The Second Circuit held that the meaning of “arbitration” under the Federal Arbitration Act is governed by federal common law, not state law, thus sharpening the split among the circuit courts of appeals on this issue. Bakoss v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 707 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-4371). The contract between the parties contained a dispute resolution clause, but the parties disagreed as to whether that clause was an arbitration agreement. One party contended that because the FAA does not supply a definition for “arbitration,” the courts should look to state law, rather than federal common law, to define that term. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have applied state law to determine whether a dispute resolution process amounts to “arbitration,” but the Second Circuit disagreed. Relying on congressional intent to create a uniform national arbitration policy, the Second Circuit held that federal common law is to be applied in determining whether a contractual clause is an “arbitration” agreement under the FAA.