Good evening.

Following are the summaries for this week’s civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

In Hurst v. Hancock, 2019 ONCA 0483, the Court reminded us that where there is anticipatory breach of contract, the innocent party can either immediately accept the anticipatory breach, treat the contract as at and end, and sue for breach, or the innocent party can wait until performance is due and actual breach occurs. If the innocent party elects the latter option, the claim for breach of contract does not arise until the time for performance and the actual breach for the purpose of calculating the limitation period to sue on the claim.

Other topics covered this week included administrative law in the labour law context, malicious prosecution, negligent investigation and breach of contract in the construction context. Congratulations to the Toronto Raptors, the 2019 NBA Champions! See you all at the parade on Monday!

Until then, enjoy the weekend.

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Keywords: Torts, Malicious Prosecution, Negligent Investigation, Conspiracy, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, No Reasonable Cause of Action, Lack of Particularity, Frivolous and Vexatious, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 21.01(1)(b), 21.01(3)(d), 25.06(8) and 26, Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 225 (Div. Ct.), Spar Roofing & Metal Supplies Ltd. v. Glynn, 2016 ONCA 296

Keywords: Administrative Law, Judicial Review, Standard of Review, Reasonableness, Labour Law, Grievances, Arbitrations, Collective Bargaining Agreements, Interpretation, Temporary Workers, Termination, Reasonable Availability for Work, Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9

Hurst v. Hancock, 2019 ONCA 0483

Keywords: Contracts, Anticipatory Breach, Anticipatory Repudiation, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Summary Judgment, Ali v. O-Two Medical Technologies Inc., 2013 ONCA 733

Short Civil Decisions

G. Cooper Equipment Rentals Limited v. 2208011 Ontario Limited (Trifield Construction), 2019 ONCA 0475

Keywords: Breach of Contract, Construction Law, Breach of Trust, Civil Procedure, Simplified Procedure, Summary Judgment, Construction Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-30

Bang v. Sebastian , 2019 ONCA 0501

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Consequential Damages, Mitigation, Evidence, Hearsay

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jury Verdicts, Gutbir v. University Health Network, 2012 ONCA 66

Criminal Decisions

R. v. Do , 2019 ONCA 0482

Keywords: Criminal Law, Producing Marihuana, Possession of Marihuana for the Purposes of Trafficking, Right to Counsel, Search and Seizure, Evidence, Exclusion, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss.10(b) and 24(2), Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, ss.7(1) and 5(2), R. v. Reid, 2016 ONCA 524, R. v. Pino, 2016 ONCA 389, R. v. Plaha (2004), 188 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Goldhart (1996), 107 C.C.C (3d) 481 (SCC), R. v. Lenhardt, 2019 ONCA 416, R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, R. v. Rover, 2018 ONCA 745

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Interference, Sexual Activity with a Minor, Defences, Mistake of Age, Procedural and Natural Justice, Adequacy of Reasons, R. v. Graat, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 819

Keywords: Criminal law, Firearms Offences, Aiding and Abetting, Mens Rea, Criminal Code, s.21(1)

R. v. Lock , 2019 ONCA 0470

Keywords: Criminal Law, Appeal Book Endorsement, Adjournment

Keywords: Criminal Law, Attempted Murder, Firearms Offences, Sentencing, Parole, Criminal Code, s.719(3), R. v. Wilson, 2008 ONCA 510, R. v. Pammett, [2016] O.J. No. 6700 (C.A.), R. v. Mannella, 2017 ONSC 2333

Keywords: Criminal Law, Breaking and Entering, Defences, Duress, Carosella Application, Jury Instructions, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss.24(1) and 7, R. v. B. (M.), 2009 ONCA 524, R. v. La, [1997] 2 SCR 680, R. v. Bero, 151 C.C.C. (3d) 545 (Ont. C.A.)

