagicor had an animus against Paterson and alleged that Paterson and Hurlstone had perpetrated a fraud on Sagicor; he also told a reporter that Paterson had made misrepresentations, causing damage to Paterson's reputation once the reporter published the information. Paterson counterclaimed for breach of contract and with a tort claim for malicious prosecution. The Cayman trial judge held that the tort claim could not succeed: while the allegations against Paterson had been made maliciously and without reasonable cause, and had caused him significant financial and other loss, they did not arise from previous criminal proceedings. The judge relied on a relatively recent House of Lords decision which declined to extend the tort of malicious prosecution to civil proceedings: Gregory v Portsmouth City Council, [2000] 1 AC 419.

The appeals made their way to the Privy Council, which has decided (3-2) that Gregory left the window open to a claim of malicious prosecution arising from civil proceedings. Lord Walker, for the majority, reviewed the authorities in detail (starting in 1285) and Gregory in particular, holding that if the tort could not be applied to the facts of this case Paterson would effectively be left without redress, which could not be right; it would betray the court's 'primary loyalty' to provide a remedy for a wrong. Lords Sumption and Neuberger disagreed: Gregory was the last word on the subject and departing from the rule in that case would permit litigants to prolong disputes by way of secondary litigation on the basis of an uncertain and potentially very wide cause of action.