In 1999, Dorothy Davis lived in a single-family home in Kankakee, Illinois. She was a widow, she was elderly, and she was African-American. A man approached her and offered to make some repairs to her home – and get a new home loan to pay for them. She ended up borrowing almost $90,000 from Mortgage Express and paying over $30,000 in settlement charges. She sued Mortgage Express. A jury found (apparently in Mortgage Express’ absence) in her favor. The court entered judgment for over $135,000 – a judgment she has since been unable to collect. Before Mortgage Express went out of business, it transferred her loan. The loan is now held by Wells Fargo Bank and serviced by Litton Loan Servicing. Wells Fargo and Litton have continued their attempts to collect on the loan. They proposed a modification, demanded payment, and pursued a foreclosure action. Davis, and now her estate, sued Wells Fargo and Litton. She asserted fraud and unconscionability claims under state law, race discrimination claims under both the Fair Housing Act and theEqual Credit Opportunity Act, and a claim for violating the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act. Judge Aspen (N.D. Ill.) dismissed all of the claims except the FHA claim, on which he granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Estate appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Evans, Sykes, and Hamilton affirmed. The Estate’s biggest problem lies in the statutes of limitations, which vary from one to five years. There are only three acts that occurred within even the longest of those periods that could support the Estate's claims: Litton's modification proposal, Wells Fargo's failure to tell Davis that it had acquired the mortgage, and Litton's payoff demand. The Court addressed each of the claims in that light. With respect to unconscionability, the allegations must relate to the formation of the contract. None of the allegations within the limitations periods do so -- the claim was properly dismissed. With respect to fraud, a plaintiff must show reliance. The only possible allegation within the limitations period relating to fraud is Wells Fargo's failure to advise Davis of the loan transfer. Assuming that could amount to a fraudulent omission, Davis never alleged that she relied on it -- the claim was properly dismissed. With respect to the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, that statute requires lenders to make certain disclosures in connection with a loan. None of the allegations within the limitations period trigger the disclosure requirements -- the claim was properly dismissed. With respect to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Court stated that that Act prohibits race discrimination against an "applicant," which is further defined as a person who receives an "extension of credit." The Court concluded that Litton's offer to modify the loan, which occurred within the limitations period, was an "extension of credit." Davis further alleged that the offer was racially discriminatory. The Court therefore concluded that the claim should have survived a motion to dismiss. The Court nevertheless affirmed the district court. It found that the defendants would have prevailed on summary judgment for the same reason they did on the FHA claim. Davis simply failed to put forth evidence of discrimination. Finally, the Court considered that FHA claim, the only claim that survived a motion to dismiss in the district court. Davis was given the opportunity, on summary judgment, to come forward with evidence that the defendants discriminated against her on the basis of race. Again, she was limited to conduct occurring within the limitations period. That "evidence" consisted of a) two unsigned and undated affidavits, which the court struck because they did not comply with the rules, b) the declarations of two former Wells Fargo employees, which the court struck because Davis never disclosed the declarants during discovery, and c) Davis' testimony that she believed she was the victim of race discrimination. Davis waived any complaint regarding the affidavits or declarations because she failed to raise any meaningful opposition to the district court’s reasoning on appeal. Her unsubstantiated personal beliefs are simply insufficient to support her claim.