Keywords: Criminal Law, Forcible Confinement, Uttering Threats, Evidence, Identity, Inferences, Sufficiency of Reasons, Sentencing

Keywords: Criminal Law, Human-Trafficking, Robbery, Assault Causing Bodily Harm, Procuring Prostitution, Financial Benefit from Prostitution, Possession of Proceeds of Crime, Sexual Assault Causing Bodily Harm, Assault, Transport to a Bawdy House, Trafficking a Person, Financial Benefit from Trafficking a Person, Withholding a Travel Document, Self-Defence, Criminal Code, ss. 343, 267(b), 286.3(1), 286.2(1), 355(a), 272(2), 266, 212(1)(a), 279.01(1), 279.02, 279.03, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 8, Search and Seizure, s.24(2), Evidence, Admissibility, Exclusion of Evidence, R. v. Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, Text Messages, Onus of Proof, Reverse Onus, R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, Appeals, New Issue on Appeal, Change in Law, R. v. Wigman, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 246, R. v. Reid, 2016 ONCA 524, R. v. Pelucco, 2015 BCCA 370, R. v. Brown, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 918, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, R. v. Mills, 2019 SCC 22

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Interference, Invitation to Sexual Touching, Sexual Assault, Evidence, Disclosure, Oath Helping, Credibility, Child Witnesses, Corroboration

Keywords: Criminal Law, Possession of a Firearm, Uttering Threats, Evidence, Admissibility, Text Messages, Credibility, Defences, Air of Reality, Jury Instructions

Keywords: Criminal Law, Possession of Narcotics, Defences, Duress, Evidence, Burden of Proof, Credibility

Keywords:Criminal Law, Production of Narcotics, Possession of Narcotics, Trafficking of Narcotics, Search and Seizure, Warrants, Telewarrants, Criminal Code, s. 487.1, R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault of a Minor, Defences, Intoxication, Consent, Error of Law, Evidence, Credibility, Criminal Code, s. 273, s. 273.1, s. 265, R. v. Sinclair, 2011 SCC 40, R. v. Tariq, 2016 ONCJ 614, R. v. Daigle (1998), 127 C.C.C. (3d) 130 (Que. C.A.), R. v. Bell, 2007 ONCA 320, R. v. Wobbes, 2008 ONCA 567, R. v. L.G., 2007 ONCA 654, R. v. R.P., 2012 SCC 22, R v. Mian, 2014 SCC 54, R v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, R. v. J.A., 2011 SCC 28, R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19, R. v. Al-Rawi, 2018 NSCA 10, R v. C.P., 2017 ONCJ 277, R v. Merritt, [2004] O.J. No. 1295 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), R v. Powers, 1999 CanLII 7332 (Ont. C.A.), R v. Dixon, 2018 ONCA 949, R v. Crespo, 2016 ONCA 454, R v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33

Keywords:

Criminal Law, Extradition, Child Exploitation, Internet Child Abuse, Search and Seizure, Reasonable and Probable Grounds, Search Warrants, Arbitrary Detention, Evidence, Disclosure, Judicial Review, Criminal Code, s.489.1, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 6(1), 7, 8, 9, 10(b), 24(2), Treaty on Extradition Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America, 3 December 1971, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 3, Article 12, Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 30 (4th Supp.), Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18, ss. 44(1), 48, United States v. Viscomi, 2015 ONCA 484, R. v. Larosa (2002), 163 O.A.C. 108 (C.A.), United States of America v. Anekwu, 2009 SCC 41, R. v. Mathurin, 2015 ONCA 581, R. v. Kutynec (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 277 (C.A.), India v. Badesha, 2017 SCC 44, United States v. Burns, 2001 SCC 7, Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, United States v. Lane, 2017 ONCA 396, Canada (Minister of Justice) v. Everard (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 363 (C.A.), United States of America v. Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 469

Ontario Review Board

Keywords: Ontario Review Board, Criminal Law, Not Criminally Responsible, Sexual Assault, Conditional Discharge, Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7

CIVIL DECISIONS

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Lauwers and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S. Asghar, acting in person J. Rosolak, for the respondents Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) and E.C. (TTC Driver) N. Salafia, for the respondents Toronto Police Services Board, Toronto Police Chief and Constable B.V. #9278 41 Division

FACTS: The appellant owned and operated a motor vehicle that was involved in a collision on May 31, 2014. He was charged by the respondent Constable BV with careless driving. The charge was withdrawn on May 16, 2016. The appellant was outraged by the situation and was convinced that he had been wrongfully charged. The appellant issued a statement of claim and started this action.

