On November 30, 2016, Judge Thomas W. Thrash dismissed a shareholder derivative action brought against Home Depot as a result of the breach of its security systems and theft of its customers’ personal financial data (“the Breach”) in 2014. In Re The Home Depot, Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, Civ. No. 1:15-CV-2999, 2016 WL 6995676 (N.D. Ga. 2016). In the derivative action, Plaintiffs asserted that Home Depot was harmed as a result of the company’s alleged delay in responding to significant security threats, and thus sought to recover under three primary claims against Home Depot’s current and former directors and officers (“Ds&Os”). These included the following alleged claims: (1) breach of the duty of loyalty by failing to institute internal controls sufficient to oversee the risks in the event of a breach, and for disbanding a Board of Directors committee that was responsible for overseeing those risks; (2) waste of corporate assets; and (3) violation of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act in connection with Home Depot’s 2014 and 2015 proxy filings. According to Judge Thrash, all of the claims against the Ds&Os “ultimately” related to what they “knew before the Breach and what they did about that knowledge.” Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which Judge Thrash ultimately granted applying Delaware law. It was undisputed that no demand was made on the Home Depot Board of Directors. Thus, Plaintiffs had the burden of demonstrating that the demand requirement was excused because it would have been futile.

Judge Thrash analyzed each of the three claims against the Ds&Os. As for the primary claim that the Directors allegedly breached their duty of loyalty and that they failed to provide oversight, Plaintiffs were required to show that the Directors either “knew they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations or that the Directors demonstrated a conscious disregard for their responsibilities[.]” When combined with the general demand futility standard, Plaintiffs essentially needed to show that a majority of the Board faced substantial liability because it consciously failed to act in the face of a known duty to act. Judge Thrash stated that this is “an incredibly high hurdle for the Plaintiffs to overcome[.]”

In finding that Plaintiffs’ failed to overcome this hurdle, Judge Thrash rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments about the significance of disbanding the Infrastructure Committee charged with oversight of the risks Home Depot faced in the event of a data breach. Plaintiffs alleged that the Board failed to amend the Audit Committee’s charter to reflect the new responsibilities for data security that had been transferred from the Infrastructure Committee, as required by the Company’s Corporate Governance Guidelines. As a result, Plaintiffs alleged that the Board failed to designate anyone with the responsibility to oversee data security, thereby leaving the company without a reporting system. Judge Thrash concluded that “[t]his argument is much too formal.” Regardless of whether the Audit Committee had “technical authority,” both the Committee and the Board believed it did. Given the factual allegations that the Audit Committee received regular reports from management on the state of Home Depot’s data security, and the fact that the Board in turn received briefings from both management and the Audit Committee, the court concluded that “there can be no question that the Board was fulfilling its duty of loyalty to ensure that a reasonable system of reporting existed.”

The court also rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the Board’s failure “to ensure that a plan was in place to ‘immediately’ remedy the deficiency in [Home Depot’s data security],” supported the breach of the duty of loyalty claim. Plaintiffs acknowledged in the complaint that the Board acted before the Breach occurred, that it had approved a plan that would have fixed many of Home Depot’s security weaknesses, and that it would be fully implemented by February 2015. Under Delaware law, the court held that directors violate their duty of loyalty only if “they knowingly and completely failed to undertake their responsibilities.” Judge Thrash concluded that “as long as the Outside Directors pursued any course of action that was reasonable, they would not have violated their duty of loyalty.”

In addition, Plaintiffs alleged that there was “a plan,” but that “it moved too slowly.” The court held that this was not the standard under which to evaluate demand futility on a duty of loyalty claim. The court noted that with the benefit of hindsight, “one can safely say that the implementation of the plan was probably too slow, and that the plan probably would not have fixed all of the problems Home Depot had with its security.” However, the court also found that “simply alleging that a board incorrectly exercised its business judgment and made a ‘wrong’ decision in response to red flags…is not enough to plead bad faith.”

Based on the foregoing analysis of the demand futility issue, the court had little difficulty discounting the claim of corporate waste. Plaintiffs alleged that the Board’s insufficient reaction to the threats posed by alleged deficiencies in compliance with contractual requirements for data security caused significant losses to the company, which constituted a waste of Home Depot’s assets. Here, the court concluded that the Plaintiffs’ claim was basically a challenge to the Director’s exercise of their business judgment, and although with hindsight, it “was easy to see that the Board’s decision to upgrade Home Depot’s security at a leisurely pace was an unfortunate one,” the decision nevertheless fell squarely within the discretion of the Board and was protected under business judgment rule.

Finally, Plaintiffs’ Section 14(a) claims, which were also subject to a demand requirement, alleged that Defendants omitted important information from their 2014 and 2015 Proxy Statements by not disclosing that Home Depot had known of specific threats to its data security, and that the Audit Committee’s charter was not amended to reflect that the responsibility for IT and data security had been transferred to it. The court rejected these arguments, noting that regardless of whether the charter was amended, “everyone believed and acted as if the Committee did have oversight over data security during the relative time period.” Further, the court found that Plaintiffs failed to specifically identify which statements in the Proxy Statements were false or misleading and also failed to plead with particularity how the omission caused the alleged loss. Thus, the court held that the claim did not demonstrate the necessary duty to disclose required under Section 14 (a). Moreover, “because [Plaintiffs] had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood that the Defendants would have been liable for a Section 14(a) violation,” the court found that demand was neither futile for the Section 14(a) claims, nor excused.

This decision is in step with two other recent decisions dismissing shareholder derivative actions against companies arising out of high-profile data breaches. See Palkon v. Holmes, et.al. 2014 WL 5341880 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2014) (court, applying Delaware law, dismissed a derivative action against Wyndham Hotels brought after that company suffered a large data breach, relying in part on the protections afforded the Ds&Os under the business judgment rule); Davis et al. v. Steinhafel et al., No. 14-cv-203, (D. Minn. July 7, 2016) (court dismissed derivative action against Target because a claim could not be stated in connection with a corporation’s special litigation committee’s decision not to pursue derivative claims against the company’s officers or directors, particularly where it demonstrated that the decision was based on a thorough and impartial investigation).

With the prevalence of security breaches taking place against various corporations, including large retailers, Home Depot is yet another reminder of the potential exposure presented by cyber-liability for the boardroom, including costly litigation even if the corporation prevails. Judge Thrash’s opinion provides guidance on how the business judgment rule can protect Ds&Os for their decision-making with respect to the demands of cybersecurity. Given the numerous references to the “benefits of hindsight,” however, corporate boards should be vigilant in assessing their cybersecurity plans. There may come a time when a court will not so readily apply the “business judgment rule” to a Board’s decision making process in addressing cybersecurity concerns.