The appellant maintained that the sketch of the accident prepared by Constable BV and the TTC driver and witness statements were all belied by the dash cam footage from Constable BV’s vehicle. The Court was not surprised that the charge of careless driving was withdrawn. The appellant’s plausible allegations were with respect to negligent investigation, malicious prosecution and conspiracy. He also sought to draw several more contentious and implausible inferences from the evidence and bring claims relating to an international criminal conspiracy involving U.S. and Canadian police forces and organized crime.

The police respondents brought a motion for an order striking out the statement of claim, without leave to amend, as being frivolous and vexatious under Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and for a lack of compliance with the pleadings requirements of r. 25.06(8), which requires that where allegations of intentional or malicious conduct are made, the claim must contain full particulars supporting the causes of action that are alleged. The police respondents also invoked Rule 21.01(1)(b) to argue that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

ISSUES: Did the motion judge err in striking the appellant’s pleadings?

HOLDING: Appeal allowed.

REASONING: Yes. In a motion to strike a pleading as disclosing no reasonable cause of action under Rule 21.01(1)(b), the moving party must show that it is “plain, obvious and beyond doubt that the claim will not succeed” at trial. The statement of claim must be read generously to allow for drafting deficiencies and if the claim has some chance of success, it must be permitted to proceed. The threshold for sustaining a pleading on a Rule 21 motion is not high. The usual result when a pleading is struck is to grant leave to amend, consistent with the generous approach to pleadings amendment under Rule 26. Leave to amend should accordingly be denied only in the clearest of cases. Read generously, with due allowance for the fact that the appellant is self-represented and is not a lawyer, the nub of the claim is for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution on the part of the investigating officer, together with conspiracy in relation to these torts.

The motion judge accepted the police respondents’ submissions that much of the statement of claim was scandalous and should be struck on that basis. She dismissed claims against the Toronto Police Services Board on the basis of s. 31 of the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15. She agreed with the submission of counsel for the police respondents that “the Claim cannot be repaired by amendments as it seeks a remedy outside of the Court’s jurisdiction; discloses no reasonable cause of action and contains irrelevant and inflammatory statements that cannot be removed from the pleading.” On this basis she struck the claim in its entirety with no leave to amend.

As to the proper parties, the Court explained there is no duty of care owed by the Toronto Police Chief personally to the appellant. The action against the Toronto Police Chief was properly dismissed. Nor do the Toronto Transit Commission and EC, the TTC driver, owe a duty of care in negligence that is engaged in this case. The Court agreed with the motion judge that many sections of the statement of claim were scandalous in the technical, legal sense of being irrelevant to the plausible causes of action advanced by the appellant.

However, with respect to the causes of action, the Court found that the appellant came very close to properly pleading the main claims of negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy. There were also possible claims pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter and s. 46.1 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, although they have not been properly pleaded.

With respect to negligent investigation and malicious prosecution, the Court found the motion judge had erred in stating that the plaintiff had not pleaded facts demonstrating how the constable and officers breached their required standard of care. The Court found that each element of the claim of malicious prosecution against the investigating officer appeared in the statement of claim: (1) the statement of claim indicates that the officer initiated the prosecution; (2) the proceedings terminated in favour of the appellant; (3) the appellant implicitly alleges the absence of reasonable and probable cause; (4) malice is asserted throughout; and (5) the appellant asserted actual injury.

With respect to conspiracy, the Court explained that the tort exists if either (1) the predominant purpose of the defendants’ conduct is to cause the plaintiff injury, whether or not the defendants’ means were lawful, or (2) the defendants act in combination, that is, in concert, by agreement or with a common design; their conduct is unlawful; their conduct is directed towards the plaintiff; the defendants should know that, in the circumstances, injury to the plaintiff is likely to result; and their conduct causes injury to the plaintiff. The Court found that the appellant had pleaded each element of this tort against the remaining parties, except for the TTC (implicated due to possible vicarious liability for the actions of the TTC driver): the appellant pleaded (1) the predominant objective of the constable including the false witnesses was to harm the appellant; (2) the constable, false witnesses, and officers working in concert and combination to harm the appellant knew or ought to have known that injury to the plaintiff was likely to occur due to their unlawful actions; and (3) actual injury.

The Court disposed of the motion by striking the untenable portions of the appellant’s statement of claim without leave to amend. The remainder of the pleading was struck with leave to amend.

Canada Post Corporation v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers

[Feldman, van Rensburg and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R.J. Charney and K. Dodds, for the appellant P.J.J. Cavalluzzo and A. Telford, for the respondent

FACTS: This appeal began with the arbitration of a grievance concerning the dismissal of a temporary postal worker (the “Employee”) and member of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (the “respondent” or the “Union”). During the material time, the respondent was a temporary postal worker employed by the appellant (the “Corporation”).

This case hinges on the interpretation of Article 44.11(b) of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. This Article authorizes the termination of a temporary worker who fails to demonstrate “reasonable availability in the acceptance of work assignments” in any six consecutive month period. The Employee was terminated when he accepted 57 of 151 work assignments that were offered to him. The appellant justified his termination on the basis that his acceptance rate (37.8%) was below the average of (49.9%) for his peer group during the same six month period.

At the arbitration, the arbitrator concluded that both the use of an acceptance rate benchmark and its application to the Employee were unreasonable. The arbitrator held that the appellant failed to consider numerous contextual factors, such as the 24/7 operation of the Distribution Centre that offered work assignments to the Employee, the high volume of parcels passing through the facility, and the Employee’s seniority. The arbitrator found that all of these factors combined to increase how often the Employee was called for work, and that he could not possibly accept all, or even most of these assignments.

Moreover, the arbitrator noted that Article 44.11(b) does not mandate consideration of a rate of acceptance based on total assignments offered for the purposes of determining reasonable availability for work. Nor does the collective bargaining agreement mandate measuring the employee’s acceptance against the peer average to determine reasonable availability. The arbitrator observed that when these factors were considered, the Employee had in fact been reasonably available for work. He set aside the dismissal and ordered the Employee’s reinstatement. On judicial review, the Divisional Court concluded that the arbitrator departed from binding arbitral jurisprudence in two respects. First, in rejecting an acceptance rate approach to assess reasonable availability. Second, in requiring “prejudice to the Corporation” as a pre-condition for termination. Nevertheless, the majority found that the arbitrator’s decision, although flawed, was reasonable. As such, the Employee’s reinstatement was upheld.

ISSUES: (1) Did the arbitrator depart from binding arbitral jurisprudence? (2) Was there any error in the arbitrator’s analysis that made his decision unreasonable?

HOLDING: Appeal dismissed.

REASONING: (1) Did the arbitrator depart from binding arbitral jurisprudence? No. Pursuant to Article 9.103 of the collective agreement, prior arbitral awards involving “identical and/or substantially identical circumstances” are binding on the parties. The appellant argued that prior arbitral awards endorse the mechanical use of an acceptance rate in determining reasonable availability, and that a minimum 50% acceptance rate has been acceptance consistently in the cases. The Union, conversely, argued that the jurisprudence does not mandate a formal acceptance rate test, but consistently calls for an analysis of circumstances on a case-by-case basis.

Justice van Rensburg, writing for the Court, began by noting that there is nothing in the prior jurisprudence that endorses or even refers to the use of a peer or “average” acceptance rate for temporary employees, below which availability is mechanically determined to be unreasonable. Nor, she continued, is there any requirement that a rate of acceptance be used when determining whether a particular employee has demonstrated reasonable availability. Importantly, there is also no jurisprudence that precludes the approach taken by the arbitrator in the case. Namely, the consideration of the contextual factors highlighted above.

The Court ultimately found only one case where the Corporation purported to define reasonable availability strictly through an acceptance rate benchmark. Nevertheless, in that case, the arbitrator concluded that the grievor’s personal circumstances cast substantial doubt on the Corporation’s calculation of reasonable availability. As a result, the grievor was reinstated.

In short, the arbitral jurisprudence points away from the mechanical approach endorsed by the Corporation, and underlines the need for a “case-by-case” review of availability.

(2) Was there any error in the arbitrator’s analysis that made his decision unreasonable? No. The parties agree that the standard of review of the arbitrator’s award is reasonableness. The Supreme Court of Canada defined the reasonableness standard in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9. In paragraph 47 of Dunsmuir, the Court states:

In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.

While the Court of Appeal found that the arbitrator did make an error in injecting into the analysis a prerequisite for prejudice to the employer, this error is not fatal to the reasonableness of the arbitrator’s decision. In the view of the Court, it was within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes to conclude that the Employee demonstrated reasonable availability in all the circumstances of the case. Moreover, the arbitrator’s reasons exhibited the qualities of justification, transparency, and intelligibility required by Dunsmuir. Importantly, the error pertaining to corporate prejudice did not drive the result.

[Feldman, Paciocco and Fairburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

T. Gleason and R. Glass, for the appellants K. Marciniak, for the respondents/responding parties M. Singh and E. Cheng (Sheung Chi), for the respondent/moving party

FACTS: The plaintiff was an employee of the respondent, Darwin Productions Inc. (“Darwin”). The respondent was the principal of Darwin. The plaintiff consulted a law firm, the intervenors/appellants, when he was not being paid extra salary he claimed was agreed upon. Both parties agreed that any extra salary was deferred to a future time when the company was financially able to pay it. However, the plaintiff felt that the agreement was not being honored, and that the respondents would continue to ignore it into the future.

In November 2009, the appellants wrote a letter to the respondents, claiming that the plaintiff had earned $127,377.30 in unpaid compensation and expenses, together with a 12% ownership interest in the company. Following this initial letter, the plaintiff and respondents had discussions about the terms on which the plaintiff would continue his employment with the company, but an agreement was not reached. Accordingly, the appellants sent a further letter in December 2009 with the same requests as the November 2009 letter.

While the plaintiff commenced a Small Claims Court action for some expenses in the fall of 2010, he did not commence the claim for the amounts referred to in the two letters until January 2012. The respondents were granted summary judgement by the motion judge, who dismissed the plaintiff’s claim as statute-barred. The motion judge rejected the plaintiff’s argument that he only discovered that the respondents were withholding his salary and ownership stake after receiving a letter from the respondents’ counsel in January 2010. The plaintiff then commenced an action for solicitor’s negligence for bringing a claim out of time that was dismissed as such. LawPro intervened and brought the appeal.

ISSUES: Was the plaintiff’s claim against the respondents statute-barred?

HOLDING: Appeal allowed.

REASONING: No. The question that must be answered to resolve this issue is when did the plaintiff’s cause of action against the respondents arise, and when did he discover it. Because this is a breach of contract claim, the more specific question is, did the respondents breach their contract with the plaintiff, and if so, when?

The appellants’ position is that the motion judge erred in law by failing to address the issue of anticipatory breach of contract. In this light, the respondents’ position in December 2009 could be characterized as notice that they intended to breach the agreement. Specifically, the position can be viewed as evidence that they intended to breach the obligation to pay the unpaid salary in the future when the company could afford to do so.

According to the principles in Ali v. O-Two Medical Technologies Inc., 2013 ONCA 733, the plaintiff could either accept that anticipatory breach and sue, or choose to wait until performance was due. The appellants therefore contend that the plaintiff chose to wait until January 2012 to sue, and that lawsuit, when brought, constituted acceptance of the repudiation. There was no basis on the evidence for the motion judge to make the finding that the extra salary became due and owing as it was earned. The Court emphasized the fact that both parties agreed that any extra salary was deferred to a future time when the company was financially able to pay it.

The Court agreed with the appellants that the motion judge erred in law by failing to address the issue of anticipatory breach. The Court found that, based on the evidence, this was a case of anticipatory breach, and therefore no cause of action accrued until the breach was accepted. Accordingly, the claim was in time.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

G. Cooper Equipment Rentals Limited v. 2208011 Ontario Limited (Trifield Construction)

[Tulloch, Roberts and Miller JJ.A.]

Counsel:

V.A. Ibe, for the appellant W. Abrams, for the respondent

Keywords:Breach of Contract, Construction Law, Breach of Trust, Civil Procedure, Simplified Procedure, Summary Judgment, Construction Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-30

Bang v. Sebastian

[MacPherson, Tulloch and Harvison Young]

Counsel:

H. Singh Makkar, for the appellant V. Tchor, for the respondents

Keywords:Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Consequential Damages, Mitigation, Evidence, Hearsay

Zambo v. 848875 Ontario Inc. (Gary’s No Frills)

[Lauwers, Fairburn and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

Counsel:

K. Arvai, for the appellant T.J. Donnelly, for the respondents

Keywords:Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jury Verdicts, Gutbir v. University Health Network, 2012 ONCA 66

CRIMINAL DECISIONS

R. v. Do

[Watt, Lauwers and Hourigan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Caterina, for the appellant J. Streeter, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Producing Marihuana, Possession of Marihuana for the Purposes of Trafficking, Right to Counsel, Search and Seizure, Evidence, Exclusion, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss.10(b) and 24(2), Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, ss.7(1) and 5(2), R. v. Reid, 2016 ONCA 524, R. v. Pino, 2016 ONCA 389, R. v. Plaha (2004), 188 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Goldhart (1996), 107 C.C.C (3d) 481 (SCC), R. v. Lenhardt, 2019 ONCA 416, R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, R. v. Rover, 2018 ONCA 745

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Hourigan and Paciocco JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S. Goldstein, for the appellant C. Weiler, for the respondent

Keywords:Criminal Law, Sexual Interference, Sexual Activity with a Minor, Defences, Mistake of Age, Procedural and Natural Justice, Adequacy of Reasons, R. v. Graat, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 819

R. v. Mohammad

[Feldman, van Rensburg and Huscroft JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R. Addelman, for the appellants R. A. Pinnock, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal law, Firearms Offences, Aiding and Abetting, Mens Rea, Criminal Code, s.21(1)

R. v. Lock

[Feldman, van Rensburg and Huscroft JJ.A.]

Counsel:

G.L., in person M. Fawcett, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Appeal Book Endorsement, Adjournment

R. v. Persaud

[Feldman, van Rensburg and Huscroft JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R.P., in person M. Dineen, duty counsel M. Fawcett, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Attempted Murder, Firearms Offences, Sentencing, Parole, Criminal Code, s.719(3), R. v. Wilson, 2008 ONCA 510, R. v. Pammett, [2016] O.J. No. 6700 (C.A.), R. v. Mannella, 2017 ONSC 2333

R. v. Simoni

[Watt, Lauwers and Hourigan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J.R. Barrs, for the appellant C. Tier, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Breaking and Entering, Defences, Duress, Carosella Application, Jury Instructions, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss.24(1) and 7, R. v. B. (M.), 2009 ONCA 524, R. v. La, [1997] 2 SCR 680, R. v. Bero, 151 C.C.C. (3d) 545 (Ont. C.A.)

R. v. Adjei

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Hourigan and Paciocco JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. Burgess, for the appellant C. Sharawy, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Forcible Confinement, Uttering Threats, Evidence, Identity, Inferences, Sufficiency of Reasons, Sentencing

R. v. N.C.

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Doherty and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

F. Mirza, for the appellant A. Derwa, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Human-Trafficking, Robbery, Assault Causing Bodily Harm, Procuring Prostitution, Financial Benefit from Prostitution, Possession of Proceeds of Crime, Sexual Assault Causing Bodily Harm, Assault, Transport to a Bawdy House, Trafficking a Person, Financial Benefit from Trafficking a Person, Withholding a Travel Document, Self-Defence, Criminal Code, ss. 343, 267(b), 286.3(1), 286.2(1), 355(a), 272(2), 266, 212(1)(a), 279.01(1), 279.02, 279.03, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 8, Search and Seizure, s.24(2), Evidence, Admissibility, Exclusion of Evidence, R. v. Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, Text Messages, Onus of Proof, Reverse Onus, R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, Appeals, New Issue on Appeal, Change in Law, R. v. Wigman, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 246, R. v. Reid, 2016 ONCA 524, R. v. Pelucco, 2015 BCCA 370, R. v. Brown, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 918, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, R. v. Mills, 2019 SCC 22

[Feldman, van Rensburg and Huscroft JJ.A.]

Counsel:

B. Vandebeek, for the appellant J. Cameron, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Interference, Invitation to Sexual Touching, Sexual Assault, Evidence, Disclosure, Oath Helping, Credibility, Child Witnesses, Corroboration

R. v. Fenton

[Doherty, Watt and Pardu JJ.A.]

Counsel:

C. Martell, for the appellant J.A. Neander, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Possession of a Firearm, Uttering Threats, Evidence, Admissibility, Text Messages, Credibility, Defences, Air of Reality, Jury Instructions

R. v. Vassell

[Doherty, Watt and Pardu JJ.A.]

Counsel:

B. Vandebeek, for the appellant, R.V. D.C. Santoro and C. Barbisan, for the appellant, A-K. B-J. X. Proestos, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Possession of Narcotics, Defences, Duress, Evidence, Burden of Proof, Credibility

R. v. DiBenedetto

[Doherty, Watt and Pardu JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R. Litkowski and J. Zita, for the appellant I. Bell and C. Matezis, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Production of Narcotics, Possession of Narcotics, Trafficking of Narcotics, Search and Seizure, Warrants, Telewarrants, Criminal Code, s. 487.1, R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33

R. v. G.F.

[Watt, Pardu and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

Counsel:

E. Taché-Green and R. Posner, for the appellants P.G. Cowle, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault of a Minor, Defences, Intoxication, Consent, Error of Law, Evidence, Credibility, Criminal Code, s. 273, s. 273.1, s. 265, R. v. Sinclair, 2011 SCC 40, R. v. Tariq, 2016 ONCJ 614, R. v. Daigle (1998), 127 C.C.C. (3d) 130 (Que. C.A.), R. v. Bell, 2007 ONCA 320, R. v. Wobbes, 2008 ONCA 567, R. v. L.G., 2007 ONCA 654, R. v. R.P., 2012 SCC 22, R v. Mian, 2014 SCC 54, R v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, R. v. J.A., 2011 SCC 28, R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19, R. v. Al-Rawi, 2018 NSCA 10, R v. C.P., 2017 ONCJ 277, R v. Merritt, [2004] O.J. No. 1295 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), R v. Powers, 1999 CanLII 7332 (Ont. C.A.), R v. Dixon, 2018 ONCA 949, R v. Crespo, 2016 ONCA 454, R v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33

[MacPherson, Miller and Paciocco JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Greenspan and B. Greenshields, for the appellant M. Rahman, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Extradition, Child Exploitation, Internet Child Abuse, Search and Seizure, Reasonable and Probable Grounds, Search Warrants, Arbitrary Detention, Evidence, Disclosure, Judicial Review, Criminal Code, s.489.1, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 6(1), 7, 8, 9, 10(b), 24(2), Treaty on Extradition Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America, 3 December 1971, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 3, Article 12, Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 30 (4th Supp.), Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18, ss. 44(1), 48, United States v. Viscomi, 2015 ONCA 484, R. v. Larosa (2002), 163 O.A.C. 108 (C.A.), United States of America v. Anekwu, 2009 SCC 41, R. v. Mathurin, 2015 ONCA 581, R. v. Kutynec (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 277 (C.A.), India v. Badesha, 2017 SCC 44, United States v. Burns, 2001 SCC 7, Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, United States v. Lane, 2017 ONCA 396, Canada (Minister of Justice) v. Everard (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 363 (C.A.), United States of America v. Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 469